Now you see them now you dont A

  • Slides: 9
Download presentation
‘Now you see them, now you don't’ A criminological reflection on (one of) the

‘Now you see them, now you don't’ A criminological reflection on (one of) the ‘hidden’ security measures at Belgian airports to combat organized crime and terrorism Jop Van der Auwera Prof. dr. Dirk Van Daele Prof. dr. Geert Vervaeke Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, KU Leuven

Overview (1) The airport as a vulnerable ‘node’ (2) The ‘Israelification' of Belgian airports

Overview (1) The airport as a vulnerable ‘node’ (2) The ‘Israelification' of Belgian airports (3) Predictive or behavioural profiling as a security measure (4) Conclusion 2

1. The airport as a vulnerable ‘node’ 1. 1. The airport as an attractive

1. The airport as a vulnerable ‘node’ 1. 1. The airport as an attractive target for terrorism Ø The airport as a (vulnerable) node § Anonymity: large area, freely accessible and therefore difficult to secure Ø Objective: disrupting society and/or media attention § National symbol § Many potential international victims § Complex interdependence (i. e. critical infrastructures) Ø Consequence: loss of control § Fear and feelings of insecurity Results in security expectations 3

1. The airport as a vulnerable ‘node’ 1. 2. Global security response Ø Focus

1. The airport as a vulnerable ‘node’ 1. 2. Global security response Ø Focus on risks and threats, mainly in vulnerable nodes (e. g. airports) Ø Preventive measures (of course in addition to reactive measures) § Purpose: to assess and eliminate potential risk persons, groups and areas § Strategic information position § Routine controls (using risk profiles) Ø Objective: prevent harmful effects 4 How will these objectives be translated into practice? What is happened to the security of Belgian airports after the bombings of March 22 (2016)?

2. The ‘Israelification' of Belgian airports 2. 1. ‘Israelification’ Ø “A process in which

2. The ‘Israelification' of Belgian airports 2. 1. ‘Israelification’ Ø “A process in which certain groups at different levels set an example and seek to adopt Israel's lifestyle, language, culture, political and other characteristics. ” Ø Israeli history of airport security § Hijacking 1968 by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Ø Change of aviation security regime (including risk profiles based on ethnicity and religion) § Terrorist attack on the Israeli airport on 30 May 1972 by PFLP Ø Cooperation with Japanese Red Army Ø Turning point in Israel's aviation security vision: 'Everyone is suspicious'. Ø Consequence: § "zero-tolerance security philosophy", "the safest and most secure airport" and "golden standard” Ø How? § Net widening and net tightening § Layered security structure 5

2. The ‘Israelification' of Belgian airports 2. 2 List of all security methods in

2. The ‘Israelification' of Belgian airports 2. 2 List of all security methods in Israel Ø Layer 1: airport perimeter - heavily armed checkpoints Ø ANPR-camera shield Ø Advanced technology, such as weight sensors, X-rays and scans of the car chassis (firearms or explosives) Ø Layer 2: entering the airport building – visual screening Ø Patrols, surveillance, (smart) cameras, etc. Ø Layer 3: extra control at check-in desk Ø Authenticity-check of the airline ticket Ø Addition of sticker on boarding pass (screening based on passenger data) Ø Layer 4: Check of baggage and individual security screening Ø “They're not looking for liquids, they're not looking at your shoes. They just look at you, with a specific focus on ‘the human factor’’’ Ø Layer 5: non-uniformed flight attendants (sky marshals) 6 Predictive profiling or behavioural profiling

3. Predictive of behavioural profiling as a security measure 3. 1 A theoretical explanation

3. Predictive of behavioural profiling as a security measure 3. 1 A theoretical explanation Ø “an added layer of security” Ø Phased progression: Ø (1) Observation – (2) Informal conversation – (3) Physical control – (4) Consequences Ø Behavior detection officer (BDO) § Focus on behavioural characteristics: abnormal behaviour and criminal intent § Stress (e. g. avoiding eye contact, yawning, sweating, late arrival at gate, clock watching, blushing, increase in heart rate, etc. ). § Fear (e. g. cold penetrating gaze, holding luggage tightly, excessive interest in security personnel, etc. ) § Deception (e. g. looking confused, not answering questions and/or wearing a disguise, etc. ). Is this a valid method? 7

3. Predictive of behavioural profiling as a security measure 3. 2 Predictive profiling from

3. Predictive of behavioural profiling as a security measure 3. 2 Predictive profiling from a psychological perspective Ø Assumption 1: “Passengers with criminal intent show abnormal verbal, non-verbal and vocal behaviour or psychophysiological signs in comparison with legitimate passengers” (!) Theoretical validity? Ø Assumption 2: “BDOs are capable of perceiving the behaviour immediately" (!) Advanced equipment needed or tiny differences? Ø Assumption 3: "BDOs are capable of accurately identifying persons with a criminal intent". (!) ± 54% for liars, but detection capacity usually slightly higher for criminal intent? Ø Assumption 4: “BDOs are able to present better detection results through training” (!) Ambivalent results in terms of a training effect? 8

4. Conclusion and contact information Theoretical desirability of the method? Ø Is the method

4. Conclusion and contact information Theoretical desirability of the method? Ø Is the method – in his current form – theoretically valid? Ø Should the method be subjected to an experimental and practical validity study? Jop Van der Auwera Research Unit of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, KU Leuven Contact: Hooverplein 10 - 3000 Leuven 016/32. 16. 02 0498/30. 75. 53 jop. [email protected] be 9