Secure Remote Access to an Internal Web Server

Secure Remote Access to an Internal Web Server “The security policy usually amounts to total trust of all insiders and total mistrust of outsiders, where the firewall defines the boundary. ” Christian Gilmore, David Kormann, and Aviel D. Rubin ATT Labs - Research

Outline • • • Requirements vs. the current architecture constrains. Proposed solution. Security assessment of the proposed solution. Conclusion. Questions. 2

Requirements • Access to the internal web server from outside of the firewall boundary. • Proposed solution should not involve – changes to the firewall configuration on the network or. . . – changes to the firewall policies 3

Environment • Firewall – “[Inside user] …can establish TCP connection to hosts outside the firewall on any port, while inbound connections are tightly restricted. ” – “[Firewall] … tears down inactive connections every 15 min. ” • DWT (dumb Web Terminal) – “We strive to treat the DWT as “untrusted” as possible” 4

Possible of the shelf solutions • Telnet or text-based browser such as Lynx – Disadvantage: • HTML travels in plain text over the network • No support for multimedia • Tunneling protocols (IPSpec, SSLtelnet). – Disadvantage: • requires advance access to the remote client browser settings and computer settings. 5

Architecture Firewall Authentication Server Internet DWT Proxy Web Server 6

Proxy Control Connection Web Request Web Server Web Reply Absent Push. Web Reply DWT Firewall Data Connection 7

Authentication and Security • User Authentication – Hash Chaining – User has to re-enter password every 20 minutes • Connection Confidentiality – HTTP over SSL - Secure Socket Layer. 8

Proxy Control Connection Web Request Web Reply Push. Web Absent Firewall Web Reply DWT Server Data Connection SSL Session 9

Connection Confidentiality • After the user was successfully authenticated the Push. Web establishes the SSL connection to the DWT. • The SSL on the Server is configured to restrict the set of ciphers supported only to those that provide USA domestic-quality encryption. 10

Security Assessment • Compromise of Absent – Do. S attack - not preventable – Eavesdrop on the user session - SSL prevents it. – Replay attack - SSL makes it almost impossible. – Spoofing - user must check SSL certificate. – Obtain root on Push. Web or access the internal web: • data cannot be moved over control connection • the same effort as from any other outside host 11

Security Assessment (Continued) • Compromise of Push. Web – Push. Web has limited access rights on the network – No other services are available from the Push. Web – No user data stored on the Push. Web 12

Conclusion • The solution achieved its goal: – No changes were required to the network infrastructure – The system provides “. . . internal Web access from sites such as terminal rooms and Internet cafes. ” • The system is using well tested protocols - one time password and SSL, but “… protocol composition is a very hard problem and has led to security problems in the past. ” 13

Questions • To overcome the firewall policy authors used Push. Web / Absent configuration. Is there any security gain in connecting through Absent machine as oppose to connecting straight through a firewall? Firewall Internet Web Push. Web DWT Absent Server SSL • If there is a gain, than against what type of attacks? 14