NeoLiberal Institutionalism The Prisoners Dilemma Player 1 Player

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

The Prisoners’ Dilemma Player 1 Player 2

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism Accepts the basic assumptions of realism – States: main actors – States: unitary, rational actors – Goals: states follow their interests » -but have multiple interests in addition to security and power » -power not always fungible – System: anarchical, no central authority

Central Question What Facilitates Cooperation in an Anarchical System?

Iteration Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) If you play the PD repeatedly the winning/dominant strategy is TIT FOR TAT, not DEFECT Implications: – Cooperation can get started even in a world of unconditional defection; – Iteration, long term horizons important; – Strategy of reciprocity can thrive where many other strategies of cooperation fail – Once established cooperation based on reciprocity can protect itself from invasion of other strategies

Conditions for Cooperation Hegemonic Interest (Realism and Institutionalism) Repeated interaction – Repeated PD: dominant strategy is “Tit-for-Tat”; NOT “Defect” No immediate threat to state survival Smaller number of actors Type of cooperation dilemma

Cooperation dilemmas PD: problems of cheating, credible commitment Battle of the Sexes: coordination problems Cooperate Defect Cooperate 3; 3 Game Opera 1; 2 0; 0 Opera 0; 0 2; 1 4; 1 Game Defect 1; 4 2; 2

International Regimes “…implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. ” Stephen Krasner (1983) International Regimes, p. 2. Example: GATT/WTO

Institutions Facilitate Cooperation Institutionalize iteration Provide information Credible commitments Issue linkage Reduce transaction costs – make agreements and monitoring less costly to administer Resolve distribution conflicts

Growth in the Number of International Regimes Environmental Treaties 1968 -1998

Realist Critique Institutions reflect the distribution of power and interests and therefore are irrelevant Neo-liberal have ignored the problem of relative gains that would inhibit or shape cooperation Little empirical evidence that institutions matter

Impact of Ozone Regime

Impact of Whaling Regime?