Open Resolvers in COMNET Resolution Duane Wessels Aziz

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Open Resolvers in COM/NET Resolution Duane Wessels, Aziz Mohaisen DNS-OARC 2014 Spring Workshop Warsaw,

Open Resolvers in COM/NET Resolution Duane Wessels, Aziz Mohaisen DNS-OARC 2014 Spring Workshop Warsaw, Poland

Outine • Why do we care about Open Resolvers? • Surveys at Verisign •

Outine • Why do we care about Open Resolvers? • Surveys at Verisign • Characterizing Open Resolvers • Intersection with COM/NET query sources • Geographic distribution • Discussion Verisign Public

Why do we care? • Exploited in DDo. S attacks • Makes cache poisoning

Why do we care? • Exploited in DDo. S attacks • Makes cache poisoning attacks much easier • Cache snooping • Analogous to open mail relays • Note: we’re talking about unintentionally open resolvers here… Verisign Public 3

Two Surveys of IPv 4 Open Resolvers Verisign Public

Two Surveys of IPv 4 Open Resolvers Verisign Public

Models • Target forwards query directly to Authority Prober Q 1 R 2 Target

Models • Target forwards query directly to Authority Prober Q 1 R 2 Target R 1 Auth NS Verisign Public Q 2

Models • Target forwards to a “forwarder” Q 1 Prober Target R 2 Auth

Models • Target forwards to a “forwarder” Q 1 Prober Target R 2 Auth NS Verisign Public R 1 Forwarder Q 2

October 2013 Survey • From Amazon Web Services • Took 173 Hours • •

October 2013 Survey • From Amazon Web Services • Took 173 Hours • • Sent 3, 676, 739, 504 Q 1 probes • • • 2013 -10 -28 14: 00 – 2013 -11 -04 18: 00 All IPv 4 space, except class D/E, RFC 1918 and do-not-probe list Received 43, 538, 209 Q 2’s • For 28, 897, 054 distinct probes • From 277, 049 distinct IP addresses Received 34, 604, 998 R 2’s Verisign Public • For 32, 040, 586 distinct probes • From 31, 424, 854 distinct IP addresses

6000 70 55 Verisign Public

6000 70 55 Verisign Public

May 2014 Survey • From Verisign • Took 17 hours • • Sent 3,

May 2014 Survey • From Verisign • Took 17 hours • • Sent 3, 676, 724, 690 Q 1 probes • • • 2014 -05 -01 18: 20 – 2014 -05 -02 11: 30 All IPv 4 space, except class D/E, RFC 1918, and do-not-probe list Received 38, 079, 578 Q 2’s • For 24, 553, 785 distinct probes • From 230, 417 distinct IP addresses Received 28, 426, 251 R 2’s Verisign Public • For 27, 905, 762 distinct probes • From 27, 281, 623 distinct IP addresses

60200 620 460 Verisign Public

60200 620 460 Verisign Public

Data Analysis • Data is collected with pcap while scan runs • Pcap files

Data Analysis • Data is collected with pcap while scan runs • Pcap files are then parsed into whitespace delimited text • Separate files for Q 1, Q 2, R 1, R 2 • The text files are loaded onto Hadoop • Analyzed with Hive (SQL statements) • Verisign Public Lots of large, multi-table joins

Closed Targets • When the probe results in neither a Q 1 nor an

Closed Targets • When the probe results in neither a Q 1 nor an R 2. Closed % Verisign Public Oct 2013 99. 1 May 2014 99. 2 Prober Target Auth NS Forwarder

Open Targets • When the probe results in either a Q 1 or an

Open Targets • When the probe results in either a Q 1 or an R 2. Open Count Oct 2013 33, 660, 906 May 2014 29, 292, 597 openresolverproject Oct 2013 32, 673, 337 May 2014 27, 454, 609 Verisign Public Prober Target Auth NS Forwarder

Simple Open Resolver • • Q 2 source address equals Target address Prober i.

Simple Open Resolver • • Q 2 source address equals Target address Prober i. e. , Target does not forward elsewhere Target Auth NS Simple Verisign Public Oct 2013 0. 6 % May 2014 0. 6 %

Forwarder • Q 2 source address differs from Target address Simple Forwarder • Oct

Forwarder • Q 2 source address differs from Target address Simple Forwarder • Oct 2013 0. 6 % 79. 8 % May 2014 0. 6 % 78. 0 % How many to Google? Google Fwds Verisign Public Oct 2013 8. 3 % May 2014 8. 9 % Prober Target Auth NS Forwarder

