METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL LAWS The Philosophy of

METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL LAWS The Philosophy of Economics and Politics 8 th November 2018 Lecturer: Dr. William Peden w. j. peden@durham. ac. uk

“… [the kind of economics he is criticising] invokes an agent from outside the economy… labelled ‘government’ … tasked with selflessly correcting market failures… the invocation of a disembodied benign agent violates the principle of methodological individualism. ” - Meir Kohn (2004, p. 325 -326)

Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism! Lars Udehn (2002)

Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism! Lars Udehn (2002)

Methodological Individualism • Meir Kohn (2004): “… economic outcomes should be explained purely in terms of individual behavior. ” (p. 308) • Prediction and explanation in social science - But what’s a good explanation? • A (partial) theory of social scientific explanation - Specifying a necessary condition (a requirement) • Still many versions – focus on most plausible

A theory T is a satisfactory explanation of a social phenomenon only if T is formulated using: (a) Terms describing individual beliefs, values, and actions (b) Terms reducible to (a) (c) Some mix of (a) and (b)

• Half-way explanations • Sufficient explanations • MI explanations ≠ Rational choice explanations - Could explain a pattern of voting in terms of individuals’ irrational thinking John Watkins 1924 -1999

NOT a metaphysical claim! NOT a claim about which theories are true! NOT a claim about meaningfulness! NOT a defence of individualist politics!

Max Weber (liberal) Friedrich Hayek (libertarian) Karl Popper Jon Elster (liberal/social (Marxist democrat) communist) 1864 -1920 1899 -1992 1902 -1994 1940 -

• Classes • Hats • A full understanding?

• “Collective terms” in social science do denote individuals • But they are not always definable using individual terms • Defensive move: we can observe collective attitudes/behaviours e. g. “hostile crowd” • Offensive move: there are some sufficient social explanations with irreducible collective terms Ernest Nagel 1901 -1985

• Nagel (1961): something like Keynesianism is needed for some explanations, but has nonreduced collective terms - “Sticky” wages/prices • Reduction: inconsistent with microeconomics? • BUT: the New Keynesians worked hard to develop “microfoundations” for Keynesianism (1970 s/1980 s/1990 s) John Maynard Keynes 1883 -1946

Compromises? • Old theories of scientific explanation: focus mostly about the logical features of explanations • Modern theories: more attention to aims of explanations - E. g. Bas Van Fraassen • MI as a theory of social scientists’ aims?

Revised MI: Only explanations of social phenomena in individual terms can be fully satisfying explanations

Comparative MI: Ceteris paribus, T 1 is preferable to T 2 as an explanation of a social phenomenon P if T 1 explains P in an MI way and T 2 does not - The New Keynesians?

Social Laws • Alternatives to MI explanations? - (Law-explanations CAN satisfy MI) • Do social scientific laws actually explain anything? • Interpretation of laws in social science?

• Social scientists: making deductions of phenomena using exceptionless laws or confirming them with probabilistic laws - DN/IS model • One (of many) problems – where are these in social science? - Tautologies or have exceptions (? ) Carl G. Hempel (1905 -1997)

• Mill: social laws as tendency laws • TENDENCY: what happens ceteris paribus • Tendency laws are generalisations that: (1) Can have exceptions John Stuart Mill (1806 -1873) (2) Express tendencies of a mechanism, including e. g. a social system - A more modern philosopher of explanation!

Properties of a tendency: (1) A kind of causation (2) If there is a tendency in a mechanism then it produces an effect if there are no disturbing factors (3) Make a contribution even when there are disturbing factors Sébastien Chabal (1977 -)

• Causal tendency laws: make sense of social scientific explanations via laws? • An increase in the level of currency increases the level of prices if there are no disturbing factors e. g. new regulations raising banks’ demand for currency reserves • How can causal tendencies provide informative guidance for social policy? Nancy Cartwright (1944 -)

SUMMARY • Methodological individualism: many meanings • Stronger and weaker claims about our explanatory objectives in social science • Tendency laws: a possible alternative to individualist explanations of social phenomena - Good news for Marx?

Bas Van Fraassen The Scientific Image (1980) Chapter 5 Jon Elster: “Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory” (1982) Theory and Society Carl G. Hempel: “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (1948) (with Paul Oppenheim) Philosophy of Science John Watkins: “Ideal Types and Historical Explanation” (1952) The British Journal for Philosophy of Science Ernest Nagel: The Structure of Science (1961) Chapter 14 Section III John Watkins: “Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences” (1957) The British Journal for Philosophy of Science Friedrich Hayek: The Counter-Revolution in Science (1964) Chapter 4 Lars Udehn: “The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism” (2002) Annual Review of Sociology John Stuart Mill: A System of Logic (1882) Book VI Chapter VI (Other references in the module handbook) Meir Kohn: “Value and Exchange” (2004) Cato Journal