REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Fiscal Council

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Fiscal Council as envisaged in the proposed Fiscal Rule Act 1

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Outline • Background • Design – Institutional features – Tasks – Role in policy making • Strengths 2

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Background A. EU legislation and Fiscal compact B. Comprehensive review of existing institutions 1. Advisory body 2. Attached to the Legislature 3. Existing independent institution (Co. A, Bo. S) 4. Attached to the Executive (IMAD, Mo. F) 5. Stand-alone institution 3

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Institutional features • independent state authority (own budget) • accountable to the Parliament • 3 members – nominated by the Government – appointed by the Parliament with 2/3 majority – employed full/part time • small secretariat (4 permanent employees) • administrative-technical tasks performed by services of Co. A • access to analysis, data and support upon request of other institutional units of the general government (e. g. IMAD, MF. . . ) 4

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Tasks • monitoring compliance and consistency of public finance policies with fiscal rules – assessments of budgetary plans and execution based on independent fiscal forecast provided by IMAD – assessments relating to the existence of exceptional circumstances and allowed deviations – assessments regarding measures envisaged in the framework of correction mechanism • assessments may also include policy recommendations 5

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Role in policy making • opinion making by producing public assessments • the Government has to present its written position regarding all assessments • but: no infringement on the policymaking responsibilities of the Parliament and the Government 6

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE Strengths • Strong scrutiny of FC members as elected by 2/3 majority • Exclusive responsibility: fiscal scrutiny • Relatively low administrative costs • Access to data and power to request analysis from units of the general government • Not need to elaborate on macro forecasts as they are already done by a credible government institution 7