No Q 2, R 2 Error • Didn’t get a Q 2 query and

No Q 2, R 2 Error • Didn’t get a Q 2 query and got an Error response • Usually REFUSED, which is good! Oct 2013 Simple 0. 6 % Forwarder 79. 8 % Err No Forward 10. 8 % Verisign Public May 2014 0. 6 % 78. 0 % 12. 6 % Prober Target Auth NS Forwarder RCODE 1 FORMERR 2 SERVFAIL 3 NXDOMAIN 4 NOTIMPL 5 REFUSED 7 9 10 Oct 2013 0. 0 % 10. 0 % 3. 0 % 0. 0 % 86. 9 % 0. 0 % May 2014 0. 0 % 9. 1 % 3. 6 % 0. 0 % 87. 3 % 0. 0 %

Got Q 2, but R 2 error code • • Received the Q 2

Got Q 2, but R 2 error code • • Received the Q 2 query, but then got an error response. Prober Target Auth NS Forwarder Usually SERVFAIL Oct 2013 Simple 0. 6 % Forwarder 79. 8 % Err No Forward 10. 8 % Err w/ Forward 0. 7 % Verisign Public May 2014 0. 6 % 78. 0 % 12. 6 % 0. 5 % RCODE 1 FORMERR 2 SERVFAIL 3 NXDOMAIN 4 NOTIMPL 5 REFUSED 13 Oct 2013 0. 1 % 77. 5 % 0. 4 % 0. 0 % 22. 0 % 0. 0 % May 2014 0. 4 % 75. 9 % 0. 1 % 23. 6 %

R 2 Blocked • Received Q 2 • But no R 2 Prober Auth

R 2 Blocked • Received Q 2 • But no R 2 Prober Auth NS Oct 2013 Simple 0. 6 % Forwarder 79. 8 % Err No Forward 10. 8 % Err w/ Forward 0. 7 % R 2 Blocked 4. 8 % Verisign Public May 2014 0. 6 % 78. 0 % 12. 6 % 0. 5 % 4. 7 % ? Target Forwarder

Synthesized Answers • No Q 2 • R 2 had an Answer section with

Synthesized Answers • No Q 2 • R 2 had an Answer section with an A record, but wrong value. • Many answer with their own IP Oct 2013 Simple 0. 6 % Forwarder 79. 8 % Err No Forward 10. 8 % Err w/ Forward 0. 7 % R 2 Blocked 4. 8 % Synthesized 3. 4 % Verisign Public May 2014 0. 6 % 78. 0 % 12. 6 % 0. 5 % 4. 7 % 3. 6 % Prober Target Auth NS Forwarder

Q 2 Missing • • No Q 2, but R 2 had an Answer

Q 2 Missing • • No Q 2, but R 2 had an Answer section with correct A record! Prober Target Auth NS Forwarder How? • Data collection problem • Lucky guess Oct 2013 Simple 0. 6 % Forwarder 79. 8 % Err No Forward 10. 8 % Err w/ Forward 0. 7 % R 2 Blocked 4. 8 % Synthesized 3. 4 % Q 2 Missing 0. 0 % Totals 100 % Verisign Public May 2014 0. 6 % 78. 0 % 12. 6 % 0. 5 % 4. 7 % 3. 6 % 0. 0 % 100 % • • 120 times in Oct 2013 survey 1109 times in May 2014 survey

Weirdness: R 2 not from Target • Sent query to x. x • Got

Weirdness: R 2 not from Target • Sent query to x. x • Got response from y. y Prober ? Auth NS IP Changed Verisign Public Oct 2013 2. 1 % May 2014 2. 4 % Target Forwarder

Weirdness: Local Port Changed • Query sent from port X • Response sent to

Weirdness: Local Port Changed • Query sent from port X • Response sent to port Y • 1560 cases Local Port Verisign Public Oct 2013 1560 X Prober Auth NS May 2014 4936 Y Target Forwarder

Weirdness: Remote Port Changed • Query to port 53 • Response from port !=

Weirdness: Remote Port Changed • Query to port 53 • Response from port != 53 53 Prober Auth NS Remote Port Verisign Public Oct 2013 46. 2 % May 2014 46. 7 % 12345 Target Forwarder

Weirdness: Q 2 with RD=1 • Usually queries to Authoritative name servers have RD=0

Weirdness: Q 2 with RD=1 • Usually queries to Authoritative name servers have RD=0 Prober Auth NS Q 2 RD=1 Verisign Public Oct 2013 6079 May 2014 5186 Target RD=1 Forwarder

Weirdness: R 2 with AA=1 • Usually responses from recursive name servers have AA=0

Weirdness: R 2 with AA=1 • Usually responses from recursive name servers have AA=0 Prober Auth NS R 2 AA=1 Verisign Public Oct 2013 0. 7 % May 2014 0. 8 % AA=1 Target Forwarder

Intersection with COM/NET Queriers Verisign Public

Intersection with COM/NET Queriers Verisign Public

COM/NET Query Data • • Four Verisign “big” sites Site Server Amsterdam h. gtld-servers.

