NUCLEAR FORENSIC SCIENCE Francisco Bencosme Instructor Ms Villani

NUCLEAR FORENSIC SCIENCE Francisco Bencosme Instructor: Ms Villani

Nuclear Forensics � Nuclear forensics is the protection of nucleic materials and facilities. It also deals with the prevention and detection of illegal trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

Nuclear Forensics and Scientists � � � To identify the nature of the seized material To assess the immediate danger involved and advise the law enforcement authorities on the procedures to be followed To confirm whether an offence has been committed under the appropriate Nuclear Regulations To locate the original source of the material if possible To identify the possible route it has taken up to the point of seizure To give an opinion on the probable intended use of the material.

History of Nuclear Forensics � Nuclear forensics began at the Laboratory under the leadership of scientist Sid Niemeyer in the mid-1990 s, and Livermore has maintained a leading role because of a collective group effort. The Laboratory has been involved in nuclear forensics and attribution for more than 15 years, since the collapse of the Soviet Union sparked concerns about the diversion of nuclear materials from former Soviet nuclear laboratories and other sites. Livermore’s capabilities in radiochemistry and nuclear physics, originally developed for the nation’s underground nuclear testing program, were adapted for use in nuclear forensics and attribution.

What Nuclear Researchers Do • Nuclear forensic covers a broad spectrum of possible substances. A main point is the detection, recovery and investigation into the origins of a stolen container of the chemicals. • Researchers analyze the chemicals and isotope composition. They measure the amount of trace elements and the ratio of parent isotope to daughter isotope. They also measure the shape, size, and texture of the chemical sample. • These measurements help determine the source, location, and the age of the sample.

What Instruments do they use? � � Researchers use techniques such as electron microscopy, x-ray diffraction, and mass spectrometry to analyze interdicted radiological and nuclear materials. In this photo, Ian Hutcheon (left), a senior scientist working with Livermore’s Forensic Science Center, and analytical chemist Peter Weber use Nano. SIMS, a secondary-ion mass spectrometer with nanometer-scale resolution.

Nuclear Forensics and Signatures Nuclear Forensic focuses also on identifying signatures. These are physical, chemical, and isotopic characteristics that make nucleic and radiological materials different from each other. � Livermore scientists and the Office of Laboratory Counsel have compiled a library that is used to check unknown samples against a database. They use statistics to identify unique signatures in each chemical sample. �

How can they stop Terrorism? � � Nuclear forensics is able to explore the origins of a nuclear missile, thereby using it in solving nuclear warfare. Scientists can measure ratios of certain isotopes to find out how long the chemicals have been in the reactor. Scientists can measure ratios of isotopes in uranium to find out its original location. Scientists can trace for impurities like gadolinium to find out how to bomb was created.

Fighting Nuclear Terrorism � � � � � Awareness after September 11. Every possibly available means might be used by terrorists. Prevention. Safeguarding and securing nuclear material. Fighting illicit trafficking. Early detection. Preparedness. Develop “model action plan”. Assistance in analyzing “fall-out”. Evaluation of scenarios.

Threats Posed by Nuclear Terrorism Crude Nuclear Weapon. (requiring larger amount of nuclear material and expertise in construction, means of delivery) � Dirty parcel or letter bombs. (conventional explosive bomb laced with nuclear or radioactive material, easy to construct, no specific amount of nuclear material necessary, no delivery problems) � ‘Quiet’ dispersion of nuclear material. (direct physical dispersion, no specific amount of nuclear or radioactive material required) �

What can happen? � � Extinction!!! Mohammed Sid. Ahmed in 2004 explains: “What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers. ”

What more can happen? Global Nuclear War! Louis Rene Beres explain the terminal impacts of nuclear terrorism � Nuclear terrorism could even spark full-scale war between states. Such war could involve the entire spectrum of nuclear-conflict possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a non-nuclear state to systemwide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists hosted in another state. For example, consider the following scenario: Early in the 1990 s, Israel and its Arab-state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already many years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as defined by the PLO—seem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one-kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousands dead ands maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon Lebanese Shiite forces and Syria retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the situation in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is certainly conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensure, one that would ultimately involve the superpowers or even every nuclear-weapons state on the planet. What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the outer limits of human destructiveness. Any nuclear would have effectively permanent and irreversible consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, such a war would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.

