SECURITY ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SCO as

SECURITY ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SCO as seen from NATO Presentation by Alyson JK Bailes, University of Iceland On behalf also of Jóhanna M. Þordisardóttir

A WORLD OF INSTITUTIONS • Role of regional insts recognized by UN • Horizontal and vertical divisons of labour, complementarity • Active partnerships: info and cooperation in normal times cooperation in crisis actions/operations

FOR INSTANCE NATO. . . • 19/11/10 Strategic Concept: “The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe…. We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations” • Most obvious examples: UN EU OSCE Russia Operating partners

THE SCO AS CINDERELLA? Limited international standing and inter-institutional contact: CSTO ASEAN/ARF United Nations OSCE NATO and EU: only secretariat contacts so far

GENERAL HYPOTHESIS • An institution may not need/seek contact (not applicable to SCO. . . ) • OR others may not wish contact with it: - because it is not a friend - because it is not a suitable match Applying this approach to SCO as seen from NATO……

THE ADVERSARIAL HYPOTHESIS • SCO aims to counter / balance NATO • - and to keep NATO out of Central Asia • Part of Moscow’s neo-imperial system of control, enlisting also China • Excludes + disadvantages Japan • No values or anti-Western values • Cosy with Western bugbears (Iran)

A POPULAR THESIS, BUT… • • Also self-regarding motives (Russia + China) Ineffective in blocking/balancing No unity on sensitive issues, or at global level Russia making more use of other frameworks for vital interests in FSU • Moscow and Beijing have separate, and ultimately more important, relationships with West

THE ‘MISMATCH’ THEORY • SCO not a collective defence alliance • Created to deal with lack of trust rather than true Russian-Chinese unity (OSCE -style elements) (CSTO a better match for NATO here? ? ) • Different governance, no strong S-G • Not globally active • Many more competences than NATO

INTERIM CONCLUSION: • Many in West hold adversarial hypothesis, but ‘mismatch’ seems more compelling • Russia itself has favoured adversarial view, seeing SCO recognition as ‘victory’ over West • China more relaxed + less adversarial, towards West and also NATO as such • But now (Lisbon Summit), ‘re-set’ and greater relaxation between NATO and Russia too…

POST-LISBON PERSPECTIVES • Better NATO/Russia relations and re-boot of NATORussia Council might make NATO more openminded on SCO, or even CSTO. . . (esp. given greater NATO realism on NIS developments and enlargement), BUT - key remains whether SCO/CSTO can offer anything concrete on Afghanistan where NATO needs it most (+ is more modest) - will Russia prefer to make play with bilateral offers?

IN THE BIGGER PICTURE • May NATO and SCO be existentially complementary? ? - Pincer attack on terrorism - SCO’s regional stabilizing effects - Central Asian room for manouvre - Sino-Russian conflict avoidance - The ‘virus’ of multilateralism

ROLES IN MULTIPOLARITY? • Rationale of regional ‘subsidiarity’? • NATO and SCO as leaders of two global camps? NOT • NATO and SCO as bridges in future US/China relations? NOT • ‘NATO an institution of the past, SCO of the future’? ? Last word: no ties of destiny….