Recht auf Leben Art 2 EMRK 1 Das

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Recht auf Leben Art. 2 EMRK (1) Das Recht jedes Menschen auf Leben wird

Recht auf Leben Art. 2 EMRK (1) Das Recht jedes Menschen auf Leben wird gesetzlich geschützt. Niemand darf absichtlich getötet werden, außer durch Vollstreckung eines Todesurteils, das ein Gericht wegen eines Verbrechens verhängt hat, für das die Todesstrafe gesetzlich vorgesehen ist. (2) Eine Tötung wird nicht als Verletzung dieses Artikels betrachtet, wenn sie durch eine Gewaltanwendung verursacht wird, die unbedingt erforderlich ist, um a) jemanden gegen rechtswidrige Gewalt zu verteidigen; b) jemanden rechtmäßig festzunehmen oder jemanden, dem die Freiheit rechtmäßig entzogen ist, an der Flucht zu hindern; c) einen Aufruhr oder Aufstand rechtmäßig niederzuschlagen.

Recht auf Leben Art. 6 ICCPR (1) Jeder Mensch hat ein angeborenes Recht auf

Recht auf Leben Art. 6 ICCPR (1) Jeder Mensch hat ein angeborenes Recht auf Leben. Dieses Recht ist gesetzlich zu schützen. Niemand darf willkürlich seines Lebens beraubt werden. (2) In Staaten, in denen die Todesstrafe nicht abgeschafft worden ist, darf ein Todesurteil nur für schwerste Verbrechen auf Grund von Gesetzen verhängt werden, die zur Zeit der Begehung der Tat in Kraft waren und die den Bestimmungen dieses Paktes und der Konvention über die Verhütung und Bestrafung des Völkermordes nicht widersprechen. Diese Strafe darf nur auf Grund eines von einem zuständigen Gericht erlassenen rechtskräftigen Urteils vollstreckt werden. (3) Erfüllt die Tötung den Tatbestand des Völkermordes, so ermächtigt dieser Artikel die Vertragsstaaten nicht, sich in irgendeiner Weise einer Verpflichtung zu entziehen, die sich nach den Bestimmungen der Konvention über die Verhütung und Bestrafung des Völkermordes übernommen haben. (4) Jeder zum Tode Verurteilte hat das Recht, um Begnadigung oder Umwandlung der Strafe zu bitten. Amnestie, Begnadigung oder Umwandlung der Todesstrafe kann in allen Fällen gewährt werden. (5) Die Todesstrafe darf für strafbare Handlungen, die von Jugendlichen unter 18 Jahren begangen worden sind, nicht verhängt und an schwangeren Frauen nicht vollstreckt werden. (6) Keine Bestimmung dieses Artikels darf herangezogen werden, um die Abschaffung der Todesstrafe durch einen Vertragsstaat zu verzögern oder zu verhindern.

Recht auf Leben Schutzbereich Art. 4 AMRK Right to Life 1. Every person has

Recht auf Leben Schutzbereich Art. 4 AMRK Right to Life 1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. (…)

EGMR, Case of Vo v. France, Judgment, 8 July 2004 80. It follows from

EGMR, Case of Vo v. France, Judgment, 8 July 2004 80. It follows from this recapitulation of the case law that in the circumstances examined to date by the Convention institutions – that is, in the various laws on abortion – the unborn child is not regarded as a “person” directly protected by Article 2 of the Convention and that if the unborn do have a “right” to “life”, it is implicitly limited by the mother’s rights and interests. The Convention institutions have not, however, ruled out the possibility that in certain circumstances safeguards may be extended to the unborn child. That is what appears to have been contemplated by the Commission in considering that “Article 8 § 1 cannot be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination are, as a principle, solely a matter of the private life of the mother” (…) and by the Court in the above mentioned Boso decision. It is also clear from an examination of these cases that the issue has always been determined by weighing up various, and sometimes conflicting, rights or freedoms claimed by a woman, a mother or a father in relation to one another or vis à vis an unborn child. 82. As is apparent from the above recapitulation of the case law, the interpretation of Article 2 in this connection has been informed by a clear desire to strike a balance, and the Convention institutions’ position in relation to the legal, medical, philosophical, ethical or religious dimensions of defining the human being has taken into account the various approaches to the matter at national level. This has been reflected in the consideration given to the diversity of views on the point at which life begins, of legal cultures and of national standards of protection, and the State has been left with considerable discretion in the matter, as the opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies at the European Commission appositely puts it: “the . . . Community authorities have to address these ethical questions taking into account the moral and philosophical differences, reflected by the extreme diversity of legal rules applicable to human embryo research. . . It is not only legally difficult to seek harmonisation of national laws at Community level, but because of lack of consensus, it would be inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code” (…).

