Rethinking Armageddon Planning Scenarios for the Second Nuclear

Rethinking Armageddon Planning Scenarios for the Second Nuclear Age Andrew Krepinevich Jacob Cohn 1

Presentation Roadmap Click to edit Master title style • Project Overview • Why Scenarios? • Five Scenarios • Selected Observations and Insights • Next Steps 2

Project Overview 3

Project Click to edit Objectives Master title style • How can scenarios support efforts to craft policies designed to reduce the chances of nuclear use? • What would constitute a representative set of scenarios that are characteristic of the Second Nuclear Age, rather than the preceding age? • Given these scenarios, what are some of the first-order implications they raise with respect to nuclear policy, strategy, and force posture? 4

Why Scenarios? 5

Scenarios Click to edit Master title style Scenarios: A tool for helping us plan in an uncertain world; an antidote to “willful ignorance” • A need for effective strategic thinking is most obvious in times of accelerated change • While the future is fundamentally unpredictable; it is not wholly uncertain 6

Click to. Why edit. Scenarios? Master title style • Do not “predict” the future; rather, they help us to think about the future • Help identify what factors will most shape the future • Understand how the environment might change • Recognize when the environment is changing • Know how to respond when change is detected 7

“Drivers” Click to edit Master title style • Geostrategic: Multipolar regional and global competitions • Geopolitical: Regime characteristics; external sources of influence • Geographic: Proximity and “interspersing” • Cultural: The Human Condition; differing perspectives on cost, benefit and risk 8

“Drivers” Click to edit Master title style • Military-Technical: – Advanced design nuclear weapons – The maturation of the precision-guided weapons regime – Advanced air and missile defenses – Cyber munitions • Military Capabilities: Size and composition of strategic forces • Proliferation Dynamics: Static, linear or non-linear? • Temporal: Mobilization, early warning, command-control 9

Five Scenarios 10

Scenarios Click to edit Master title style • Iran, Israel and the Crisis Neither Sought • An “N-Player” Middle East Confrontation • Russia’s “Escalate to De-escalate” threat • North Korea’s “Rational” Option • China and the Long-Term Great Power Competition 11

Middle East

Iran to andedit Israel to thetitle Brinkstyle Click Master Scenario (2016 – 2020) • Economic: Joint Agreement unfreezes Iranian assets and ends many economic sanctions • Proxies: Tehran’s “slow squeeze” of Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and Israel • Crisis: Third Lebanon War expands to direct conflict between Israel and Iran; both sides concerned about preemptive nuclear attack Destabilizing Factors • Geographic proximity and limits of Early Warning/C 2 • Predelegation of authority • Nuclear doctrine 13

Theto“N-Player” Problem Click edit Master title style Scenario (2016 – 2020) • Excursion from previous scenario focusing on the “N-Player” problem • Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE expect same nuclear freedom as granted to Iran • Saudi Arabia jumpstarts nuclear program with Pakistan’s assistance • September 2018, Pakistan deploys nuclear IRBMs to Saudi Arabia Destabilizing Factors • Attribution problem • Will the U. S. protect its allies equally? 14

Eastern Europe

Sub-Conventional Aggression in style Latvia Click to edit Master title Scenario (2016 – 2018) • Economic: Falling oil and gas prices, continued economic sanctions • Security: Increasing insecurity as ISIS attributed terror attacks mount • Timing: Low domestic approval and weakening internal control near election • Crisis: Creeping aggression in Latvia, incorrectly assuming NATO would not intervene, Russia backed into a losing conventional position Destabilizing Factors • Alliance management • Deterring the “escalate to deescalate” threat • Ability of non-nuclear weapons to fill nuclear missions • Gaps in the escalation ladder 16

North Korea

North. Master Korea title style Click to edit Scenario (2016 – 2021) • • Economic: Economic reform backfires, by 2019 the situation is desperate Nuclear: Believed to have nuclear capable Taepodong-3 s and Nodongs Arms Control: Concessions viewed as a path to regime change Crisis: Nuclear strike on Japan as last ditch effort to stave off regime collapse Destabilizing Factors • (Mis)perceptions of leaders • Alliance management • Vulnerability of missile defenses to Haystack tactic • Vulnerability of small arsenals to missile defense 18

Long-Term Competition with China and Russia

Long-Term Competition Click to Multipolar edit Master title style Scenario (2017 – 2020) • Economic: Economic slowdown leaves regime reliant on nationalism • Geopolitical: Setbacks in South China Sea/East China Sea stress last pillar • Military-Technical: U. S. CPGS development and Russian violation of INF treaty raises concerns over vertical escalation vulnerability • Nuclear: Fissile material is the principal near-term barrier to growing China’s arsenal; decision made to seek balance with U. S. and Russia Destabilizing Factors • What force structure is needed for a multipolar competition? • Avoiding an arms race & the role of arms control • Effect of geographic proximity – nuclear overflight 20

Selected Insights and Observations 21

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style • The “Nuclear Balance” is now the “Strategic Balance” – Wide range of capabilities; many non-nuclear – New vertical and horizontal escalation ladders • The Bipolar structure is transitioning to a Multipolar structure – Global and regional competitions – Strategies for deterring one rival may weaken deterrence with another – A nuclear “great game” – Potential for non-nuclear powers to play 22

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style • The Challenge of Extended Deterrence – What is reassuring for one may not be for another – Need to review along with revised escalation ladders • The Death of “Rational Strategic Man” – Single, rational unitary actor model long discredited – Crises lead to thinking “fast, ” not “slow” – Prospect Theory suggests coercion strategies may be a “dead end” 23

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style • The Erosion of Crisis Stability – Geographic Proximity, Early Warning, Command-and. Control, Pre-delegation Authority and Human Cognitive Limitations – Cyber Munitions and Catalytic War – Problems with Prompt Attribution – Blurring of Strategic and Non-Strategic Strikes – Undeclared Arsenals – Multiple Extended Deterrence Commitments – Haystack Attacks – 1914 Redux: The Mobilization of Missile Defenses 24

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style • Arms Control – From New START to the Washington Naval Treaty – “Multidimensional” Problems – “Multipolar” Problems – Enforcement and Verification Challenges • Implications for the U. S. Strategic Posture – Old metrics may no longer apply – More options needed – Position matters in a mobilization race – Potential gap between commitments and capabilities (extended deterrence) – Which scenarios are accorded priority? – A need to think long term 25

Next Steps 26

Next Steps Click. Selected to edit Master title style • Undertake Strategic Net Assessments on global, regional and functional aspects of the competition • Comparative assessment of strategic doctrines • Identify strategic planning issues that emerge across scenarios • Develop a set of the “missing” scenarios (e. g. ; India-Pakistan; nuclear war termination) 27

Next Steps Click. Selected to edit Master title style • Develop a revised set of metrics to guide efforts to assess the strategic force balance(s) • Update horizontal and vertical escalation ladders • Assess prospects for regulating the strategic competition (such as a contemporary version of the Washington Naval Treaty) • Examine ongoing efforts among the competitors to enhance their strategic forces, identifying major asymmetries in doctrine, forces and their implications 28

Questions? 29