Can terrorists Acquire Nuclear weapons? Some Say Yes � Alyn Ware in “Rule of Force or Rule of Law? Legal Responses to Nuclear Threats from Terrorism, Proliferation, and War, ” says � "acquisition of a nuclear explosive device, by theft or construction, and its threat or use by a terrorist organization, is becoming more likely. In Russia, there is concern over security of their nuclear warheads, particularly those decommissioned and on their tactical delivery vehicles. There is particular concern regarding suitcase-sized "mini-nukes, " though even larger nuclear weapons could be stolen with a large truck. n 29 Of even greater concern is the possibility that a sub-national group could acquire the key ingredients for a nuclear warhead, highly enriched uranium or plutonium, to manufacture a bomb. The smuggling of highly enriched uranium has been intercepted on a couple of occasions, n 30 as has the smuggling of plutonium. n 31 While the construction of a nuclear bomb is difficult, the U. S. Office of Technology Assessment has reported that it is definitely within the capabilities of a non-state group: [A] small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device. They would not necessarily require a great deal of technological equipment or have to undertake any experiments. The group would have to include at a minimum, a [*250] person capable of researching and understanding the literature in several fields and a jack-of-all trades technician. N 32”

Can terrorist acquire Nuclear Weapons? Some Say No � � Gary Milhollin a Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Controlcites several nuclear scientists who conclude that the risk is low. “There are essentially two ways for a terrorist group to lay its hands on a nuclear weapon: either build one from scratch or somehow procure an already manufactured one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Building a bomb from scratch would confer the most power: a group that could build one bomb could build several, and a nuclear arsenal would put it front and center on the world stage. But of all the possibilities, this is the unlikeliest-"so remote, " in the words of a senior nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, "that it can be essentially ruled out. " The chief obstacle lies in producing the nuclear fuel-either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium-that actually explodes in a chain reaction. More than 80 percent of the effort that went into making America's first bombs was devoted to producing this fuel, and it is no easy task. To make bomb-grade uranium, a terrorist group would need thousands of high-speed gas centrifuges, machined to exact dimensions, arranged in series, and capable of operating under the most demanding conditions. If they wanted to produce the uranium by a diffusion process, they would need an even greater number of other machines, equally difficult to manufacture and operate. If they followed Saddam Hussein's example, they could try building a series of giant electromagnets, capable of bending a stream of electrically charged particles-a no less daunting challenge. For any of these, they would also need a steady supply of natural uranium and a specialized plant to convert it to a gaseous form for processing. Who would sell these things to would-be nuclear terrorists? The answer is: nobody. The world's nuclear-equipment makers are organized into a cooperative group that exists precisely to stop items like these from getting into unauthorized hands. Nor could a buyer disguise the destination and send materials through obliging places like Dubai (as Iran does with its hot cargoes) or Malta (favored by Libya's smugglers). The equipment is so specialized, and the suppliers so few, that a forest of red flags would go up. And even if the equipment could be bought, it would have to be operated in a place that the United States could not find. “

International Effort Against Nuclear Terrorism � Strengthening the Worldwide Effort The Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) was chartered in 1996 to foster international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. “The ITWG was formed with the recognition that nations must work together, ” says geochemist David Smith of the Nonproliferation, Homeland International Security Directorate. The ITWG was cofounded by Livermore scientist Sid Niemeyer and has been cochaired by Lawrence Livermore since its inception. The ITWG works closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide member countries with support forensic analyses. Priorities include the development of common protocols for the collection of evidence and laboratory investigations, organization of forensic exercises, and technical assistance to requesting nations. Experts from participating nations and organizations meet annually to work on issues concerning illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The 2006 meeting was sponsored by the European Commission’s Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany. To promote the science of nuclear forensics within the ITWG, the Nuclear Forensics Laboratory Group was organized in 2004. In that year, Livermore scientists wrote a comprehensive description of a model action plan to guide member states in their own nuclear forensic investigations. The plan provides recommendations governing incident response, sampling and distribution of materials, radioactive materials analysis, traditional forensic analysis, and nuclear forensic interpretation of signatures. In 2006, the IAEA published the model action plan as a Nuclear Security Series Technical Document. Participating countries have adopted the plan and used it in their own

Problems faced by Nuclear Forensics Today � Due to huge costs and insignificant funding, nuclear forensics has been restricted to only a few national and international labs. Most scientists have not yet had the chance to learn how to handle the proper chemicals in order to work in a lab. Also, the standards for collecting and examining evidence that is suspected of being of a nuclear smuggling is still developing.