EGMR, Case of Vo v. France, Judgment, 8 July 2004 82. (…) It follows

EGMR, Case of Vo v. France, Judgment, 8 July 2004 82. (…) It follows that the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions” (…). The reasons for that conclusion are, firstly, that the issue of such protection has not been resolved within the majority of the Contracting States themselves, in France in particular, where it is the subject of debate (…) and, secondly, that there is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life (…). 84. At European level, the Court observes that there is no consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus (…), although they are beginning to receive some protection in the light of scientific progress and the potential consequences of research into genetic engineering, medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation. At best, it may be regarded as common ground between States that the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being and its capacity to become a person – enjoying protection under the civil law, moreover, in many States, such as France, in the context of inheritance and gifts, and also in the United Kingdom (…) – require protection in the name of human dignity, without making it a “person” with the “right to life” for the purposes of Article 2. The Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, indeed, is careful not to give a definition of the term “everyone”, and its explanatory report indicates that, in the absence of a unanimous agreement on the definition, the member States decided to allow domestic law to provide clarification for the purposes of the application of that Convention (…). The same is true of the Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings and the Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research, which do not define the concept of “human being” (…). It is worth noting that the Court may be requested under Article 29 of the Oviedo Convention to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of that instrument.

Recht auf Leben Schutzpflichten General Comment No. 06: The right to life (art. 6):

Recht auf Leben Schutzpflichten General Comment No. 06: The right to life (art. 6): 30. 04. 1982 (…) 3. The protection against arbitrary deprivation of life which is explicitly required by the third sentence of article 6 (1) is of paramount importance. The Committee considers that States parties should take measures not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces. The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by such authorities.

EGMR, Case of Osman v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 28. 10. 1998 (…) 115.

EGMR, Case of Osman v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 28. 10. 1998 (…) 115. The Court notes that the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see the L. C. B. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 III, p. 1403, § 36). It is common ground that the State’s obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. It is thus accepted by those appearing before the Court that Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. The scope of this obligation is a matter of dispute between the parties. (…)

Eingriffe in das Recht auf Leben Art. 15 EMRK (…) Aufgrund des Absatzes 1

Eingriffe in das Recht auf Leben Art. 15 EMRK (…) Aufgrund des Absatzes 1 darf von Artikel 2 nur bei Todesfällen infolge rechtmäßiger Kriegshandlungen und von Artikel 3, Artikel 4 (Absatz 1) und Artikel 7 in keinem Fall abgewichen werden. (…) EGMR, Case of Mc. Cann and Others v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 27 September 1995 (…) 150. In keeping with the importance of this provision (art. 2) in a democratic society, the Court must, in making its assessment, subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination. (…) 213. In sum, having regard to the decision not to prevent the suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the failure of the authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that their intelligence assessments might, in some respects at least, be erroneous and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when the soldiers opened fire, the Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2 para. 2 (a) (art. 2 2 a) of the Convention. (…)

Eingriffe in das Recht auf Leben ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of

Eingriffe in das Recht auf Leben ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 JULY 1996 (…) 25. The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. (…)

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe General Comment No. 06: The right to life (art.

