RAIL SAFETY SUMMIT 2015 The Rail Safety Summit

RAIL SAFETY SUMMIT 2015 The Rail Safety Summit 2015

PAUL OLIFFE Director of Transport and Investigations, National Audit Office The Rail Safety Summit 2015

Government’s approach to handling concerns

What we did Recently completed series of investigation reports on whistleblowing: • Phase 1: Government whistleblowing policies Examined quality of 39 whistleblowing policies across government • Phase 2: Making a whistleblowing policy work Examined systems, structured and behaviours to enable effective whistleblowing arrangements • Phase 3: The role of prescribed persons Examined the role of prescribed persons and how they support whistleblowers

Phase 1: Government whistleblowing policies What we did: • • Examined policies of 39 government bodies: departments, NDPBs and Executive Agencies RAG rated policies against checklist Worked with organisations during fieldwork to improve policies (over half have updated policy as a result of review) Produced good practice guidance on what a strong policy should include

What we know: an effective whistleblowing policy is just the starting point A mature organisation will have a whistleblowing policy that reassures staff and encourages whistleblowers to come forward. An effective policy will: • State the high value the organisation places on whistleblower information and the leadership team’s commitment to take concerns seriously • Explain routes that whistleblowers can use, including internal and external avenues • Reassure whistleblowers they will not suffer detriment or victimisation if they raise a concern • Explain how the concern will be handled and the feedback a whistleblower will receive • Be clear, well presented and contain all necessary information • Make realistic statements about respecting a whistleblower’s confidentiality • Provide sources of independent advice, both internal and external to the organisation Case study: importance of tone from the top The Francis Report on the failings in the mid. Staff NHS Trust found that the Trust Board: “failed to tackle an insidious negative culture involving a tolerance of poor standards and a disengagement from managerial and leadership responsibilities” and it “did not listen sufficiently to its patients and staff or ensure the correction of deficiencies brought to the Trust’s attention”. Case study: reassuring whistleblowers Almost every inquiry into scandals and disasters in the 1980 s /1990 s (including the Clapham rail crash, the Piper Alpha disaster, and the Zeebrugge ferry tragedy) found that employees knew of the dangers that existed but had been too scared to sound the alarm or raised it in the wrong way.

Phase 2: Making a whistleblowing policy work What we did: • Examined systems that support whistleblowing, including clarity of governance arrangements and availability of intelligence • Explored challenges faced by organisations with complex delivery chains • Considered behaviours that are necessary to support and enable a positive environment where whistleblowing is accepted Case study: lack of overview We recommended: In November 2013, Birmingham City Council received a document (known as the ‘Trojan Horse’ letter) which described a strategy to • There should be a central government take over some schools in Birmingham and run them on strict strategy lead to: bring together existing Islamic principles. intelligence; disseminate good practice The letter was leaked to the media and the associated scandal guidance; and work with existing bodies to quickly gained media and political attention. A number of reviews support training programmes were commissioned to examine what happened. The review by • Organisations should ensure their the Education Commission for Birmingham stated that: whistleblowing arrangements are clear and “During interviews with senior officers of the Council, it became are communicated to all staff and delivery apparent that each complaint [to the council] was approached on partners, and request intelligence held by a case by case basis. This meant that there was never any their delivery partners to identify possible serious attempt to see if there was a pattern to what was system failures happening in school governing bodies. ”

What we know: Processes and structures should reflect the commitments set out in the policy • Having a strong policy is only the first step in implementing appropriate whistleblowing arrangements • A mature organisation will have strong accountability and governance arrangements to support their whistleblowing arrangements. This may include: • making use of expertise from audit committees / internal audit • having powerful systems to collect and understand whistleblowing intelligence • Have strong structures to support whistleblowing through delivery chain and to gather whistleblowing intelligence from delivery partners • Promote positive behaviours around whistleblowing and ensure staff awareness of whistleblowing arrangements is high

Phase 3: The role of prescribed persons What we did: • • Explored process for appointed and supporting prescribed persons • Reviewed how prescribed persons handle concerns Examined information provided by prescribed persons to potential whistleblowers We concluded that: • Organisations demonstrated a sound commitment to improving procedures for handling concerns. But a gap exists between whistleblowers’ expectations and actions of prescribed persons. We recommended: • Prescribed persons should: manage whistleblowers’ expectations by publishing more information on the prescribed persons remit and powers and details of how they investigate; and explain to their employees how they should handle whistleblowers • BIS should support the network of prescribed persons by developing good practice guidance for prescribed persons and ensuring they understand their responsibilities within the legislation Case study: managing expectations Whistleblowers we spoke to were often dissatisfied with the amount of feedback they received: for example one whistleblower reported a concern to a prescribed person in January 2014 but did not receive any feedback until October 2014. One whistleblower we spoke to raised a concern with the relevant prescribed person and was told the concern would be passed to the relevant team to consider. However, the whistleblower understands that the prescribed person chose not to investigate and is disappointed with this lack of action.

What we know: role of the prescribed person is crucial • Decision to blow whistle is a difficult one: whistleblowers need support throughout the process • Whistleblowers can experience negative outcomes but the current system does not enable it to monitor how whistleblowers are treated • Prescribed persons are well prepared to handle concerns and review and update their procedures • It is not clear what is expected from the prescribed persons community • There is a gap between whistleblowers’ expectations and the actions of prescribed persons