Michael J Boyle La Salle University The Vietnam

Michael J. Boyle La Salle University

§ The Vietnam War (1955 -1975) is among the most important events of Cold War history. § Today, it is remembered as one of the few wars that the United States has lost in its distinguished military history. § For many who lived through it, both as combatants and protesters, the memory of the Vietnam war is painful. § It is also perhaps the most potent metaphor in American foreign policy – the so-called “Vietnam syndrome”

§ What is perhaps less understood today that Vietnam stands as a crucial case for counterinsurgency (COIN) as a mode of warfare § Many of the problems that the U. S. faced in Vietnam are identifiable as recurring problems under theory and practice of COIN § These problems were also experienced by the French military forces occupying Indochina § The problems the U. S. faced in Vietnam are due equally to the specifics of the case (Vietnam) and the inherent features of this model of warfare

§ Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (U. S. Army, 2006) § Can also be waged by occupying power, or some combination of a foreign power and a local government § Includes psychological operations § Walter Lacquer: counterinsurgency is nothing more than an effort to turn the insurgent’s weapons and tactics against them

§ As a mode of warfare, COIN is very old, although it was not recognized as intellectually distinct until the 19 th century § Insurgency was originally conceived as “people’s war” and arose with the levee en masse in revolutionary France § Regimes that fought against this mode of warfare were often described as reactionary § In the twentieth century, many colonial powers were responsible for fighting COIN campaigns against national liberation movements

§ Among the first to recognize this was T. E. Lawrence, who described the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency in his works § He was profoundly ambivalent about the counterinsurgency as a practice and described his experience as a betrayal of Arab nationalism § He described COIN as “like eating soup with a knife. ”

§ Over time, there has come to be two broad schools of thought on COIN: § Direct (Combat) § Indirect (aka Hearts and Minds) § These are ideal types and most strategies that the U. S. and its allies have adopted are a mix of both § The Vietnam case can be understood as the U. S. shifting between both approaches without success.

§ Direct Approach § Try to defeat the insurgents directly in open combat § Draw them out in the open to obviate terrain advantages § Plays to the strength of conventional army § Includes combat operations, support to local forces and psychological warfare § Much of the direct approach to counterinsurgency depends on attrition – eliminating more of the enemy than they can regenerate § Col. Harry Summers: “A War is A War Is a War”

§ Indirect Approach § Focus on dividing people from insurgents § Mao: The insurgent is to the people as a fish is to the sea § How? Win both their hearts and minds (aka their loyalty) § Once insurgents are cut off from the population, they can be isolated and destroyed § Concurrently, you should build a local government that is representative of the people § War is a competition for the loyalties of the population

§ Carl Von Clausewitz (1780 -1831) – Prussian soldier, writer and military theorist § Fought in the Jena campaign against Napoleon, was captured, and began to think about the changing dynamics of warfare in On War § Anticipated both the rise of insurgencies and why COIN would be so difficult Carl Von Clausewitz

§ People’s War: Clausewitz recognized that there would be occasions where the people rose up in arms against armies § Conditions for Success of Uprising § War fought in interior § No decisive battle § Large Theatre of Operations § National Character § Country Must be Rough and Inaccessible § These conditions fit the Vietnam case particularly well, which suggests it would always be a tough case

§ Problem: Inherent Advantage of the Defense § Defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than offense § Easier to hold ground than to take it § Three factors matter in warfare: § Surprise § Terrain § Concentric Attack (concentration of force) § Second (and perhaps the first) are the natural advantage of the insurgent § Very lack of a decision constitutes a victory for the defense

§ Clausewitz’s counterinsurgency approach: minimize advantages of the defense with conventional operations § Also employ your own irregulars and militias for sabotage and advance operations § But the real problem lies with the people – insurgency cannot be defeated militarily § At the end, you must somehow create a government that competes effectively for the loyalties of the population § You must also do this in the middle of a conflict where at least part of that population is at war

§ Since the end of World War II, French forces had been in control of Indochina, but had been fighting a vicious war against Viet Minh insurgents for control of the country § The U. S. had cooperated with the Viet Minh during World War II, but the Truman administration (1945 -1953) had been reluctant to allow independence, for fear it would lead to Communist expansion § The U. S. backed France as it sought to create a puppet government under its effective control (Bao Dai solution). § Facing a conference in Geneva to discuss the fate of Vietnam, France tried to draw out Viet Minh forces for a direct COIN approach at Fien Bien Phu, and was badly defeated.

