Sociology 125 Lecture 25 MILITARISM DEMOCRACY April 25

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Sociology 125. Lecture 25 MILITARISM & DEMOCRACY April 25, 2017

Sociology 125. Lecture 25 MILITARISM & DEMOCRACY April 25, 2017

Final Exam 1. 75% on Part III of the course, Democracy; 25% on Parts

Final Exam 1. 75% on Part III of the course, Democracy; 25% on Parts I and II. 2. The questions on Part III will like the two midterms. 3. The questions on Parts I and II will only be about major ideas; no statistics.

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the United States: We use our military power to defend freedom, to defend democracy, to protect America, but not to dominate other countries. We are defenders not aggressors. 2. The reality: (a) We spend vastly more than any other country in the world on the military (b) We use military threats and intervention as a central instrument of foreign policy, including overthrowing democratically-elected governments (c) Our domestic affairs are severely affected by the global role of our military; we have a heavily militarized economy.

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the United States: We use our military power to defend freedom, to defend democracy, to protect America, but not to dominate other countries. We are defenders not aggressors. 2. The reality: (a) We spend vastly more than any other country in the world on the military (b) We use military threats and intervention as a central instrument of foreign policy, including overthrowing democratically-elected governments (c) Our domestic affairs are severely affected by the global role of our military; we have a heavily militarized economy.

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the United States: We use our military power to defend freedom, to defend democracy, to protect America, but not to dominate other countries. We are defenders not aggressors. 2. The reality: (a) We spend vastly more than any other country in the world on the military (b) We use military threats and intervention as a central instrument of foreign policy, including overthrowing democratically-elected governments (c) Our domestic affairs are severely affected by the global role of our military; we have a heavily militarized economy.

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the United States: We use our military power to defend freedom, to defend democracy, to protect America, but not to dominate other countries. We are defenders not aggressors. 2. The reality: (a) We spend vastly more than any other country in the world on the military (b) We use military threats and intervention as a central instrument of foreign policy, including overthrowing democratically-elected governments (c) Our domestic affairs are severely affected by the global role of our military; we have a heavily militarized economy.

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the United States: We use our military power to defend freedom, to defend democracy, to protect America, but not to dominate other countries. We are defenders not aggressors. 2. The reality: (a) We spend vastly more than any other country in the world on the military (b) We use military threats and intervention as a central instrument of foreign policy, including overthrowing democratically-elected governments (c) Our domestic affairs are severely affected by the global role of our military; we have a heavily militarized economy.

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the United States: We use our military power to defend freedom, to defend democracy, to protect America, but not to dominate other countries. We are defenders not aggressors. 2. The reality: (a) We spend vastly more than any other country in the world on the military (b) We use military threats and intervention as a central instrument of foreign policy, including overthrowing democratically-elected governments (c) Our domestic affairs are severely affected by the global role of our military; we have a heavily militarized economy.

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The conventional view by Americans about War & Peace and the United States: We use our military power to defend freedom, to defend democracy, to protect America, but not to dominate other countries. We are defenders not aggressors. 2. The reality: (a) We spend vastly more than any other country in the world on the military (b) We use military threats and intervention as a central instrument of foreign policy, including overthrowing democratically-elected governments (c) Our domestic affairs are severely affected by the global role of our military; we have a heavily militarized economy.

I. INTRODUCTION Military Budgets, 2008

I. INTRODUCTION Military Budgets, 2008

I. INTRODUCTION LIST OF U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS , 1945 -2010 yellow = direct

I. INTRODUCTION LIST OF U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS , 1945 -2010 yellow = direct involvement on American troops GREECE 1947– 49 U. S. directs extreme right in civil war. PHILIPPINES 1948– 54 CIA directs war against Huk Rebellion. KOREA 1951– 53 Korean War IRAN 1953 CIA overthrows democracy, installs shah. GUATEMALA 1954 CIA directs overthrow of democratic government LEBANON 1958 Marine occupation against rebels. VIETNAM 1960– 75 Vietnam War LAOS 1962 Military builds up defenses during guerrilla war. CUBA 1961 CIA-directed exile invasion fails. INDONESIA 1965 Million killed in CIA-assisted army coup. DOMINICAN REP. 1965– 66 Marines land during election campaign. GUATEMALA 1966– 67 Green Berets intervene against rebels. CAMBODIA 1969– 75 Secrete Bombing LAOS 1971– 73 U. S. directs South Vietnamese invasion. CHILE 1973 CIA-backed coup ousts elected Marxist president. ANGOLA 1976– 92 CIA assists South African–backed rebels.

