Social Worker as Knowledge Worker Some Puzzling Remarks

Social Worker as Knowledge Worker.

Some Puzzling Remarks: u Peter Godfrey-Smith, an associate professor of philosophy and of history and philosophy of science at Stanford University, wrote in his Theory and Reality (2003) that logical positivism/ empiricism are ‘fossils’ in the philosophy of science

u Note also what George Steinmetz said in introducing The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and its epistemological others (2005, 23. ):

u “The sheer fact that positivism was already declared anachronistic in the 1900 s and 1930 s and again in the 1960 s and 1970 s cautions us against any finalist illusions in this realm. Many of the contributors to this volume track positivism’s uncanny persistence in the human sciences up to the present moment…One of the

u guiding threads in this volume concerns the surprising longevity of positivism- especially in latent, unexamined, or unconscious formsin the human sciences. Despite repeated attempts by social theorists and researchers to drive a stake through the heart of the vampire, the disciplines continue to experience a positivistic haunting. ”

Why do we still need to know what the positivist said? u First, I will suggest that because these ‘fossils’ might be ‘dead’ only in the domain of philosophy and social theory; in fact, as testified by Steinmetz, they are some of the most deep-seated ‘living forces’ in many human and social sciences;

u Secondly, not only are these some of the major ‘forces’ behind the reforms in the social welfare field and public sector in recent years, in social work there are calls for reform of social work practice in the spirit of these ‘fossils’ (for instance, the evidencebased practice movement);

u Thirdly, alternative approaches are developed against positivism. One could not appreciate these alternatives (hermeneutics, critical theory, social constructionism etc…) without a proper understanding of their target of criticisms.

Meta-theoretical Assumptions of Positivism Regarding the Nature of Knowledge 1. Naive Realism: object/world exists independent of knower.

u u u Objectivity of Sense Perception: object/world exists independent of knower, but how does one know? A, access through sense perception; B, base on assumption 1, our sense perception reaches consensus/ agreement

u Correspondence Theory of Truth ( [相應真理觀]): Statements are true when what they refer correspond with the external world.

u [The above formulation is based on Prof. Yuen Sun Pong’s revised verson of Mary Hesse’ formulation see 阮新邦， (2004) “邁向詮釋取向的社會 作實踐(上 )：實證主義的迷思與強烈價值介入論” 載 於 詮釋取向的社會 作實踐，新加坡：八方。 & Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980), Introduction. ]

u Some remarks: Positivism presupposes a disengaged knower who gets access to the external world through his sense perception; In reception, sense perception is understood as given, thus, the role of the knower should be passive. The role of interpretation is down played; Therefore, involvement brings distortion; clear vision comes from disengagement.

Crisis of Care and the Nature of Caregiving as Practice u. A Crisis of Care?

u “A dominant strategy in all the helping professions has been to objectify and standardize as much of the professional activity as possible in the quest of quality control. But this strategy obscures the requisite judgment and particularized relationships required in the helping professions. ” (Susan Phillips & Patricia Benner, ‘preface’ in The Crisis of Care)

Two readings: u 1, the dominant strategy prizes objective, scientific knowledge, and thus tend to objectify and standardize as much of the professional activity as possible in the quest of quality control vs. u 2, this strategy obscures the requisite judgment and particularized relationships required in the helping professions.

What is caring? u A, Care as sentiment/ caregiving as practice: u B, Caring as objectifiable vs. caring as situated, relational, reciprocal social practice that requires social space, presence & listening on the part of caregiver, i. e. , not completely objectifiable.

What is practice? u. A practice differs from discrete behaviours, strategies, or techniques in that it is constituted by its normative dimension. Practice is not just a collection of discrete behaviours; a practice is defined by the standards of excellence and ideals that are internal to it.