Sources of Nuclear Materials � Nuclear materials can be placed into three categories. � Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) IAEA categories of High Enriched Uranium (HUE), which includes the sub category of Weapons Grade Uranium (WGU) and Weapons Grade Plutonium (WGPu). � Reactor Fuel IAEA categories of Low Enriched uranium (LEU), Reactor grade Plutonium (RGPu), Fuel Grade Plutonium (FGPu), and Mox Grade Plutonium (MGPu). � Commercial Radioactive Sources Chemically purified sources that decay by the emission of alpha, beta, or gamma rays.

Expectations and Attributions of Forensics Scientists Determining how and where legitimate control of nuclear material was lost and tracing the route of the material from diversion through interdiction are important goals for any nuclear attribution. It is equally important to determine whether additional devices or materials that pose a threat to public safety are available on the black market. The answer to these questions depends on determining the source of the material and its method of production. Nuclear forensics provides essential insights into methods of production and sources of illicit radioactive materials. It is most powerful when combined with traditional methods of investigation, including intelligence sources and traditional detective work. Nuclear forensics can play a decisive role in attributing and prosecuting crimes involving radioactive materials. Some of the current limitations of nuclear forensics are a result of the emerging nature and increasing urgency of this discipline. For example, the world’s nuclear powers are only now beginning to share information about their nuclear processes and materials. Numerous databases exist in many countries and organizations that could be valuable for the future development and application of nuclear forensics. The contents of many of these databases will never be directly shared, but the development of a “distributed” comprehensive database (see Section 6. 3) will benefit international efforts. In addition, countries are beginning to combine the expertise of traditional forensics experts, normally found in police organizations, and nuclear experts, normally found in universities and government laboratories. Nuclear forensics will always be limited by the diagnostic information inherent in the interdicted material. For example, the clever criminal can minimize or eliminate the important markers for traditional forensics (fingerprints, stray material, etc. ). Some nuclear materials inherently have isotopic or chemical characteristics that serve as unequivocal markers of specific sources, production processes, or transit routes. Other nuclear materials do not. Fortunately, the international nuclear engineering enterprise has a restricted number of conspicuous process steps that makes the attribution process easier. Finally, it will always be difficult to distinguish between materials that reflect similar source or production histories, but are derived from disparate sites.

� � � References FP 6 - Press briefing, Wed. 13 Novmeber, 10: 45 Small technologies versus big crime: nanotechnlogies for safety, security Klaus Lützenkirchen, JRC - ITU, Nuclear Forensic Science http: //ec. europa. eu/research/conferences/2002/pdf/presspacks/presentations/3 -2 -4 -ppt_en. pdf http: //www-cmls. llnl. gov/? url=about_cmels-centers_and_institutes-fsc http: //www-cmls. llnl. gov/? url=science_and_technology-chemistry-nuclear_forensics “Identifying the Source of stolen nuclear materials” Arnie Heller Scientific Support to Terrorism Investigations, Randall S. Murch, Deputy Assistant Director, Science Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, DC, http: //www. fbi. gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july 1999/murchltr. htm "The Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism — And Next Steps To Reduce The Danger“ Committee On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate Testimony, Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University April 2, 200, http: //belfercenter. ksg. harvard. edu/publication/18187/risk_of_nuclear_terrorism_and_next_steps_to_reduce_the_danger. html Mohamed Sid-Ahmed 2004 (Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, "Extinction!" 8/26, http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2004/705/op 5. htm) Beres 1987 (Louis René- Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat, p. 42 -43) Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 2002 (Commentary Magazine, 2/1, p. 45 -9, “Can Terrorists Get the Bomb? ”) Gregg Easterbrook, WIRED, November 7, 2003 (http: //www. wired. com/wired/archive/11. 07/doomsday. html) Arms Control Today, October 2006: Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism (William Dunlop and Harold Smith) New tools for a new world order, Nuclear forensics touted as method to trace bomb materials, deterrent for rogue nations Matthew B. Stannard, Chronicle Staff Writer, Sunday, October 29, 2006, http: //www. sfgate. com/cgi-bin/article. cgi? f=/c/a/2006/10/29/MNG 32 M 27 K 61. DTL