Newall Philosophy of Mind I Mind and body
Newall: Philosophy of Mind I. Mind and body are the same (monism) a) Physicalism: physical objects or processes (e. g. , neural firings) are “tokens” (examples) of “types” of things (minds or mental events) i. Reductive physicalism: minds/mental events are reducible to physical objects/events ii. Non-reductive physicalism: minds/mental events “supervene on” physical objects and events: that is, they depend on, but are not reducible to, physical objects and processes
More Monistic Theories of Mind b) Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: mental states are simply brain states • Objection: brain states and introspective qualia (experiences) have different characteristics c) Functionalism: mental states are associations or linkages of sensory stimuli and behaviors d) Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with materialist expressions e) Idealism: physical objects/processes are really only mental events or objects of mind
Dualistic Theories of Mind a) Predicate Dualism: the mental and physical are said to be different kinds of things b) Property Dualism: the mental and physical are different characteristics of things c) Substance Dualism: the mental and physical are simply different kinds of real things 1. The major problem with dualism (viz. , interaction) concerns how the physical and mental can affect or relate to one another
Attempted Solutions to the Challenge of Dualistic Interactionism • Epiphenomenalism: bodies can influence minds, but minds cannot influence bodies Objections: why can’t minds influence bodies? Why have the mental at all? • Occasionalism: God’s intervention accounts for the interaction N. Malebranche • Parallelism: apparent interaction is due to a pre-established harmony between the physical and mental G. W. Leibniz
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