Session 6 The Great Blackouts 1 Governor of

Session 6. The Great Blackouts 1

Governor of NJ following 1967 PJM Blackout “I don’t care what you do or how you do it, but don’t ever let this happen again. ” 2

NOVEMBER 9, 1965 NORTHEAST U. S. & ONTARIO The Mother of all Blackouts – aka the “good” blackout • Involved all/parts of Ont. , NY & NE – 30 million people • Caused by incorrectly set overcurrent relays in Ontario • Classic case of transient instability • Complete system separation occurred in about 7 sec. • Load restoration took up to 13 hrs. • Lessons: Need for good planning & operating criteria Need for cooperation & coordination Led to formation of NPCC, NYPP, NEPOOL Devices to facilitate system restoration Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding 3

June 5, 1967 PJM Interconnection Involved most of Middle Atlantic states (except New York) – 13 million people Sequence • Scheduled switching of 230 k. V line not performed • Line overloaded, sagged, tripped • Caused overloads on other circuits to overload and trip • System stabilized @ 53 hertz • Generation tripped on loss of field • Entire region shut down 4

Con Ed VP to George Loehr June 6, 1967 “Leave it to PJM to be lucky enough to have their blackout the same day war breaks out in the Middle East. ” 5

July 13 -14, 1977 Con Ed • New York City, some northern suburbs • Thunderstorms tripped most of Con Ed ties to the north • Con Ed SO didn’t realize state of system – then waited too long to attempt manual load shedding (and when he finally did, it didn’t work) • Load restoration took up to 24 hrs. • Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding worked, but didn’t save the system • Lessons: – Contingencies beyond criteria can occur – Adequate control room displays essential – Pool (or ISO/RTO) must have military authority 6

June 2 -3, 1996 & August 10, 1996 Western Interconnection Involved most of Western United States July 2: a 345 k. V line exiting Jim Bridger coal-fired power plan in southwestern WY tripped, triggering a second line to trip and a special protection system to operate – ultimately the WSCC system became unstable and broke up. July 3: same sequence began, but was arrested by timely manual load shedding by system operator in Idaho. 7

July/August 1996 (cont. ) August 10: a series of 500 k. V line outages occurred in the vicinity of the Pacific NW-SW Tie – no attempt was made to adjust flow or even modify the transmission transfer capability on the Pacific NW-SW Tie – led to instability and breakup of the WSCC system. Also, many of the generators on-line were set for zero VARs (unity power factor). 8

August 14, 2003 “O Tempora! O Mores!” Cicero 9

August 14, 2003 Real Causes Partition of the system, diffusion of responsibility • Small control areas, patchwork quilt • Dispersed, fragmented control • Lack of “military” authority – bad protocols • Poor training, inadequate tools Culture Shift • Fundamentalist reliance on “markets” • Cavalier attitude toward reliability in general, strong criteria in particular • “Cognitive Dissonance” 10

Footprints of Reliability Coordinators in Midwest 11

Patchwork Quilt Types of Super-Entities: • Regional Reliability Councils • ISOs / RTOs • Market Areas • Control Areas Defense de Overlap ! 12

“Cognitive Dissonance” (social scientists) • Britannia: “the mental conflict that occurs when beliefs or assumptions are contradicted by new information. ” • Cf: “Disconnected Policymakers, ” Gerald A. Norlander (of PULP), The Electricity Journal, Aug. /Sept. 2001 • Beam me up, Scotty – there’s no intelligent life down here 13

COMMON ELEMENTS • • • All due to transmission problems Abundant generating capacity – lots of reserves Human error often a contributing factor Also, lack of cooperation & coordination Inadequate predictive studies Lessons: Need for good coordination among CAs Need for thorough off-line studies Need for on-line, real-time TTC calc. capability Need to see key flows on other systems Need to know effects of key outages on TTCs Timely information sharing State-of-the-art control room displays & applications 14

Myths of Shakespeare’s Macbeth The witches and the apparition foretell: • Macbeth will not be killed “by man born of woman” • Macbeth will not be defeated “till Birnam Wood to Dunsinane shall come” The more things change, the more they stay the same 15

Myths About the Grid 1. “Third World Grid” (Gov. Richardson) 2. It’s not about “deregulation” 3. More transmission = greater reliability 4. Need standards (criteria) that are national/mandatory/uniform 5. Replace today’s “dumb” grid with a “smart” grid (like the internet) 6. Markets will take care of everything 16

1. “Third World Grid” • If it were a “Third World Grid, ” the 2003 blackout would never have happened. • There wouldn’t have been a 580, 000 MW grid in the first place. • “This was a First World Blackout” (Slate magazine). • Raises the question: are present grids too large? 17

2. Not About Deregulation • Deregulation/restructuring = more players, separation of generation from transmission. • Led to greater institutional complexity. • More (and more complicated) rules & regulations, additional operating difficulties. • “Cognitive Dissonance. ” • Culture shift – coord. /cooperation to competition. • Physics forced into econometric models. • Deregulation … isn’t !! 18

3. More Transmission = Greater Reliability It’s important to make distinctions! • More transmission = greater transfer capability, thus greater commercial capacity. • Tougher, more stringent reliability criteria (or standards) = greater reliability. To increase TTC, build transmission. To increase reliability, use stronger criteria. 19

