November 8 1999 CACR Briefing CACR CC Briefing

November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing

CACR CC Briefing Stephen Booth Computer and System Security Section Communications Security Establishment Stephen. Booth@cse-cst. gc. ca November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing

Presentation Objectives • I intend to provide: – an overview of the CC Project – the Current Status of the CC and CEM – a description of the CC MRA – a high level description of the CC - how it is structured – a description of the Canadian CC Scheme November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 3

• • • Terms Used CC - Common Criteria CCEF - (CCE Approved) CC Evaluation Facility CCS - Canadian CC Evaluation and Certification Scheme CEM - Common Evaluation Methodology EAL - Evaluation Assurance Level MRA Mutual Recognition Arrangement PP - Protection Profile ( what the buyer needs) ST - Security Target ( what the vendor has) TOE - Target of Evaluation (the product) TSF - TOE Security Functions November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 4

CC PPs and STs/TOEs Customer Protection Profile (What I Need) Vendor Security Target (What I Have) November 8, 1999 Target of Evaluation (the Product) CACR Briefing 5

History of Evaluation Criteria • ‘ 83/85: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) • ‘ 91: Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) • ‘ 93: Canadian Trusted Computer Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) • ‘ 96: Common Criteria (CC) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 6

TCSEC • Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (orange book) Do. D 5200. 28 -STD, December 1983 • Four trust rating divisions (classes): – D, C (C 1, C 2), B (B 1, B 2, B 3), A (A 1) • Three basic requirements: • specific security functionality requirement • assurance requirement • documentation requirement November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 7

ITSEC • Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (France, Germany, Netherlands and UK) v 1. 2, 1991 • focus is on assurance regardless of functionality • product evaluated to perform as indicated in documentation November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 8

CTCPEC • Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria, Version 3. 0, Jan. 1993 • two types of requirements are delineated: • functionality requirements • assurance requirements (T-0 to T-7) • functionality: four policy-oriented criteria Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Accountability November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 9

Common Criteria (CC) • Common Criteria Version 1. 0 (CC) 31 Jan 1996 • aligned the evaluation criteria of nations (ie. TCSEC, FC (USA), CTCPEC (Canada), ITSEC (Europe), ISO) • compatible with existing evaluation criteria • one product evaluated against it (Milkyway Black Hole firewall) • CC version 2. 0 (May 1998) now superceded by • CC Version 2. 1 which is identical to ISO 17408 November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 10

CEM • What is the CEM? – Common Methodology for information technology security evaluation – An common understanding of what the CC assurance requirements mean and the minimum work necessary to satisfy them – Supports mutual recognition of evaluation results November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 11

Purpose of the CEM • Defines specific evaluator work units • Common approach to satisfying assurance requirements defined in CC Part 3 • Primary audience is evaluators and certifiers overseeing evaluator work • Counter balances commercial pressures to reduce evaluation effort November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 12

Progress to date on the CEM • Part 1, Introduction and general model, release January 97 • Part 2, Evaluation methodology, first released January 99 (ver 0. 6) (1003 comments received) • Part 2, re-released, August 99 (ver 1. 0) – Incorporated large majority of comments • Working document for next 12 to 18 months • MRA requirement to use for evaluations commencing Jan 2000 November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 13

Future work on the CEM • Methodology for augmentations beyond predefined assurance packages • Evaluations need not be performed using pre-define assurance packages • Methodology for maintenance of certificates • How to extend evaluation results to future releases • Methodology for high assurance requirements • Current CEM covers assurance requirements in low to medium assurance category November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 14

Mutual Recognition Arrangement • attempted to document a “gentleman’s agreement” to accept each others evaluation results • started as an agreement but that meant it was staffed and signed as an international treaty • fundamental concept of the CC project • if there is no effective MRA then the CC project has failed! November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 15

What do we need for MRA? • Common and agreed upon standard • Common and agreed upon evaluation methodology • Trust / comfort that the other signatories are doing things if not the same way then at least in a consistent way • Willingness of all the partners to take some risks November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 16

• • • What do we have that let us sign MRA? CC CEM require evaluation facilities to be accredited to ISO 25 require CBs to meet the requirements of ISO 65 Technical discussion group that meets to talk about how each of our schemes work • a commitment to undergo voluntary periodic assessments • Are we all totally comfortable? November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 17