§ At the Geneva conference in 1954, the U. S. , China, Soviet Union, France and others agreed to split Vietnam at the 17 th parallel into two parts for two years § North Vietnam – Democratic Republic of Vietnam § South Vietnam – State of Vietnam

§ The DRV (North) adopted an official policy of socialist consolidation in the north and political struggle in the south § They expected to win the 1956 elections, which would abolish the American-backed government § By 1959, they had resumed armed struggle to the South and organized supplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail § The North organized the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) which was designed to overthrow the social structure and government of the southern leader Ngo Dinh Diem

Ngo Dinh Diem Ho Chi Minh

§ President John F. Kennedy was initially ambivalent about the Vietnam crisis § The war for the loyalties of the population was raging, but the Diem leadership in the south was weak and corrupt § Significant divisions between the army and the regime § Internal divisions, particularly minority Buddhist unrest § Rampant corruption by party elites § The result was that the North held the political advantage § This also illustrated one of the fundamental problems of counterinsurgency: that foreign governments are often tied to unstable local governments that they cannot control

§ Kennedy did not have a consistent policy on Vietnam, largely because he was distracted by the insurgency in Laos and under domestic pressure not to “lose” Southeast Asia § He was also acutely aware of his own weaknesses after the Bay of Pigs debacle and wanted to draw a clear line in the sand to contain Soviet expansion to preserve American credibility § He dispatched two of the “best and brightest” – Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow – to assess the chances of a negotiated solution § They recommended greater US involvement to fight the Viet Cong guerrillas, but he opted for advisors and training

§ To some extent, Kennedy recognized that COIN in Vietnam was going to be difficult because of the natural advantages the Vietcong had in the country § In effect, he did not want to pick either a direct (combat) or indirect (hearts and minds) approach to COIN, and instead pressed the Diem government for reform § The deployment of aid and advisors was designed to boost leverage on Diem and to ensure that he was compliant with U. S. demands § But Diem had the U. S. in a bind, and had no incentive to cooperate with Kennedy

§ One way that the Diem government attempted to appease Kennedy was the ‘strategic hamlets’ program § This involved relocating families to easily defensible areas that could be defended by local police § The underlying idea was a “hearts and minds” approach to separate the insurgents from the population § Beset by corruption and poor execution, it was a failure

§ In May 1963, the Buddhist crisis erupted § Buddhist monks immolated themselves in response to perceived discrimination § Government forces engaged in repression, imposed martial law and staged mass arrests § Diem handled the crisis badly

§ Diem is killed in a coup by dissident generals § Still debated whether Kennedy authorized the coup or whether he knew that Diem would be brutally killed § The result was that the U. S. was now was responsible for competing for the hearts and minds of Vietnamese population

§ In summary, Kennedy did not have a clear policy § He knew that Vietnam was a tough case that the Viet. Cong possessed a clear defensive advantage § Did not want to spend the resources for either a direct or indirect approach § He was tied to the Diem government, and unable to influence it because of how dependent he was § His policy was dominated more by what he did not want to do – to lose Vietnam, to sacrifice credibility – than what he wanted to do

§ President Lyndon Johnson varied between both direct and indirect approaches, but in the end he was responsible for an intensification of the conflict § The new South Vietnamese government of Nguyen Khanh tried to convince the U. S. to attack the north, but Johnson delayed

§ The Gulf of Tonkin crisis in 1964 remains in dispute, but its clear that the USS Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats § Using this pretext, the Johnson administration got the Gulf of Tonkin resolution passed authorizing “all necessary measures” to repel further aggression in Vietnam § This gave Johnson a free hand to escalate the conflict