More Transmission Might Make the System Less Reliable • Adding transmission reduces the transfer impedances of the grid. • i. e. , the system is geoelectrically smaller. • New York is closer to Atlanta, Chicago etc. • Thus any given disturbance will adversely affect a larger area. • ’ 03 blackout covered a much larger area than ’ 65 blackout. The next one …? 20

Loehr’s Axiom Reliability is a function of the standards or criteria used, not the amount of wire in the air. 21

4. National/Mandatory/Uniform Stds. • Need national standards – but as a floor. • Already mandatory some places (NPCC, MAAC, SERC, parts of WECC). • Uniform standards: NY vs. Albuquerque. • Must have more stringent standards in certain areas. • These must not be subject to NERC. • And then there’s the problem of your neighbor…. • Note: NERC standards now being made less stringent. 22

Less Stringent Standards? ! NERC Requirement Old New Reserves on Reserves refreshed 10 min. 30 min. 15 min. 105 min. Transmission transfer limits (FAC 008 thru 013) (aka Std. 600) single cont. , multiple element single element only (ballot soon) Floor or Ceiling NERC = minimum NERC = absolute (DOE Blackout Report and FERC statement support “floor”) 23

Uniform Standards? Lower TTCs if criteria include multi-element contingencies e. g. , L/O both lines on a double circuit tower, stuck breaker faults, L/O both poles of an HVDC line But, all the user needs to know it the TTC 24

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5. “Smart” Grid Myth: Today’s “dumb” electric grid must be transformed into a smart, self-healing, digital, internet-like grid. Reality: Blackouts as often as my server goes down? ! Needs to be seriously looked at … but … Be vewy careful (Elmer Fudd) – over-complication can lead to lower reliability 26

6. Properly Structured Markets Will Take Care of Everything When the Laws of Physics and the Laws of Economics Collide … Physics Always Wins! Kirchhoff’s Laws No economic theory, no legislation, no gov’t. regulation can change the Laws of Physics 27

Other Myths 7. The grid is a patchwork of lines built by individual utilities without coordination 8. Not built for long distance transfers 9. It’s all because of the growth in electrical demand (a. k. a. “load growth”) 10. Two words: Vegetation management 10 b. “We did _____ to fix it. ” 11. “We stopped the spread of the blackout!” 28

7. Patchwork … No Coordination • • • Power Pools – PJM, NYPP, NEPOOL Regional Reliability Councils MEN, VEM, VAST, etc. Culture of Cooperation & Coordination Example: HQ-NE Phase 2 – Major changes to plan – Major changes to operating procedures – “Golden Rule” 29

8. Heavy/Long Distance Transfers • Going on for decades: – Niagara / St. Lawrence – PJM / Minemouth – Southern / TVA – Pacific Northwest to California – Four Corners, Intermountain, etc. – Quebec to New York, New England – MEN / VEM – VAST 30

9. Load Growth • Electrical demand has grown steadily since Thomas Edison began operating Pearl St. Station in 1882. • Through wars, recessions, etc. • One exception – the Great Depression. • 1960 s: 7 to 7 ½ % • Now: about 1 ½ % 31

10. “I Talk to the Trees. …” Is it really all about “vegetation management”? • 1971 upstate NY (near miss) • 1996 West Coast • 2003 Midwest/Northeast • 2003 Italy • etc. , etc. “… till Birnam wood to Dunsinane shall come” rogue Ents from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings 32

10 b. “We Did _____ to Fix It” • • Vegetation Management Energy Bill NERC “Version 0” standards Reliability First Corp. (proposed merger of several regional reliability councils: MAAC, ECAR, MAIN, perhaps MRO/MAPP) Nothing but spin! 33

11. “We Stopped the Spread of the Blackout!” (a. k. a. PJM) • • System doesn’t work that way. ’ 50 s Sci Fi flick, The Blob. Instability occurs in seconds. Function of system configuration, pre-conditions, nature of contingency, Kirchhoff’s Laws. • Kirchhoff’s Laws cannot be repealed! • Will you be part of it or not? Luck!!! • (How are you, Phil Harris? ) 34

• “I canna change the Laws of Physics, Captain Kirk. ” Lt. Commander Montgomery Scott (a. k. a. recently deceased actor James Doohan) 35

“Till Birnam Wood to Dunsinane Shall Come” • Macduff’s army cuts trees from Birnum Wood to use as camouflage. • Macduff is a Caesarean birth (not “born” of woman). • In the end, Lady Macbeth goes mad, and Macbeth is killed by Macduff. • Sometimes things do work out ! 36

Joe Farace – columnist “I haven’t lost my mind, it’s backed up on a disk somewhere. ” 37

Deep Thoughts • So what should we do when we see some of these things? • Speak up!!! • “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing. ” Edmund Burke (18 th Century Irish author, orator, philosopher and politician) 38

New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC) • Mission: to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly so where no VAR has gone before. • Oops – wrong mission! 39

New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC) • Mission: promote and preserve reliability in NYS by developing, maintaining and updating reliability rules/standards/criteria. • These must be consistent with all NPCC and NERC reliability standards. • They must be complied with by the NYISO and all entities engaging in electric power transactions in New York State. • Visit our web site at www. nysrc. org 40

American Education Institute Courses for the Electric Power Industry Principles include: Jack Casazza, Frank Delea, George Loehr “Good questions, reliable answers” www. ameredinst. org 41

Summary When the Laws of Physics and the Laws of Economics Collide … Physics Wins! “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing. ” Edmund Burke George C. Loehr gloehr@e. Lucem. com American Education Institute (AEI) www. ameredinst. org 42