Relazione di denotazione oggetti idee Relazione causale Le

Relazione di denotazione oggetti idee Relazione causale Le idee semplici sono indici di elementi nel mondo obiettivo.

immanenza idee trascendenza oggetti Un fraintendimento da mettere da canto: siamo coscienti esclusivamente delle idee e non anche, mediatamente, degli oggetti trascendenti, di cui non abbiamo esperienza, anche se Locke ritiene sia possibile averne conoscenza sul fondamento di un’ipotesi che deve indicare la strada ad un’inferenza. L’ipotesi verte sul carattere causale dell’esperienza; l’inferenza invece sorregge il nostro tentativo di attribuire alle idee un valore indicale

idee (i 1 … in) xoggetti 1…xn (o 1 … on) Risolvere il problema di Locke significa allora riflettere se vi è, e se vi è come si configura, la funzione che ci consente da un lato di ripercorrere a ritroso il nesso causale e dall’altro di cogliere, data una serie di idee i 1…in , quali sono e come sono fatti gli elementi oggettuali o 1…on di cui i 1…in sono indici.

Tre domande: xoggetti 1…xn (o 1 … on) idee (i 1 … in) La prima: Possiamo sostenere che esista una funzione che ci conduce da ogni idea a ciò che le corrisponde sul terreno degli elementi oggettuali? O più esattamente: possiamo davvero sostenere che per ogni idea vi sia qualcosa che le corrisponde sul terreno oggettuale? b a' a c d d' e' f c

Tre domande: f(i)=o xoggetti 1…xn (o 1 … on) idee (i 1 … in) a b a' c b’ c' d'

“Only the qualities that affect the senses are imaginable. This is the reason why - though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to man- yet I think it is not possible for any man to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four senses, the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense can possibly be; - which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think that, in other mansions of it, there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; - but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose” (J. Locke, An Essay. . , II, ii, 3).

“The mind being […] furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things […] takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name […] because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; […]; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was- a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied- something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children: who, being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something: which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia” (J. Locke, An Essay. . , II, xxiii, 1 -2).

Tre domande f(i)=o xoggetti 1…xn (o 1 … on) idee (i 1 … in) a b c d a' b’ f d' c' e

A nessuna di queste tre domande si può dare una risposta affermativa. E questo vuol dire che non possiamo fare affidamento sulle condizioni ideali di un linguaggio: Non possiamo infatti escludere che 1. qualche nostra idea non abbia un denotato; 2. Che vi siano oggetti cui non corrisponde alcuna idea; 3. Che idee diverse abbiano un identico denotato. Per dirla nel linguaggio della nostra analogia: nella successione di suoni che ascoltiamo, alcuni potrebbero derivare da risonanze interne e non corrispondere ad un tasto; altri potrebbero essere prodotti da tasti differenti perché il pianoforte è scordato. Infine, potrebbe accadere che i martelletti fossero rotti e che, per questo, ci fossero dei tasti che non producono suoni e che, proprio per questo, non potrebbero essere associati ai suoni che udiamo. Shigeo Fukuda, Underground Piano (1984) Questo basta per rinunciare a dire che le idee costituiscono un linguaggio? No, perché anche il nostro linguaggio non ottempera ai requisiti di una lingua ideale.