Property dualism objections Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy co uk

Property dualism: objections Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk © Michael Lacewing

Substance and property dualism • Substance dualism: minds are not bodies nor parts of bodies, but distinct substances – Cartesian dualism: Minds can exist independent of bodies, and mental properties are properties of a mental substance • Property dualism: there is just one sort of substance, physical substance, but at least some mental properties are a fundamentally new kind of property that are not fixed by physical properties – Properties of phenomenal consciousness – qualia © Michael Lacewing

Rejecting physicalism • Physicalism: everything that exists is physical or depends on what is physical – The only kind of substance is physical – The only properties that are fundamental are physical properties – all other properties depend on physical properties • Property dualism: some properties of consciousness are not ontologically dependent on physical properties – There are natural laws that correlate mental properties with physical ones, but it is metaphysically possible for these correlations to be different © Michael Lacewing

Mental causation • Do mental properties have ‘causal powers’? – E. g. Do thoughts cause bodily movements and other thoughts? • Property dualism doesn’t face the problem that substance dualism does, because mental properties are properties of physical substance • But how do mental properties cause physical effects? – This is no objection: any fundamental causal relationship can’t be further explained (e. g. how does mass bend space? ) © Michael Lacewing

Property dualism and science • Objection: if mental properties cause physical effects, this is incompatible with science, esp. neuroscience – We don’t have good evidence of this – Some interpretations of quantum mechanics support the idea that consciousness has effects © Michael Lacewing

Epiphenomenalism • It is appealing to think that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause • This is compatible with property dualism if mental properties make no causal difference to the world – epiphenomenalism • Physicalism is right about causation, but wrong about what exists © Michael Lacewing

Counter-intuitive • Objection: Epiphenomenalism is very counterintuitive – Reply 1: it is only some mental properties – qualia – that are epiphenomenal – Reply 2: it seems like mental states (e. g. pain) cause physical effects (e. g. crying) because a brain process causes both – So the mental state is correlated with the effect, but doesn’t cause it © Michael Lacewing

Natural selection • Objection: how and why would epiphenomenal properties evolve? – The traits that evolve are ones that causally contribute to survival and reproduction • Reply: epiphenomenal mental properties are byproducts of traits (brain processes) that make a difference to survival – Not all properties are selected for, e. g. a polar bear needs a warm coat, and this turns out to be heavy, but the heaviness doesn’t contribute to survival – It’s just a fundamental law of nature that some brain processes are correlated with consciousness © Michael Lacewing

An objection from introspection • I know I am in pain, because my belief that I am in pain is caused by my pain. • If epiphenomenalism is true, my pain causes nothing. • If epiphenomenalism is true, I will believe that I am in pain if my brain processes are the same, even if I am not in pain. • So if epiphenomenalism is true, my belief that I am in pain is unreliable, and not knowledge. © Michael Lacewing

Reply • Knowledge doesn’t require direct causation – Suppose the brain state that causes pain also causes the belief that I am in pain – Then I wouldn’t (normally) have the belief without the pain – so my belief is reliable – So I know when I’m in pain © Michael Lacewing

A ‘category mistake’ • Category mistake: To treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from the one it actually belongs to – E. g. Oxford University; team spirit • Ryle: Substance dualism wrongly thinks that the mind is another ‘thing’ – It is not a distinct, complex, organised unit, subject to distinct relations of cause and effect (to lose your mind and lose your keys is not to lose two things!) – Mental concepts (of ‘states’ and ‘processes’) do not operate like physical concepts • The ‘para-mechanical hypothesis’: – since physical processes can be explained in mechanical terms, mental concepts must refer to non-spatial, non-mechanical processes – This is a category mistake © Michael Lacewing

A ‘category mistake’ • This applies to property dualism – it thinks of mental properties as part of the same metaphysical framework as physical and functional properties, only different • Experiences are not a ‘something’ with peculiar properties of ‘what it is like’ • ‘What it is like’ to see red is given by describing what we see when we attend to a red object – ‘Red’ is the colour of the object, not a property of experience • Differences between experiences (‘what it is like to see red is different from what it is like to see blue’) are simply differences between physical objects © Michael Lacewing