Strategic Commitment and Competition Strategic Moves A strategic

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Strategic Commitment and Competition

Strategic Commitment and Competition

Strategic Moves A strategic move is designed to alter the beliefs and actions of

Strategic Moves A strategic move is designed to alter the beliefs and actions of others in a direction favorable to yourself. 2

Classification of strategic Moves • Strategic commitments – decisions that have long-term impacts and

Classification of strategic Moves • Strategic commitments – decisions that have long-term impacts and are difficult to reverse • Threats • Promises 3

Strategic Commitments In 1982 … Should Philips build a disk-pressing plant to supply CDs

Strategic Commitments In 1982 … Should Philips build a disk-pressing plant to supply CDs to the American market, or should it delay its decision a year or so, until the commercial appeal of the CD market became more certain? 4

A Simultaneous-Move Game Firm B L R T 1, 1 3, 2 D 2,

A Simultaneous-Move Game Firm B L R T 1, 1 3, 2 D 2, 4 4, 3 Firm A 5

A Sequential-Move Game B A L T R D L B R (1, 1)

A Sequential-Move Game B A L T R D L B R (1, 1) (3, 2) (2, 4) (4, 3) 6

Credible Commitments must be • observable and understandable • irreversible (i. e. credible) 7

Credible Commitments must be • observable and understandable • irreversible (i. e. credible) 7

Threats and Promises Threats and promises are response rules: your actual future action is

Threats and Promises Threats and promises are response rules: your actual future action is conditioned on what the other players do, but your freedom of future action is constrained to following the stated rule. 8

Example of a Threat Japan Open Close 4, 3 3, 4 2, 1 1,

Example of a Threat Japan Open Close 4, 3 3, 4 2, 1 1, 2 USA We will Close close our market if you close yours 9

About the Threat • How can the US make its threat credible? – a

About the Threat • How can the US make its threat credible? – a threat might be “too big” to be credible – a threat which creates a risk of the bad outcome is called brinkmanship • How can Japan counter the threat? 10

Example of a Promise Firm B High Firm A We will Low charge a

Example of a Promise Firm B High Firm A We will Low charge a high price if you do. High Low 60, 60 36, 70 70, 36 50, 50 11

Combining Threat & Promise USA Yes No 3, 3 2, 4 4, 1 1,

Combining Threat & Promise USA Yes No 3, 3 2, 4 4, 1 1, 2 Europe We will No intervene if, and only if, you do 12

Making Strategies Credible (I) Reducing your freedom of action – automatic fulfillment (doomsday device)

Making Strategies Credible (I) Reducing your freedom of action – automatic fulfillment (doomsday device) – delegation – cut off communication – burn bridges behind you 13

Making Strategies Credible (II) Changing your payoffs – – – establish and use a

Making Strategies Credible (II) Changing your payoffs – – – establish and use a reputation divide the game into small steps contracts teamwork irrationality brinkmanship 14

Countering the opponent’s Strategic Movies • • Irrationality Cutting off communication Leave escape routes

Countering the opponent’s Strategic Movies • • Irrationality Cutting off communication Leave escape routes open Undermining your opponent’s motive to uphold his reputation • Salami Tactics 15

Case of Thin-Slab Casting Background. . . • Continuous casting for producing sheet steel

Case of Thin-Slab Casting Background. . . • Continuous casting for producing sheet steel is not very efficient because of the need to reheat the slabs before rolling them into thin sheets. • Thin-slab casting could save costs 16

Nucor and USX In 1987, Nucor became the first U. S. adopter of thin-slab

Nucor and USX In 1987, Nucor became the first U. S. adopter of thin-slab casting. At that time, Nucor was looking for a way to enter the flat-rolled sheet segment of the steel business, which had been unavailable to the so called minimills such as Nucor. 17

Nucor and USX (cont. ) USX, the largest U. S. integrated steel producer and

Nucor and USX (cont. ) USX, the largest U. S. integrated steel producer and a company 60 times as large as Nucor, eventually decided not to adopt thin-slab casting. 18

Who adopts first? Decision-theoretic analysis predicts earlier adoption by an entrants – cannibalization or

Who adopts first? Decision-theoretic analysis predicts earlier adoption by an entrants – cannibalization or replacement effect – the innovation reduces capital costs more than operating costs 19

Incumbent Adopt First? Game-theoretic analysis predicts that an incumbent may adopt process innovations more

Incumbent Adopt First? Game-theoretic analysis predicts that an incumbent may adopt process innovations more quickly – the business-stealing effect may outweigh the cannibalization or replacement effect. 20

Adoption of Thin-slab Casting • The decision-theoretic analysis predicts “correctly” what actually happened in

Adoption of Thin-slab Casting • The decision-theoretic analysis predicts “correctly” what actually happened in thin-slab casting. • However, the decision-theoretic approach ignores interactive considerations. 21

Why USX “should” adopt first? • Nondrastic innovation • Capacity utilization were below 100%

Why USX “should” adopt first? • Nondrastic innovation • Capacity utilization were below 100% – price competition – process innovation like thin-slab casting would make the adopter “tough” • Returns from the new technology were fairly predictable 22

A Taxonomy of Strategic Commitments Stage 2 tactical variables are Strategic Complements (e. g.

A Taxonomy of Strategic Commitments Stage 2 tactical variables are Strategic Complements (e. g. , Price) Commitment makes the Firm. . . Tough Puppy-Dog Ploy Strategic Substitutes Top-Dog Strategy (e. g. , quantities) Soft Fat-Cat Effect Lean and Hungry Look 23

Why didn’t USX adopt? The decision, argues Ghemawat, stemmed from prior organizational and strategic

Why didn’t USX adopt? The decision, argues Ghemawat, stemmed from prior organizational and strategic commitments that constrained USX’s opportunity to profit from thin-slab casting. 24

Comment In forecasting the likely reactions of competitors to major strategic commitments, a firm

Comment In forecasting the likely reactions of competitors to major strategic commitments, a firm should recognize that prior commitments made by its competitors can constrain their potential responses. 25