Philosophy 224 Butler Upon Human Nature Joseph Butler

Philosophy 224 Butler, “Upon Human Nature”

Joseph Butler (1692 -1752) � Butler was an Anglican churchman (eventually rising to the office of Bishop), theologian, and philosopher. � As a theologian, he’s best known for his defense of Anglican orthodoxy against Deism. � As a philosopher, he’s known as a critic of both Hobbes and Locke.

The Sermons �The title of the book from which our selections is drawn is Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, published in 1726. �The title given to the first of these sermons in our text is not “Upon Human Nature, ” but rather “Upon the Social Nature of Man. ” ◦ The difference may appear trivial, but it turns out to be crucial to our understanding of how Butler is responding to Hobbes.

Parts and Wholes �The biblical text upon which the sermon is based is from Romans (12: 4 -5). �In his discussion of the context of the biblical passage (in particular ¶ 4) Butler frames his concerns in a way that explicitly evokes the corpuscularism characteristic of Hobbes’s account of human nature. �He seems to agree, at least initially, with Hobbes that the pursuit of self-interest, when properly constrained, serves the interests of society as a whole (cf. , 123), but this agreement is only on the surface.

Peace not War �The disagreement becomes clear immediately in ¶ 6, where Butler insists that our natural state is not the war of all against all, but a community structured by a “natural principle of benevolence” (124), which Butler defines as “love for another (125). �In a footnote attached to this term “benevolence, ” Butler responds directly to Hobbes’s insistence that our fundamental orientation towards others is war, citing a number of common examples of attitudes and dispositions that are inexplicable on the Hobbesian hypothesis.

What did Hobbes Miss? �On Butler’s analysis, a position like Hobbes’s makes the fundamental error of assuming a conflict between love for another and love for oneself, between benevolence and self-concern. ◦ We can’t deny our self-love, so if they are in conflict, we have to deny benevolence. �Butler’s main point is that they need not be in conflict. In fact, they work in concert both to promote private and public good (126)

Conscience is the Clue �We can see this cooperative possibility in our own reflective life in the form of the conscience. �In the operation of conscience, insists Butler, we see the intimate unity of our concern for ourselves and our concern for others. �Our conscience pricks us precisely when this unity is out of whack, when, that is, we are failing ourselves or failing others.

Can this be right? � Someone like Hobbes might respond that this sounds all well and good, but time and time again we see people acting as he suggests we naturally act, without apparent concern for or consequence from their conscience. � Butler responds two ways: 1. 2. People do sometimes receive short term benefits from non-benevolent actions, and this can lead them towards such actions, but history and reflection reveal that these short term benefits come at a cost, and that they end up being happier when they sacrifice the short-term good for the benefit of the unified character he has described (¶ 10). Those few people who are really sociopathic are not the standard by which we should judge humanity, but are aberrations (¶ 13).

The Sum of the Whole �“…as [humans] neglect their duties they owe to their fellow creatures, to which their nature leads them; and are injurious, to which their nature is abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real happiness or interest in the present world…for the sake of which they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and instruments of their own misery and ruin” (132, corrected).