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe General Comment No. 06: The right to life (art. 6): 30. 04. 1982 (…) 6. While it follows from article 6 (2) to (6) that States parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty totally they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it for other than the "most serious crimes". Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death penalty to the "most serious crimes". The article also refers generally to abolition in terms which strongly suggest (paras. 2 (2) and (6)) that abolition is desirable. The Committee concludes that all measures of abolition should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life within the meaning of article 40, and should as such be reported to the Committee. The Committee notes that a number of States have already abolished the death penalty or suspended its application. Nevertheless, States' reports show that progress made towards abolishing or limiting the application of the death penalty is quite inadequate. (…)

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe Art. 6 ICCPR (…) (5) Die Todesstrafe darf für

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe Art. 6 ICCPR (…) (5) Die Todesstrafe darf für strafbare Handlungen, die von Jugendlichen unter 18 Jahren begangen worden sind, nicht verhängt und an schwangeren Frauen nicht vollstreckt werden. Vorbehalt der USA zu Art. 6 V ICCPR "(2) That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age. Einspruch dagegen von Deutschland "The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany objects to the United States' reservation referring to article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant, which prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age. The reservation referring to this provision is incompatible with the text as well as the object and purpose of article 6, which, as made clear by paragraph 2 of article 4, lays down the minimum standard for the protection of the right to life. ”

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe US Supreme Court, Roper v. Simmons, 1. März 2005:

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe US Supreme Court, Roper v. Simmons, 1. März 2005: Todesstrafe für minderjährige Straftäter wegen internationalen Standards und Handhabung verfassungswidrig No. 03– 633. Argued October 13, 2004—Decided March 1, 2005 “Respondent and his amici have submitted, and peti tioner does not contest, that only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital pun ishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. (…) In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty. (…) It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime. (…) The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does pro vide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions. ”

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe Art. 14 ICCPR und Art. 6 EMRK > Verfahrensgarantien

Recht auf Leben und Todesstrafe Art. 14 ICCPR und Art. 6 EMRK > Verfahrensgarantien bei Todesstrafe EGMR, Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment, 12 May 2005 (…) 112. The Court has consistently held that certain aspects of the status of military judges sitting as members of the national security courts made their independence from the executive questionable (…) 115. Secondly, when a military judge has participated in one or more interlocutory decisions that continue to remain in effect in the criminal proceedings concerned, the accused has reasonable cause for concern about the validity of the entire proceedings, unless it is established that the procedure subsequently followed in the national security court sufficiently dispelled that concern. More specifically, where a military judge has participated in an interlocutory decision that forms an integral part of proceedings against a civilian, the whole proceedings are deprived of the appearance of having been conducted by an independent and impartial court. (…)

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada,

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada, 13 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 10. 1 The Human Rights Committee has examined the communication in light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided for in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. Question 1. As Canada has abolished the death penalty, did it violate the author’s right to life under article 6, his right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 7, or his right to an effective remedy under article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant by deporting him to a State in which he was under sentence of death without ensuring that sentence would not be carried out? 10. 2 In considering Canada’s obligations, as a State party which has abolished the death penalty, in removing persons to another country where they are under sentence of death, the Committee recalls its previous jurisprudence in Kindler v. Canada, 35 that it does not consider that the deportation of a person from a country which has abolished the death penalty to a country where he/she is under sentence of death amounts per se to a violation of article 6 of the Covenant. The Committee’s rationale in this decision was based on an interpretation of the Covenant which read article 6, paragraph 1, together with article 6, paragraph 2, which does not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for the most serious crimes. It considered that as Canada itself had not imposed the death penalty but had extradited the author to the United States to face capital punishment, a state which had not abolished the death penalty, the extradition itself would not amount to a violation by Canada unless there was a real risk that the author’s rights under the Covenant would be violated in the United States. On the issue of assurances, the Committee found that the terms of article 6 did not necessarily require Canada to refuse to extradite or to seek assurances but that such a request should at least be considered by the removing state.

