Shadow Banking New Regulatory Issue 1 http www

Shadow Banking: New Regulatory Issue 1

http: //www. financialstabilityboard. org/list/fsb_publication s/tid_150/index. htm http: //www. bis. org/bcbs/ http: //ec. europa. eu/internal_market/bank/docs/shadow/g reen-paper_en. pdf http: //www. sec. gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa. pdf 2

Introduction ® The “shadow banking system”, can broadly be described as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system”. ® Intermediating credit through non-bank channels can have advantages. ® However, the shadow banking system can also become a source of systemic risk. ® It can also create opportunities for arbitrage that might undermine stricter bank regulation 3

1. A definition of “shadow banking system” ® Firstly, authorities should cast the net wide, looking at all non-bank credit intermediation to ensure that data gathering and surveillance cover all the activities within which shadow bankingrelated risks might arise. ® Authorities should then narrow the focus, concentrating on the subset of non-bank credit intermediation where maturity/liquidity transformation and/or flawed credit risk transfer and/or leverage create important risks. 4

1. 1 Casting the net wide: Non-bank credit intermediation ® First, it is essential to cast the net wide by considering “the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system”. ---The broad definition is nevertheless limited in scope to “credit intermediation”. ---This wide net surveillance would focus in particular on “entities and activities outside the regular banking system”. 5

1. 2 Narrowing the focus: risks created by maturity/liquidity transformation, flawed credit risk transfer and leverage ® authorities would concentrate on activities which give rise to either or both of the following concerns: --- systemic risk concerns --- regulatory arbitrage concerns 6

® “Maturity transformation” is the activity of issuing short term liabilities (such as deposits) and transforming them into medium–long term assets (such as loans). ® “Liquidity transformation” is the issuing of liquid liabilities to finance illiquid assets. An asset is illiquid when it cannot be easily converted into cash without a loss in nominal value. 7

1. 2. 1 The shadow banking system as a systemic risk concern ---Maturity/liquidity transformation within the shadow banking system, especially if combined with high leverage, raises systemic concerns for authorities because of the risk that short-term deposit-like funding in the shadow banking system can create “modern bank-runs” if undertaken on a sufficiently large scale. 8

----The leverage built up within the shadow banking system can also amplify procyclicality. ---In addition to the systemic risks deriving from within the shadow banking system, the shadow banking system’s interconnectedness with the regular banking system can raise systemic concerns. 9

1. 2. 2 The shadow banking system as a regulatory arbitrage concern ® ---If parts of the shadow banking system are able to operate without internalising the true cost of its risks and thus gain a funding advantage relative to banks where regulation aims to achieve such an internalisation, this is likely to create opportunities for arbitrage that might undermine bank regulation and lead to a build -up of additional leverage and risks in the system. 10

----Moreover, banks themselves may use shadow banking entities to increase leverage and find ways to circumvent their regulatory capital or liquidity requirements. 11

2. Potential approaches for monitoring the shadow banking system 12

2. 1 Current monitoring practices for the shadow banking system ® on the basis of currently available information, authorities have been monitoring or “mapping” the shadow banking system in their jurisdictions through a combination of quantitative and qualitative information from both a i) macro (system-wide) and ii) micro (entity/activitybased) perspective. 13

---- The Macro-perspective in monitoring the shadow banking system: ® Quantitative information derived from Flow of Funds/Sectoral Balance Sheet data is often used as a proxy that would provide a macro-financial perspective. ® The aim is to try to estimate the size and growth rate of the financial assets in the shadow banking system, usually in a broad sense, both in absolute terms and in relation to the total debt, GDP, and size of the regular banking system. 14

® A macro-perspective can give a very broad picture of how the shadow banking system is evolving over time and alert the authorities to changes in the system that may not immediately be picked up from a micro-perspective. ® If there is sufficient detail in the sectoral breakdown, it can also be useful in helping to assess the funding vulnerabilities of broad shadow banking sectors and non-financial sectors. 15

---- The Micro-perspective in monitoring the shadow banking system: ® Both quantitative and qualitative information are used in monitoring from a microperspective. ® Under the quantitative approach, survey data, published releases or market data available from commercial vendors on stocks and flows for related products are typically used to identify the scale of certain types of entities or instruments. 16

® In addition, counterparty credit exposure data of the regular banking sector or other regulated sectors (eg insurance companies) are also utilised to provide a “window” into the shadow banking system and can help to identify potential spill-over risks from the shadow banking system to the regular banking sector. 17

® Data on intra-group activities may also be useful. These indirect data can be useful especially in jurisdictions where the regular banking system constitutes most of the overall credit intermediation. ® Since Flow of Funds data are secondary statistics and, in some cases, become available only after a significant time lag, these quantitative micro-data can offer a more timely perspective for monitoring developments and risks in particular areas of the shadow banking system. 18

2. Categorising the possible regulatory measures for the shadow banking system ® Broadly, any proposed regulatory response on shadow banking is likely to fit within the four categories outlined below: 19

(i) Banks’ interactions with shadow banking entities (indirect regulation): By regulating banks’ interactions with shadow banking entities, the spill-over of risks into the regular banking system will be reduced. Actions can also be taken to close opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by which banks seek to reduce capital or liquidity requirements by organising transactions wholly or in part through shadow banking entities. 20

(ii) Shadow banking entities (direct regulation): Shadow banking entities can themselves be regulated to reduce the risks they pose to the system. 21

(iii) Shadow banking activities: Instead of regulating shadow banking entities, authorities may intervene to address risks affecting particular instruments, markets or activities so as to facilitate sound credit intermediation through the shadow banking system. 22

(iv) Macro-prudential measures: Rather than focusing on certain entities or activities, policy measures can address systemic risk in the shadow banking system more broadly (eg regulatory measures for mitigating procyclicality or policies to strengthen market infrastructure to lower contagion risks). 23