What do we have that let us sign MRA? • Risk takers and mitigation steps – accepted each other “on faith” and before CEM was completed – we accept EAL 1 to 4 for now • a commitment to make MRA and the CC project work November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 18

MRA Signing • Arrangement on the Mutual Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the Field of Information Technology Security – signed October 8, 1998 – Germany, UK, Canada, US and France – expanded this year (September )to include the Australasian Scheme November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 19

What does it mean? • Extracts from the MRA document November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 20

MRA Future • • expand both signatories and scope ( >EAL 4) initiatives underway to expand to Europe work on CEM for higher assurance levels stepping up the schedule of “voluntary assessments” November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 21

CC Document Structure • Part 1 Introduction and general model • Part 2 Security functional requirements • Part 3 Security assurance requirements November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 22

CC Part 1 • • Introduction to the rest of the documents A general model of evaluation Common Criteria evaluation results Structure for expressing requirements and specifications November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 23

CC Part 2 • • Class, family, and component structure Operations Catalogue of functional requirements Application notes (housed in a separate volume) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 24

CC Part 3 • Assurance requirements of the criteria: – CC Assurance Paradigm – Evaluation criteria for PPs (Class APE) – Evaluation criteria for STs (Class ASE) – Catalogue of assurance requirements – Evaluation assurance levels (EALs) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 25

CC Functionality November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing

Functional Requirements • Describe the desired security behavior of the TOE • Intended to protect confidentiality, integrity and availability of assets, as required • May be customized for inclusion in a PP/ST November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 27

Requirements Structure Class Family Component Element November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing Component Element 28

Interpreting Functional Requirement Names FIA_UID. 1. 2 Element Number F=Functional A=Assurance Specific Class November 8, 1999 Family Name CACR Briefing Component Number 29

CC Functional Classes (1) • • • Security audit (FAU) Communication (FCO) Cryptographic support (FCS) User data protection (FDP) Identification and authentication (FIA) • Security management (FMT) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 30

CC Functional Classes (2) • Privacy (FPR) • Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT) • Resource utilisation (FRU) • TOE access (FTA) • Trusted path/channels (FTP) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 31

Functional Components • It is the collection of functional components in a PP/ST that defines the functionality • Each component contains a list of evaluatable statements, called “elements” • All elements must be successfully evaluated within a component November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 32

FIA: Identification and authentication • Addresses requirements for functions to establish and verify a claimed user identity • FIA deals with: – user identification and authentication – authentication failures – user attributes (e. g. , clearances, roles) – constraints on quality of authentication data (e. g. minimum password size) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 33

Selected FIA families • FIA_UID: User identification • FIA_UAU: User authentication • FIA_SOS: Specification of secrets November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 34

FAU: Security Audit • Security auditing involves recognising, recording, storing, and analysing information related to security relevant events. • Post event examination of which security events took place, and which user (if applicable) is responsible. November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 35

Selected FAU families • • • FAU_GEN: Security Audit Data Generation FAU_SEL: Security Audit Event Selection FAU_STG: Security Audit Event Storage FAU_SAR: Security Audit Review FAU_SAA: Security Audit Analysis November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 36

FMT: Security Management • management of TSF data (e. g. banners) • management of security attributes (ACL’s) • management of functions of the TSF (e. g. selection of functions, setting rules, etc. ) • definition of security roles November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 37

Selected FMT families • FMT_MSA: Management of Security Attributes – attribute: used for enforcement of TSP • FMT_MTD: Management of TSF Data – data: created by and for the TOE • FMT_SMR: Security Management Roles November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 38

FCO: Communications • Address the functions that are concerned with assuring the identity of a party participating in a data exchange – proof of origin – proof of receipt November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 39

FCO Families • FCO_NRO: Non-repudaition of origin • FCO_NRR: Non-repudiation of receipt November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 40

FDP: User data protection • Specifies requirements for policies and functions related to user data protection • FDP deals with: – security function policies for user data protection (access control, information flow) – forms of user data protection – off-line storage, import and export – inter-TSF communication November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 41

Selected FDP families • FDP_ACC: Access control policy • FDP_ACF: Access control functions • FDP_RIP: Residual information protection • FDP_ROL: Rollback • FDP_SDI: Stored data integrity November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 42

FPR: Privacy • Addresses those functions that protect against discovery and misuse of identity by others November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 43