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada,

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada, 13 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (…) 10. 3 While recognizing that the Committee should ensure both consistency and coherence of its jurisprudence, it notes that there may be exceptional situations in which a review of the scope of application of the rights protected in the Covenant is required, such as where an alleged violation involves that most fundamental of rights – the right to life and in particular if there have been notable factual and legal developments and changes in international opinion in respect of the issue raised. The Committee is mindful of the fact that the abovementioned jurisprudence was established some 10 years ago, and that since that time there has been a broadening international consensus in favour of abolition of the death penalty, and in states which have retained the death penalty, a broadening consensus not to carry it out. Significantly, the Committee notes that since Kindler the State party itself has recognized the need to amend its own domestic law to secure the protection of those extradited from Canada under sentence of death in the receiving state, in the case of United States v. Burns. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the government must seek assurances, in all but exceptional cases, that the death penalty will not be applied prior to extraditing an individual to a state where he/she faces capital punishment. It is pertinent to note that under the terms of this judgment, “Other abolitionist countries do not, in general, extradite without assurances. ” The Committee considers that the Covenant should be interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in the light of present–day conditions. (…)

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada,

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada, 13 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 10. 4 In reviewing its application of article 6, the Committee notes that, as required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty should be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Paragraph 1 of article 6, which states that “Every human being has the inherent right to life…”, is a general rule: its purpose is to protect life. States parties that have abolished the death penalty have an obligation under this paragraph t so protect in all circumstances. Paragraphs 2 to 6 of article 6 are evidently included to avoid a reading of the first paragraph of article 6, according to which that paragraph could be understood as abolishing the death penalty as such. This construction of the article is reinforced by the opening words of paragraph 2 (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty…”) and by paragraph 6 (“Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant. ”). In effect, paragraphs 2 to 6 have the dual function of creating an exception to the right to life in respect of the death penalty and laying down limits on the scope of that exception. Only the death penalty pronounced when certain elements are present can benefit from the exception. Among these limitations are that found in the opening words of paragraph 2, namely, that only States parties that “have not abolished the death penalty” can avail themselves of the exceptions created in paragraphs 2 to 6. For countries that have abolished the death penalty, there is an obligation not to expose a person to the real risk of its application. Thus, they may not remove, either by deportation or extradition, individuals from their jurisdiction if it may be reasonably anticipated that they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that the death sentence would not be carried out.

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada,

Auslieferung bei drohender Todesstrafe Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 829/1998, Roger Judge v. Canada, 13 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (…) 10. 6 For these reasons, the Committee considers that Canada, as a State party which has abolished the death penalty, irrespective of whether it has not yet ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, violated the author’s right to life under article 6, paragraph 1, by deporting him to the United States, where he is under sentence of death, without ensuring that the death penalty would not be carried out. The Committee recognizes that Canada did not itself impose the death penalty on the author. But by deporting him to a country where he was under sentence of death, Canada established the crucial link in the causal chain that would make possible the execution of the author. (…)

Folterverbot Art. 3 EMRK Niemand darf der Folter oder unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung oder

Folterverbot Art. 3 EMRK Niemand darf der Folter oder unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung oder Strafe unterworfen werden. Art. 7 ICCPR Niemand darf der Folter oder grausamer, unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung oder. Strafe unterworfen werden. Insbesondere darf niemand ohne seine freiwillige Zustimmung medizinischen oder wissenschaftlichen Versuchen unterworfen werden

Absolute Geltung ART. 15 EMRK, Abweichen im Notstandsfall 1. Wird das Leben der Nation

Absolute Geltung ART. 15 EMRK, Abweichen im Notstandsfall 1. Wird das Leben der Nation durch Krieg oder einen anderen öffentlichen Notstand bedroht, so kann jede Hohe Vertragspartei Maßnahmen treffen, die von den in dieser Konvention vorgesehenen Verpflichtungen abweichen, jedoch nur, soweit es die Lage unbedingt erfordert und wenn die Maßnahmen nicht im Widerspruch zu den sonstigen völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen der Vertragspartei stehen. 2. Aufgrund des Absatzes 1 darf von Artikel 2 nur bei Todesfällen infolge rechtmäßiger Kriegshandlungen und von Artikel 3, Artikel 4 Absatz 1 und Artikel 7 in keinem Fall abgewichen werden.

