Ryles philosophical behaviourism Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy co uk

Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk © Michael Lacewing

Philosophical behaviourism • A family of theories that claim that we can analyse mental concepts in terms of concepts that relate to the body, and in particular, the concept of ‘behaviour’ • Focus not on metaphysics – what exists – but on language – mental concepts – Before we do metaphysics of mind, we need conceptual analysis © Michael Lacewing

Methodological behaviourism • A theory about how a scientific psychology works (Watson, Skinner) – To be properly scientific, psychology must deal with what can be observed, not what cannot – Therefore, psychology should aim only at the explanation and prediction of behaviour without appealing to ‘inner’ mental states • A claim about science and about how we know about mental states © Michael Lacewing

Philosophical behaviourism • What we are talking about when we are talking about the mind and mental states is behaviour – Our psychological terms are about what people do, and how they react – ‘The mind’ is not a thing • Different kinds of philosophical behaviourism – Hempel: ‘logical’, ‘analytical’, ‘hard’ behaviourism – But sometimes ‘logical’ = ‘philosophical’! – Ryle: ‘soft’ behaviourism © Michael Lacewing

Dualism’s ‘category mistake’ • Ryle understands substance dualism (‘the official doctrine’) as claiming: – the mind can exist without the body – they are two different substances; – there are mental and physical properties, but while the body is in space and is subject to mechanical (physical) laws, the mind isn’t • ‘The dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’ © Michael Lacewing

Dualism’s ‘category mistake’ • Category mistake: To treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from the one it actually belongs to – E. g. Oxford University; team spirit • The mind is not another ‘thing’ – It is not a distinct, complex, organised unit, subject to distinct relations of cause and effect (to lose your mind and lose your keys is not to lose two things!) – Mental concepts (of ‘states’ and ‘processes’) do not operate like physical concepts • The ‘para-mechanical hypothesis’: – since physical processes can be explained in mechanical terms, mental concepts must refer to non-spatial, non-mechanical processes – This is a category mistake © Michael Lacewing

Dispositions • Simplest form: to be in mental state x is to behave in way y – E. g. To be in pain is to exhibit pain-behaviour • Objection: suppressed pain (pain without pain behaviour) • Many mental states, e. g. knowing French, are dispositions, not occurrences • So (many) mental states are dispositions of a person to behave in certain ways (in certain circumstances) – To be in pain is to be disposed to cry out, nurse the injured part of the body … © Michael Lacewing

Dispositions • We often speak of mental states expressed in action – Knowing how to play chess; reading thoughtfully – Cp. skills: not a single action, but not something invisible or non-spatial – a disposition • Disposition: How something will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances – E. g. solubility, being hard – ‘If…then…’ • Mental concepts, e. g. being proud, pick out a set of dispositions that are ‘indefinitely heterogenous’ © Michael Lacewing

Not categorical, not reducible • Whether someone has a particular disposition is a matter of whether certain statements about what they could or would do are true or not – Many of these circumstances may never arise – Psychological statements don’t describe categorical – actual, concrete, particular – states of some mental substance • Statements involving mental concepts can’t be translated or reduced to a set of hypothetical statements about behaviour – Mental concepts can analysed in these terms, but never completely replaced – the account in terms of what a person would in circumstances x, y, z can’t be completed © Michael Lacewing

Thinking • How can an ‘internal process’ like thinking be a disposition to behaviour? • Note that there isn’t one kind of thinking – We do many things thoughtfully – this isn’t a matter of a second independent mental processes accompanying the behaviour, but a matter of how the behaviour is done • Reply: thinking to oneself is internalised speaking – Speaking is behaviour, and thinking is acquired later – The silence is inessential to the nature of thinking – you can think out loud or with pen and paper © Michael Lacewing

Thinking • Thinking isn’t just a disposition, but also an occurrence – Cp. ‘it is dissolving’ – It is still the basis for attributing dispositions • Paying attention – you are ready to report on what you are doing if asked © Michael Lacewing

Physicalism and the category mistake • We can extend Ryle’s criticism of substance dualism to later physicalist theories • Identity theory and eliminative materialism understand mental properties and physical properties in the same way – Identity: they are physical properties – Eliminativism: they are part of a (faulty) empirical, causal account of human behaviour • This metaphysical approach to philosophy of mind commits the same category mistake as dualism © Michael Lacewing

Physicalism and the category mistake • Nevertheless, philosophical behaviourism is a materialist theory – We can’t talk about mental substances and properties as things that ‘exist’ – Questions about what exists are questions about physical substance and properties – Mental states are analyzed in terms of behaviour, which depends upon physical properties (just as dispositions in general depend upon categorical facts) © Michael Lacewing