COM/NET Query Data • • Four Verisign “big” sites Site Server Amsterdam h. gtld-servers. net Wash DC l. gtld-servers. net New York c. gtld-servers. net San Francisco g. gtld-servers. net Only 4 of 13 gtld-servers. net letters Verisign Public

Intersection of open resolvers and COM/NET (Oct 2013) • What percent of open resolver

Intersection of open resolvers and COM/NET (Oct 2013) • What percent of open resolver exit Ips appear in the COM/NET query data? Site • %OR IPs %COM/NET Queries Amsterdam 64. 3 5. 2 51. 7 Wash DC 66. 4 5. 5 48. 4 New York 66. 2 5. 2 46. 2 San Francisco 64. 6 5. 4 45. 2 Example: At Amsterdam, we see 64. 3% of the open resolvers IPs in one day. This is 5. 2% of all COM/NET IPs seen there. Those IPs are responsible for 51. 7% of COM/NET queries at the site. Verisign Public

Verisign Public

Verisign Public

Verisign Public

Verisign Public

Verisign Public

Verisign Public

Intersection of open resolvers and COM/NET (May 2014) Site %OR IPs %COM/NET Queries Amsterdam

Intersection of open resolvers and COM/NET (May 2014) Site %OR IPs %COM/NET Queries Amsterdam (H) 59. 4 4. 8 57. 2 Wash DC (L) 61. 3 4. 8 50. 6 New York (C) San Francisco (G) Verisign Public down for maintenance 59. 2 4. 9 47. 4

Geographic Distribution Verisign Public

Geographic Distribution Verisign Public

Open Resolvers Geographical Distribution • Open resolvers are massively distributed • 232 countries (including

Open Resolvers Geographical Distribution • Open resolvers are massively distributed • 232 countries (including special territories) • 10, 240 different cities • 13, 887 different organizations (including ISPs) • 83, 407 different networks (domains) • All distributions are heavy tailed (city, org, net, country) • Open resolvers/forwarder associations are distributed Verisign Public • Includes across country associations • Not only limited to well-understood applications, but includes service providers association without territory resolvers

Open Resolvers Geographical Distribution Verisign Public

Open Resolvers Geographical Distribution Verisign Public

Open Resolvers vs. Internet Usage • Per-user distribution is consistent with overall per-country, except

Open Resolvers vs. Internet Usage • Per-user distribution is consistent with overall per-country, except in a few cases (small, hop countries) Verisign Public

Verisign Public te da it ta. n et ai et rte b. ne lb

Verisign Public te da it ta. n et ai et rte b. ne lb ro t ad. co ba nd te lk om. in. n et. id vn n. vn to tb b. as n tu rk 132 et te 85 le. n ko et m. c om. tr hi un net. n in et et. n et. m go x og le. c om er o. lib Organization Level Distribution – Resolvers 3000000 2500000 2000000 1500000 1000000 500000 0

lib er o. te da it ta. n ai et et rte b. ne

lib er o. te da it ta. n ai et et rte b. ne lb ro t ad. co ba nd te lk om. in. n et. id vn n. vn to tb b. as ne tu 1 32 t rk te 8 5. le ne ko m t. c om. tr hi un net. n in et et. n et. m go x og le. c om Organization Level Distribution – Open Resolvers Per Forwarder 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 Verisign Public

Verisign Public te da it ta. n et et ai rte b. ne lb

Verisign Public te da it ta. n et et ai rte b. ne lb ro t ad. co ba nd te lk om. in. n et. id vn n. vn to tb b. as ne tu 1 t 32 rk te 8 5. le ne ko t m. c om. tr hi un net. ne in et t. n et. m go x og le. c om er o. lib Organization Level Distribution - log 10(Forwarders) 4. 5 4 3. 5 3 2. 5 2 1. 5 1 0. 5 0

Final Thoughts Verisign Public

Final Thoughts Verisign Public

Key Points • Still many millions of Open Resolvers on the Internet • The

Key Points • Still many millions of Open Resolvers on the Internet • The trend is decreasing • Most Open Resolvers forward to another recursive • About half respond from the wrong port! • Open Resolver forwarder IPs are strongly linked to COM/NET queries. • Verisign Public Responsible for 50% of the query traffic 42

Questions? Verisign Public

Questions? Verisign Public