Auslegung Definition in der UN Antifolterkonvention Teil I Art. 1 (1) Im Sinne dieses

Auslegung Definition in der UN Antifolterkonvention Teil I Art. 1 (1) Im Sinne dieses Übereinkommens bezeichnet der Ausdruck "Folter" jede Handlung, durch die einer Person vorsätzlich große körperliche oder seelische Schmerzen oder Leiden zugefügt werden, zum Beispiel um von ihr oder einem Dritten eine Aussage oder ein Geständnis zu erlangen, um sie für eine tatsächlich oder mutmaßlich von ihr oder einem Dritten begangene Tat zu bestrafen oder um sie oder einen Dritten einzuschüchtern oder zu nötigen, oder aus einem anderen, auf irgendeiner Art von Diskriminierung beruhenden Grund, wenn diese Schmerzen oder Leiden von einem Angehörigen des öffentlichen Dienstes oder einer anderen in amtlicher Eigenschaft handelnden Person, auf deren Veranlassung oder mit deren ausdrücklichem oder stillschweigendem Einverständnis verursacht werden. Der Ausdruck umfasst nicht Schmerzen oder Leiden, die sich lediglich aus gesetzlich zulässigen Sanktionen ergeben, dazu gehören oder damit verbunden sind.

Qualifikation als Folter EGMR, Case of Atkas v. Turkey, Judgment, 24 April 2003 313.

Qualifikation als Folter EGMR, Case of Atkas v. Turkey, Judgment, 24 April 2003 313. In determining whether a particular form of ill treatment should be qualified as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should, by means of this distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (…) In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which came into force on 26 June 1987, which defines torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating.

Abgrenzung der Folter von der unmenschlichen oder erniedrigender Behandlung EGMR, Case of Ireland v

Abgrenzung der Folter von der unmenschlichen oder erniedrigender Behandlung EGMR, Case of Ireland v UK, Judgment, 18 January 1978 167. The Court considers in fact that, whilst there exists on the one hand violence which is to be condemned both on moral grounds and also in most cases under the domestic law of the Contracting States but which does not fall within Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention, it appears on the other hand that it was the intention that the Convention, with its distinction between "torture" and "inhuman or degrading treatment", should by the first of these terms attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. Moreover, this seems to be thinking lying behind Article 1 in fine of Resolution 3452 (XXX) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1975, which declares: "Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information and although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.

Entwicklung des Folterbegriffs vor EGMR, Case of Selmouni v. Frankreich, 28 July 1999 101.

Entwicklung des Folterbegriffs vor EGMR, Case of Selmouni v. Frankreich, 28 July 1999 101. The Court has previously examined cases in which it concluded that there had been treatment which could only be described as torture (see the Aksoy v. Turkey judgment cited above, p. 2279, § 64, and the Aydin v. Turkey judgment cited above, pp. 1892 93, §§ 83 84 and 86). However, having regard to the fact that the Convention is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions”(…) the Court considers that certain acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as opposed to “torture” could be classified differently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.

Gewährleistungspflichten General Comment No. 20: concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment

Gewährleistungspflichten General Comment No. 20: concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7): 10. 03. 1992 8. The Committee notes that it is not sufficient for the implementation of article 7 to prohibit such treatment or punishment or to make it a crime. States parties should inform the Committee of the legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures they take to prevent and punish acts of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in any territory under their jurisdiction (…) 12. It is important for the discouragement of violations under article 7 that the law must prohibit the use of admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through torture or other prohibited treatment.

Androhung von Folter EGMR, Case of Gäfgen v Germany, Judgment, 1. 6. 2010 67.

Androhung von Folter EGMR, Case of Gäfgen v Germany, Judgment, 1. 6. 2010 67. The United Nations Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights found in his report of 3 July 2001 to the General Assembly on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (UN Doc. A/56/156) as follows: “As stated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 20 (10 April 1992), on article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Special Rapporteur would like to remind Governments that the prohibition of torture relates not only to acts that cause physical pain but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim, such as intimidation and other forms of threats” (§ 3). He pointed out that “the fear of physical torture may itself constitute mental torture” (§ 7). Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur was of the opinion that “serious and credible threats, including death threats, to the physical integrity of the victim or a third person can amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or even to torture, especially when the victim remains in the hands of law enforcement officials” (§ 8). 91. (…) a threat of conduct prohibited by Article 3, provided it is sufficiently real and immediate, may fall foul of that provision.