Problem Structure Human Rights and the Environment Predictions

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Problem Structure: Human Rights and the Environment

Problem Structure: Human Rights and the Environment

Predictions based on Variation in Problem Structure • DV: difficulty of reaching agreement –

Predictions based on Variation in Problem Structure • DV: difficulty of reaching agreement – Benign/malign distinction – How we “measure” (“proxy” or “indicator” of) the DV – how long it will take to reach agreement • IVs – Perpetrators and victims as ways of distinguishing problem structure – Problem type: deadlock, PEPI, up/downstream, collaboration, coordination, knowledge, normative – Inherent transparency; Violation tolerance; Response incentives

Predictions based on Variation in Problem Structure • Difficulty – hardest at top –

Predictions based on Variation in Problem Structure • Difficulty – hardest at top – Deadlock – Upstream/downstream – Normative – Collaboration – Positive externalities plagued by incapacity – Coordination – Epistemic/knowledge

Predictions based on Variation in Problem Structure • Low violation tolerance: EASIER to resolve

Predictions based on Variation in Problem Structure • Low violation tolerance: EASIER to resolve • High inherent transparency: EASIER to resolve • Weak response incentives – difficult to predict: – If large benefits from cooperation, then strong response incentives reassure actors that others will comply, making it EASIER to negotiate agreement – If small benefits from cooperation, then states may want to have flexibility and, therefore, weak response incentives will : EASIER to resolve IF weak incentives for action

Q 1: Conflict/harmony/cooperation Human Rights • Behaviors impose only NON-material costs on other countries

Q 1: Conflict/harmony/cooperation Human Rights • Behaviors impose only NON-material costs on other countries and only some countries see these as suboptimal • Often deadlock because of difference of values • Rarely an important priority Environment • Some cases, all countries see outcomes as suboptimal • Other cases, only some see as suboptimal • Rarely is it an important priority

Q 2: Actors Human Rights Environment • Normative agenda so • Problems vary: regional,

Q 2: Actors Human Rights Environment • Normative agenda so • Problems vary: regional, ALL countries implicated global, Antarctic and fisheries (different # of • For some rights, non“players” in different governmental actors problems) are responsible (e. g. , FGM) • Govts often not the culprits

Q 3: Capacities/power Human Rights • Econ/social rights AND Health: NOT all countries can

Q 3: Capacities/power Human Rights • Econ/social rights AND Health: NOT all countries can provide PEPI • Powerful countries’ values wield more influence than weak countries’ Environment • Many problems, all countries are capable of engaging or not in problem • For some problems, some countries cannot engage in problem (e. g. , nuclear pollution) • For some problems, some countries cannot engage in solution (e. g. , wildlife protection) PEPI

Q 4: Incentives/preferences Human Rights • Civil/political rights: government incentives to violate to preserve

Q 4: Incentives/preferences Human Rights • Civil/political rights: government incentives to violate to preserve order and retain power (all have capacity of restraint) SIMILARITIES TO Upstream/downstream problem BUT better thought of as Normative problem Environment • River pollution and water use, acid rain (all have capacity but perhaps not tech of restraint) Upstream/downstream problem • Overfishing, agreed-upon pollution problems, climate change, biodiversity loss(all have capacity but perhaps not tech of restraint) Collaboration problem

Q 5: Information/knowledge Human Rights • “Knowledge” plays little role Environment • Some problems

Q 5: Information/knowledge Human Rights • “Knowledge” plays little role Environment • Some problems well understood scientifically, others not • Often, knowledge of problem develops over time – new knowledge may change “game” from Tragedy of the Commons to harmony

Q 6: Norms/values • • Human Rights “Values” and how those differ across issues,

Q 6: Norms/values • • Human Rights “Values” and how those differ across issues, cultures and time Stronger norm against civ/pol violations than econ/soc Govts have normative “right” to preserve order but debate over what means can be used General norm of HR growing over time Environment • Some areas where norms apply: shouldn’t harm other’s lands, “common heritage” • General norm of environmental protection vs. economy growth

Q 7: Inherent transparency & ability to cheat Human Rights • Econ/social relatively transparent

Q 7: Inherent transparency & ability to cheat Human Rights • Econ/social relatively transparent and low incentives to keep secret because of weak norms • Civil/political easier to keep secret from other governments but individuals/NGOs can get information out Environment • Depends on problem: some pollution can be done without trace while others cannot (chemical vs. oil ocean pollution) • Even “hideable” acts can often be inferred (must sell fish, sealskins, GHG and pollutant emissions reflect fuel use)

Q 8: Response incentives • • • Human Rights Genocide: very low tolerance Major

Q 8: Response incentives • • • Human Rights Genocide: very low tolerance Major civil/political violations: pretty low tolerance Econ/social violations: very high tolerance and low incentives to respond Rarely seen as warranting military response Economic response raises concerns about effectiveness and that others may not join in sanctions Reciprocity won’t work • • Environment Low priority so low incentives to respond; high tolerance Rarely seen as warranting any response Violation tolerance depends on how immediate and large economic costs are (overfishing are high, pollution usually lower) Reciprocity won’t work