Security Considerations for Deterministic Networking Draft Update IETF

Security Considerations for Deterministic Networking Draft Update IETF 106 Singapore 2019 Ethan Grossman Senior Software Engineering Manager Dolby Laboratories, San Francisco

Det. Net Security Considerations Scope l Draft: https: //datatracker. ietf. org/doc/draft-ietf-detnet-security/ l Scope A reference/toolkit for those who have not built time-sensitive networks before l Exclusively addresses time-related threats l Other Det. Net drafts address draft-topic-specific considerations then refer here (as informational) l 2

Det. Net Security Considerations Status l Data plane technology-independent sections § l IP- and MPLS-specific sections § l No unique threats identified – discussion on this later TSN-specific section § l Mature, but still some editing and a few small sections to fill in Not started Security-related statements from Use Cases § Update? Delete? 3

Det. Net Security Considerations Discussion and Next Steps l Discussion l Data plane technology-specific threats - are we missing something? § l l l There will be more data planes – so maybe that info should not be in here? Security-related statements from Use Cases – Update? Delete? Sec. Dir review – before or after WG LC? Next Steps l l Finish edits, add any new material Working Group Last Call 4

Det. Net Security Considerations l The End l Remaining slides are optional, a brief overview of the draft 5

Det. Net Security Considerations l Security Considerations draft as ”toolkit” l Attackers l Attacks l Impacts l Mitigations l Table of attacks to impacts and mitigation l Table of use cases to relevant attacks 6

Attacker Types [Based on RFC 7384] Internal / external External Internal Man-in-the-middle (MITM) / Injector MITM Injector 7

Impact of Recon and Delay Attacks Control Plane Data Plane Reconnaissance • Monitor changes in the network • Monitor flows and their IDs • Identify controllers • Identify active targets • Determine type of targets based on observed stream parameters. • Find opportune moment to conduct final attack Delay attacks • • • Resource exhaustion (removing old links delayed) • Reduces Qo. S (creating new links delayed) • Denial of Service (due to exhaustion, not enough to form new link) • Loss of privacy (data sent to old target) Increased buffering in bridges Elimination nodes consume more resources Skew path metrics Outage (single path) 9

Mitigations Mitigation Method Relevant Attack(s) • Path redundancy • Man-in-the-middle attacks • Integrity protection • Modification/tampering • Det. Net node authentication • Spoofing • Encryption • Recon • Control message protection • Control plane attacks • Performance analytics • Resource exhaustion attacks 10

Mapping Attacks to Impacts / Mitigations +-----------+---------------------+ | Attack | Impact | Mitigations | +-----------+---------------------+ |Delay Attack |-Non-deterministic |-Path redundancy | | | delay |-Performance | | |-Data disruption | analytics | | |-Increased resource | | consumption | | +-----------+---------------------+ |Det. Net Flow Modificat-|-Increased resource |-Path redundancy | |ion or Spoofing | consumption |-Integrity protection| | |-Data disruption |-Det. Net Node | | authentication | +-----------+---------------------+ (etc) 11