EL SALVADOR 1981– 92 Advisors, overflights, aid anti-rebel war. AFGHANISTAN 1979– 89 CIA supports

EL SALVADOR 1981– 92 Advisors, overflights, aid anti-rebel war. AFGHANISTAN 1979– 89 CIA supports mujahideen fight against Afghan regime and Soviet army. NICARAGUA 1981– 90 CIA directs exile (Contra) invasions. LEBANON 1982– 84 Marines expel PLO and back Phalangists. GRENADA 1983– 84 Invasion occurs four years after revolution ousts regime. IRAN 1984 Two Iranian jets shot down over Persian Gulf. LIBYA 1986 Air strikes to topple nationalist government. IRAN 1987– 88 U. S. intervenes to protect Iraqi tankers in Iran war. PANAMA 1989 Nationalist government ousted by 27, 000 soldiers. KUWAIT 1991 First Gulf War SOMALIA 1992– 94 U. S. leads United Nations occupation during civil war. BOSNIA 1993– 4 No-fly zone in civil war; downed jets, bombed Serbs. HAITI 1994 Troops restore Aristide to office three years after coup. YUGOSLAVIA 1999 Heavy NATO air strikes after Serbia declines to with draw from Kosovo. AFGHANISTAN 2001–? Afghanistan War COLOMBIA 2003– 10 U. S. special forces sent to rebel zones. IRAQ 2003–? Iraq War HAITI 2004– 2005 Marines land after rebels oust elected President Aristide.

Military Spending as a Proportion of Federal spending, 2009

Military Spending as a Proportion of Federal spending, 2009

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation towards international affairs in which: 1. The threat and use of military power is a central strategy of international policy. 2. The military plays a pervasive role in the internal economic and political life of a country. 3. Military preparedness is the highest priority of government policy. Militarism is an “institution”, not a “policy”

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation towards international affairs in which: 1. The threat and use of military power is a central strategy of international policy. 2. The military plays a pervasive role in the internal economic and political life of a country. 3. Military preparedness is the highest priority of government policy. Militarism is an “institution”, not a “policy”

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation towards international affairs in which: 1. The threat and use of military power is a central strategy of international policy. 2. The military plays a pervasive role in the internal economic and political life of a country. 3. Military preparedness is the highest priority of government policy. Militarism is an “institution”, not a “policy”

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation towards international affairs in which: 1. The threat and use of military power is a central strategy of international policy. 2. The military plays a pervasive role in the internal economic and political life of a country. 3. Military preparedness is the highest priority of government policy. Militarism is an “institution”, not a “policy”

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation

I. INTRODUCTION 3. What is Militarism? Definition: Militarism is a political and ideological orientation towards international affairs in which: 1. The threat and use of military power is a central strategy of international policy. 2. The military plays a pervasive role in the internal economic and political life of a country. 3. Military preparedness is the highest priority of government policy. Militarism is an “institution”, not a “policy”

II. The Historical Trajectory of American Militarism

II. The Historical Trajectory of American Militarism

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 1. Founding Fathers and the early Republic At the

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 1. Founding Fathers and the early Republic At the founding of the United States there was great skepticism about the Military and the use of military power for national objectives. There was widespread objection to the idea of a standing army. George Washington: “Overgrown military establishments are under any form of government inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile to Republican liberty. ” Farewell Address 1796

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 1. Founding Fathers and the early Republic At the

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 1. Founding Fathers and the early Republic At the founding of the United States there was great skepticism about the Military and the use of military power for national objectives. There was widespread objection to the idea of a standing army. George Washington: “Overgrown military establishments are under any form of government inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile to Republican liberty. ” Farewell Address 1796

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory James Madison: “Of all enemies to public liberty, war

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory James Madison: “Of all enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, debt and taxes are the known instrument for bringing the many under the domination of the few. ” Nearly 200 years later, Eisenhower affirmed the same worry: “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience…In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence…of the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. ”

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory James Madison: “Of all enemies to public liberty, war

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory James Madison: “Of all enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, debt and taxes are the known instrument for bringing the many under the domination of the few. ” Nearly 200 years later, Eisenhower affirmed the same worry: “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience…In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence…of the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. ”

http: //www. youtube. com/watch? v=CWi. IYW_f. Bf. Y&feature= player_detailpage#t=403 s [@7: 30 -9: 00]

http: //www. youtube. com/watch? v=CWi. IYW_f. Bf. Y&feature= player_detailpage#t=403 s [@7: 30 -9: 00]

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 2. 19 th century ambivalence The worry about standing

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 2. 19 th century ambivalence The worry about standing armies confronted another core American idea: the importance of military power for the conquest of lands in North America itself. This became crystallized as Manifest Destiny. 3. The Spanish-American War This launched U. S. militarism on a global scale 4. Building a modern Military Bureaucracy In the period leading up to WWI there occurred the first efforts to seriously bureaucratize and modernize the military

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 2. 19 th century ambivalence The worry about standing

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 2. 19 th century ambivalence The worry about standing armies confronted another core American idea: the importance of military power for the conquest of lands in North America itself. This became crystallized as Manifest Destiny. 3. The Spanish-American War This launched U. S. militarism on a global scale 4. Building a modern Military Bureaucracy In the period leading up to WWI there occurred the first efforts to seriously bureaucratize and modernize the military

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 2. 19 th century ambivalence The worry about standing

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 2. 19 th century ambivalence The worry about standing armies confronted another core American idea: the importance of military power for the conquest of lands in North America itself. This became crystallized as Manifest Destiny. 3. The Spanish-American War This launched U. S. militarism on a global scale 4. Building a modern Military Bureaucracy In the period leading up to WWI there occurred the first efforts to seriously bureaucratize and modernize the military

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 5. World War I • The decisive turning point

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 5. World War I • The decisive turning point for the formation of a substantial, modernized military • Ideological Crusades: WWI was fought under slogans “making the world safe for democracy” and “the war to end all wars”. • After WWI there was substantial demilitarization: we did not become a militarized economy 6. WWII & The Cold War • • • WWII was greatest military mobilization in American history After the War there was some expectation of demilitarization The Cold War ended that possibility: the result is more than half a century of military budgets over $300 billion dollars and often over $400 billion.