§ Under domestic pressure and fearful of ‘losing’ Vietnam, Johnson decided to engage in a direct COIN approach § Responding to a NLF attack in 1965, Johnson authorized Operation Rolling Thunder, an expanded air war campaign to bring the North to heel § He also sent American ground forces in to protect against possible retaliation, but in practice they were authorized for direct combat § The reasoning was to wear the Vietcong down by directly fighting them in part because he did not believe that South Vietnam could save itself

§ In 1965, Johnson argued that his approach was “peace without conquest” § In practice, he quietly escalated the war without informing the population § By the end of 1965, over 165, 000 US troops were in Vietnam and the war cost was costing $2 billion per month

§ The direct approach undertaken by Johnson was a failure § The U. S. deployed massive airpower against North Vietnamese and NLF military bases § Had little effect on the insurgents, but alienated civilians on both sides § Use of Agent Orange and napalm alienated many § The U. S. engaged in “search and destroy” parties, which were too indiscriminate to allow the direct approach to be successful § The U. S. also used ‘body counts’ as a metric, which produced perverse incentives for U. S. commanders in terms of force application

§ Much of this approach was premised on attrition – that the U. S. would kill enough of their soldiers that they would be forced to negotiate § This illustrates one of the central dynamics of COIN – that often one negotiates as one fights, rather than treating them as alternatives § A search and destroy approach did not hold villages and territory, which allowed the Vietcong to return § The environment was set up for the defense, nor offense § Johnson did not want to pay the costs of a sustained countrywide pacification campaign, despite recommendations from his generals

§ With the insurgency positioned against the direct approach, violence escalated on both sides § The Vietcong also engaged in brutality against the local population including torture and executions § Among their goals was to ensure that no one could remain neutral – that the population had to make a costly choice with their loyalties

§ The U. S. also committed atrocities as the war escalated § Among the worst of these was the My Lai massacre, which involved the deaths of 300 -500 civilians § There was no convictions for many of those involved in this war crime § Result was to galvanize domestic and student protests

§ Much of his early strategy was focused on the war of attrition, and did not attempt to influence the government of South Vietnam § The Tet Offensive – a massive NLF attack on American and South Vietnamese bases – was a costly strategic surprise that illustrated the futility of the war § The NLF lost more troops, but the perception was that the U. S. had lost the battle – as Walter Cronkhite said, “We are mired in stalemate” § As his administration continued, Johnson shifted to a more indirect (hearts and minds) approach that was designed to boost the legitimacy of the South Vietnam government § The U. S. engaged in a wide degree of economic reform, market stimulation and civil affairs programs to win the support of the population

§ The late Johnson approach was premised on building the local government up through enough combat and ‘hearts and minds’ approach that the U. S. could achieve peace by negotiations § The problem was that Johnson was beset by a rising anti-war movement at home § Johnson was fighting two wars: one in Vietnam, and another at home § Limited his domestic option for escalation

§ Under increasing pressure, Johnson announced he would not accept another nomination for the presidency § He hoped that this decision would lead to a chance for new negotiations for peace, but the American election campaign precluded a serious discussion of foreign policy goals § Nixon won the election promising to end the war, which undercut Johnson’s leverage

§ Under Johnson, the U. S. shifted between the direct and indirect approach with no decisive result § Attempts to take a direct combat role backfired due to indiscriminate violence § The Vietcong were able to consolidate their defensive advantage and to prolong the war § Both surprise (Tet Offensive) and time was on their side, especially as student protests continued § The question: would a decisive shift towards the direct or indirect approach have led to victory?