FPR Families • FPR_ANO: Anonymity • FPR_PSE: Pseudonymity • FRP_UNL: Unlinkability • FPR: Unobservability November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 44

FRU: Resource utilization • Supports the availability of required resources (processing capability, storage capacity) • FRU deals with: – fault tolerance – prioritization of services – resource allocation November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 45

Selected FRU family • FRU_RSA: November 8, 1999 Resource allocation CACR Briefing 46

FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions • 3 significant portions of the TSF: – abstract machine • what does the TOE “sit upon” – implementation • the mechanisms that enforce the TSP – TSF data • the transient rules and data of the TOE November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 47

Selected FPT families • • FPT_FLS: Fail Secure FPT_RCV: Trusted Recovery FPT_RVM: Reference Mediation FPT_SEP: Domain Separation November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 48

FTA: TOE Access • Addresses functional requirements for controlling the establishment of a user’s session November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 49

FTA Families • FTA_LSA: Limitation on scope of slectable attributes • FTA_MCS: Limitation on multiple concurrent sessions • FTA_SSL: Session locking • FTA_TAB: TOE Access banners • FTA_TAH: TOE Access history November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 50 • FTA_TSE: TOE Session establishment

FTP: Trusted Path/Channels • Addresses functional requirements for – trusted communications path between users and the TSF and – trusted channel between TSF and other trusted IT products November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 51

FTP Families • FTP_ITC: Inter TSF trusted channel • FTP_TRP: Trusted path – a direct path between users and the TSF November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 52

FCS: Cryptographic support • Addresses TOEs which employ cryptographic functionality • FCS deals with: – cryptographic key generation, distribution, access and destruction – cryptographic operations performed by the TOE (e. g. , encryption, decryption, digital signatures, checksums, secure hash, etc. ) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 53

FCS families • FCS_CKM: Cryptographic key management • FCS_COP: November 8, 1999 Cryptographic operation CACR Briefing 54

FCS_CKM: Cryptographic key management (1) • This family supports the management of cryptographic keys throughout their life cycle • Each of the components allow for claims to be made that particular standards are met • FCS_CKM. 1 requires that the TSF generate cryptographic keys; operations are completed for the key generation algorithm and key size November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 55

FCS_CKM: Cryptographic key management (2) • FCS_CKM. 2 defines how the TSF distributes cryptographic keys (operations) • FCS_CKM. 3 specifies the types of cryptographic access (with associated methods) employed by the TSF (operations) • FCS_CKM. 4 defines how the TSF destroys cryptographic keys. CACR (operations) November 8, 1999 Briefing 56

FCS_COP: Cryptographic operation (1) • This family contains only one component: FCS_COP. 1 • This family identifies which cryptographic operations (e. g. , data encryption, digital signature) are performed by the TOE, and using which cryptographic algorithms, and key sizes November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 57

FCS_COP: Cryptographic operation (2) • Although strength of cryptographic algorithms is outside the scope of the CC, the correct implementation of the cryptographic algorithms must still be verified by the evaluator November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 58

CC Assurance • Configuration Management • Delivery & Operation • Development November 8, 1999 • • Guidance Documents Life Cycle Support Tests Vulnerability Assessment CACR Briefing 59

Different Levels of Assurance • The CC Provides for 7 different “Evaluation Assurance Levels” (EALs) – Starts at EAL 1 (Low Assurance) – EAL 3 & EAL 4 (Medium Assurance) – EAL 5 & EAL 6 (High Assurance) – EAL 7 (State of the Art) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 60

November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 61

Objective of EAL 1 • Security requirements are traced into the design • testing verifies behavior is as expected • This provides assurance because; – if a product behaves IAW with security requirements, and – if security requirements are effective to solve security problem, then – product will effectively solve security problem November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 62

Why EAL 1 is considered basic • So little is known about the product’s design – correct behavior does not mean vulnerability free • Nothing is known about the development process – poor development practices often means poor security, or – good security cannot be assured in the absence of good development practices November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 63

EAL 1 versus EAL 3 • EAL 1 (Low Assurance) – “Functionally Tested” – Given a product with Installation, Admin & User Guides. – Does it do what the Guides said it would? November 8, 1999 • EAL 3 (Medium Assurance) – EAL 1 plus… – High Level Design – Test Plan, Procedures, Results, Coverage, Depth, Independent – Misuse, SOF, Obvious Vulnerabilities CACR Briefing 64

Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 65

CCS Purpose • To provide a cost effective, expandable IT security evaluation capability in Canada • ensure quality of evaluations • improve availability of evaluated products • improve efficiency and cost effectiveness of evaluation and certification processes November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 66

CCS Framework • • SCC Accreditation of IT E&T Facilities CSE Approval of CCS ITSEFs >>CCEFs will Evaluate IT products CSE will Certify CCEF results November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 67

A Framework for Commercial ITS Evaluation and Testing • Basic Quality System • Management Structure • Documented Procedures General requirements for the Competence of Calibration & Testing Laboratories: ISO Guide 25, CAN-P-4 November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 68

A Framework for Commercial ITS Evaluation and Testing • ITS Knowledge and Skills Guidelines for the Accreditation of ITS Evaluation and Testing Facilities (CAN-P-1591) General requirements for the Competence of Calibration & Testing Laboratories: ISO Guide 25, CAN-P-4 November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 69

CC Based Product (Phase I) and System (Phase II) Evaluations and Certifications A Framework for Commercial ITS Evaluation and Testing • The Canadian CCS will be the first program to build on this “foundation” in Canada Guidelines for the Accreditation of ITS Evaluation and Testing Facilities (CAN-P-1591) General requirements for the Competence of Calibration & Testing Laboratories: ISO Guide 25, CAN-P-4 November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 70

CC Based Product (Phase I) and System (Phase II) Evaluations and Certifications A Framework for Commercial ITS Evaluation and Testing Secure Electronic Business Testing / Approvals? PKI Certificate Policy Approvals? Biometric Testing / Approvals? System Vulnerability Analysis? CBA Testing? Guidelines for the Accreditation of ITS Evaluation and Testing Facilities (CAN-P-1591) General requirements for the Competence of Calibration & Testing Laboratories: ISO Guide 25, CAN-P-4 November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 71

CSE as the Certification Body • • • approve prospective CCEFs provide advice & guidance to the CCEFs monitor the conduct of evaluations certify conformance of evaluation results provide international liaison - the MRA November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 72

Certification - 3 Pillars • Performance of Evaluator Activities – Independently perform & compare • Observation of Evaluator Activities – First hand observe Evaluator Activities • Examination of Evaluation deliverables – Approval of final results (e. g. ETR, PCR) November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 73

The Big Picture November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 74

Summary • IT Products Evaluated by a Trusted & Qualified 3 rd Party are of Value. • The CC is the New World Standard (ISO 15408) • The CCS and the CCEF’s are here today to help you acquire Security and Assurance. November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 75

Points of Contact / Info • CSE & CCS: http: //www. cse-cst. gc. ca • SCC: http: //www. scc. ca/palcan/itset. html • EWA: http: //www. ewa-canada. com/ – has evaluated at EAL 1 http: //www. signal 9. com/ • LGS/Domus: http: //www. domus. com/itss/ – is evaluating http: //www. winmagic. com/product. html • CGI: http: //www. cgi. ca/e/solutions/expertise/infosecurity/ – has evaluated at EAL 1 http: //www. entrust. com/truedelete/index. htm November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 76

Links • • • Common Criteria Support Environment – ccse. cesg. gov. uk/ Protection Profiles - WEB site – www. radium. ncsc. mil/tpep/library/protection_profiles – csrc. nist. gov/cc/pp/pplist. htm – www. cesg. gov. uk/cchtml/ippr/ CC Resource WEB sites – http: //www. cse. dnd. ca/cse/english/cc. html – ftp: //ftp. cse. dnd. ca/pub/criteria – http: //csrc. nist. gov/cc November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 77

CSE Approved CCEFs · CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Inc. • POC: Mr Andrew Pridham Tel: (613) 234 -2155 • E-mail: andrew. pridham@cgi. ca · DOMUS ITSL, a division of LGS Group Inc. • POC: Mr Bill Dziadyk Tel: (613) 230 - 6285 • E-mail: Bill_Dziadyk@LGS. com · EWA - Canada Ltd, • POC: Mr Paul Zatychec Tel: (613) 230 - 6067 Ex. 227 • E-mail: pzatychec@ewa-canada. com • November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 78

Questions? November 8, 1999 CACR Briefing 79