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 5. World War I • The decisive turning point

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 5. World War I • The decisive turning point for the formation of a substantial, modernized military • Ideological Crusades: WWI was fought under slogans “making the world safe for democracy” and “the war to end all wars”. • After WWI there was substantial demilitarization: we did not become a militarized economy 6. WWII & The Cold War • WWII was greatest military mobilization in American history • After the War there was some expectation of demilitarization • The Cold War ended that possibility: the result is more than half a century of military budgets over $300 billion dollars and often over $400 billion.

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 600 Billions of 2009 dollars 500 400 300 200

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 600 Billions of 2009 dollars 500 400 300 200 100 0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Department of Defense Budget, 1950 -2008 2000 2005

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 7. Effects of 70 years of interventions & military

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 7. Effects of 70 years of interventions & military spending • Defense contracts are the single most important way that the government intervenes in the economy. • Ultimately, this depends on war: in the absence of war it is almost impossible to maintain over a long period of time huge military spending • Massive Military spending almost inevitably breeds corruption. 8. The 21 st Century? • After the Cold War there was much talk in the 1990 s of the “Peace Dividend” • 9/11 and the “War on Terrorism” ended such discussion • The 2000 s lead to a significant intensification of previous militarism.

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 7. Effects of 65 years of interventions & military

I. Historical II. Historical. Trajectory 7. Effects of 65 years of interventions & military spending • Defense contracts are the single most important way that the government intervenes in the economy. • Ultimately, this depends on war: in the absence of war it is almost impossible to maintain over a long period of time huge military spending • Massive Military spending almost inevitably breeds corruption. 8. The 21 st Century? • After the Cold War there was much talk in the 1990 s of the “Peace Dividend” • 9/11 and the “War on Terrorism” ended such discussion • The 2000 s lead to a significant intensification of previous militarism.

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding motive that explains militarism. Motivation #1. Narrow Economic Interests Motivation # 2. Maintenance of global economic dominance of American based multinational corporations Motivation # 3. National security Motivation # 4. Distinctive interests of the military-industrial complex itself. Motivation # 5. Ideological Crusades

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding motive that explains militarism. Motivation #1. Narrow Economic Interests Motivation # 2. Maintenance of global economic dominance of American based multinational corporations Motivation # 3. National security Motivation # 4. Distinctive interests of the military-industrial complex itself. Motivation # 5. Ideological Crusades

III. Motivations New U. S. military base clusters 1. Gulf War, 1991 2. Yugoslav

III. Motivations New U. S. military base clusters 1. Gulf War, 1991 2. Yugoslav wars, 1990 s 3. Afghan War, 2001 4. Iraq War, 2003 Bases built to wage wars, or wars waged to build bases? U. S. sphere of influence growing between economic competitors in EU & Asia Prepared by Zoltan Grossman Z article available

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding motive that explains militarism. Motivation #1. Narrow Economic Interests Motivation # 2. Maintenance of global economic dominance of American based multinational corporations Motivation # 3. National security Motivation # 4. Distinctive interests of the military-industrial complex itself. Motivation # 5. Ideological Crusades

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding motive that explains militarism. Motivation #1. Narrow Economic Interests Motivation # 2. Maintenance of global economic dominance of American based multinational corporations Motivation # 3. National security Motivation # 4. Distinctive interests of the military-industrial complex itself. Motivation # 5. Ideological Crusades

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding motive that explains militarism. Motivation #1. Narrow Economic Interests Motivation # 2. Maintenance of global economic dominance of American based multinational corporations Motivation # 3. National security Motivation # 4. Distinctive interests of the military-industrial complex itself. Motivation # 5. Ideological Crusades

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding

III. Motivations for Militarism today: the problem of “Empire” There is no single overriding motive that explains militarism. Motivation #1. Narrow Economic Interests Motivation # 2. Maintenance of global economic dominance of American based multinational corporations Motivation # 3. National security Motivation # 4. Distinctive interests of the military-industrial complex itself. Motivation # 5. Ideological Crusades

III. Motivations Bush Administration National Security Document: “[there is] a single sustainable model for

III. Motivations Bush Administration National Security Document: “[there is] a single sustainable model for national success…. that is right and true for every person in every society…The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere”

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3. Degradation of Information 4. Bankruptcy

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3. Degradation of Information 4. Bankruptcy

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3. Degradation of Information 4. Bankruptcy

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3. Degradation of Information 4. Bankruptcy

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARISM 1. Perpetual War 2. Reduction of democracy at home 3. Degradation of Information 4. National Bankruptcy