§ Although he campaigned under an end the war platform, Nixon believed that it was too costly to walk away from Vietnam without achieving the objective of a stable South Vietnam § Unlike Johnson, he decisively shifted towards a direct approach designed to ensure that the Vietcong were defeated § His “secret plan” was to escalate the war in order to put the U. S. in a position to end it

§ Nixon adopted a strategy of Vietnamization to end the war which transferred more fighting to South Vietnamese forces § This is a common COIN strategy, particularly when the domestic costs of the war have increased § He articulated the Nixon Doctrine, which argued that allies should bear more of the cost of the fighting their own wars, with American help § The problem was that the South Vietnamese government was weak and the local forces were demoralized

§ At the same time, Nixon engaged in the Phoenix program which was designed to find and destroy Communist insurgents and turn the countryside § In order to stop the supply lines for the Vietcong, he began to secretly bomb Cambodia and Laos § Effectively, Nixon was escalating the war and assuming a greater direct combat responsibility for U. S. troops § Although he continued the hearts and minds work, Nixon’s strategy was based on attrition -punishing the Vietcong until they negotiated.

§ Nixon also made a series of diplomatic moves designed to isolate Hanoi § He pursued triangular diplomacy against both China and the Soviet Union, both backers of Hanoi § He also portrayed himself as a “madman” designed to intimidate Hanoi at the negotiating table

§ At home, Nixon was beset by intense criticisms and was unable to deal with growing student protests, as millions protested by the early 1970 s § He appealed to the great silent majority to back him as he sought a peaceful compromise with Hanoi § At the same time, his decisions to apply pressure to the Vietcong with the invasions of Cambodia and the supported South Vietnamese operations in Laos produced widespread discontent § He was applying a classic COIN theory of direct combat – but has lost ‘hearts and minds’ both in Vietnam and at home

§ Nixon was determined to have leverage in the Paris Peace Negotiations, but the problem was that time was not on his side § “You have the watches. We have the time. ” § Kissinger offered a generous set of terms to Hanoi, but they rejected it and pressed their leverage with a massive assault of 120, 000 troops on South Vietnam. § Facing a collapse, Nixon escalated by authorizing the “Linebacker” bombings against Hanoi and its local forces in the south § Kissinger-Le Duc: “You never beat us. That’s true. It’s also irrelevant. ”

§ Nixon entered the final negotiations in the hopes of producing a “decent interval” for the Saigon regime § When Hanoi balked on terms, Nixon engaged in massive bombings (the Christmas bombings) which were designed to bring them back to the table § The final deal was nearly the same as before the Christmas bombing, leaving many to ask whether it was necessary § Congress ultimately ended the war on its own

§ By 1974, with the Paris Accords in place, Hanoi sped up its plans to invade the South § By April 1975, South Vietnam was conquered § The Vietcong engaged in mass-scale reprisals against those who worked with the Americans § U. S. forces evacuated and as predicted both Laos and Cambodia turned Communist

§ In summary, Nixon adopted a direct approach designed to raise the costs for Hanoi and to ensure that they were forced to negotiate § He paid comparatively less attention to the “hearts and minds” but it remains unclear whether these were already lost § The bombing of Cambodia and Laos may have had military utility, but it had no public support and was a risky decision given widespread popular opposition § He lost the war at home, not because the U. S. failed in direct engagements with the Vietcong § In fact, they played for time effectively

§ What conclusions can we draw from this? § To some extent, Vietnam was a tough case from a Clausewitzian perspective – a rough terrain, with a determined population, and no timeline for achieving independence § They were led by a leader, Ho Chi Minh, who was ruthless but effective in exploiting people’s war § Some critics have looked at this case and concluded that it was always unwinnable § The U. S. debate is divided between those who think: § We should have committed more military resources and won, or § We should have engaged in more ‘hearts and minds’ and less combat, or § We should have made South Vietnam fight the war themselves earlier

§ Key unanswered questions: § Did the failure to commit to a single direct or indirect strategy doom the U. S. ? § How did shifting goals – victory, negotiations, a decent interval – undermine U. S. strategy? § Would a ‘hearts and minds’ approach ever work? § How should a President manage discontent at home? How does this affect strategy? § What do you do with a recalcitrant, corrupt government? § What should be done with an insurgency that exploits a neighboring country’s territory?

§ Thank you § boylem@lasalle. edu