Privacy And Authentication for Wireless Local Area Networks

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Privacy And Authentication for Wireless Local Area Networks Ashar Aziz Whitfield Diffie Sun Microsystems,

Privacy And Authentication for Wireless Local Area Networks Ashar Aziz Whitfield Diffie Sun Microsystems, Inc Presented by: Naveen Srinivasan. Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 1

OUTLINE • Loopholes in wireless • Design Goals • Design Overview • Message Exchange

OUTLINE • Loopholes in wireless • Design Goals • Design Overview • Message Exchange in Protocol • Other Issues Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 2

 • Loopholes in Wireless medium – Wireless receivers – No physical constraints •

• Loopholes in Wireless medium – Wireless receivers – No physical constraints • Design Goals – Privacy of wireless data communication and authenticity of the communicating parties – Seamless integration into existing wired network – Mutual authentication – To take advantage of shared key cryptography Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 3

 • Two ways to achieve security – Secure wireless link • Obviates the

• Two ways to achieve security – Secure wireless link • Obviates the need for upgrading existing network • secured(wired)+secured(wireless) – End-to-End Approach • application layer • transport layer • upgrading existing network Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 4

Design Overview Public key and shared key cryptographic techniques – Public Key : session

Design Overview Public key and shared key cryptographic techniques – Public Key : session key and authentication – Shared Key: privacy CA Pub Key Mobile Challenge/Response Protocol Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN Base 5

Content of the Certificate CA Contents: • Serial Number • Validity Period • Machine

Content of the Certificate CA Contents: • Serial Number • Validity Period • Machine Name • Machine Public Key • CA Name Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 6

Message #1 Cert_Mobile, CH 1, Lists of SKCSs Mobile Base • CH 1 128

Message #1 Cert_Mobile, CH 1, Lists of SKCSs Mobile Base • CH 1 128 bit random number • List of SK algorithm include algo and key size • Base station on receiving could indentify that it received from mobile but it doesn’t know if the certificate belongs to Mobile • Certificate • Invalid – rejects the connection • Valid – Reply to message as mentioned in Message #2 Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 7

Message #2 Cert_Base, E(Pub_mobile, RN 1), Chosen SKCS, Sig(Priv_Base, { E(pub_Mobile, RN 1), Chosen

Message #2 Cert_Base, E(Pub_mobile, RN 1), Chosen SKCS, Sig(Priv_Base, { E(pub_Mobile, RN 1), Chosen SKCS, CH 1, List of SKCSs }) Mobile Base • Issues in choosing the SKCS • Why list of SKCSs and CH 1 is sent in Msg #2 ? Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 8

Message #3 E(Pub_Base, RN 2), Sig{ Priv_Mobile, { E(Pub_Base, RN 2), E(Pub_Mobile, RN 1)

Message #3 E(Pub_Base, RN 2), Sig{ Priv_Mobile, { E(Pub_Base, RN 2), E(Pub_Mobile, RN 1) } } Mobile Base Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 9

Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 10

Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 10

Data Packet Issues Problems: • Packet losses • Playback attack Solutions: • Message ID

Data Packet Issues Problems: • Packet losses • Playback attack Solutions: • Message ID • Count of no. of 64 -bits blocks that have been sent • Last 64 -bits of the cipher-text of the last packet • Assumes taken care by higher layer protocol Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 11

Operation with Multiple CAs Previous protocol description single network wide CA – not feasible

Operation with Multiple CAs Previous protocol description single network wide CA – not feasible Hierarchy of CA s is employed Base Station • Not only include the certificate but also the certificate path Mobile • Just its own certificate Privacy and Authentication for Wireless LAN 12