Metaethics Section 3 Moral Realism 1 Moral Realism

Meta-ethics Section 3 Moral Realism 1

Moral Realism n n Holds that moral properties are real & independent of people’s states of mind. Moral claims can be true or false. 2

Rival Theories n n n Non-cognitivism (see Section 1 of this Chapter). Error theory: moral claims purport to be true but fail, & are all false (see note 1 [final slide for this Section]). Subjectivism: moral truths are truths about attitudes / approvals. 3

Consider… § These rival theories are not without their problems. Why might each of these theories be problematic? Consider some of the problems raised in Section 1 of this Chapter. 4

Link between Moral Language & Action Non-cognitivism: n n This link may be thought to give non-cognitivism the edge over cognitivism. For the non-cognitivist, moral judgements express prescriptions, & prescriptions guide action (see Sec. 1, this Chapter). 5

Moral Language & Action Realism: n But the action-guiding role of moral language can be reconciled with realism, & does not require resort to non-cognitivism. 6

Main Objection to Realism n Prevalence of radical moral disagreement. 7

Reply n n n Moral realists can explain such disagreement. The mere fact of disagreement doesn’t of itself suggest that there are no facts of the matter in question. Can argue (contrary to Hume) that moral judgements are amenable to reason. 8

Further Objection n J. L. Mackie: the objection from the relation of moral language to motivation. This objection will be considered more fully in Section 4 of this Chapter. 9

Defending Cognitivism n n Cognitivism holds that some moral claims amount to knowledge. So, one of the best ways to argue for moral realism (& at the same time for cognitivism) is to present examples of moral knowledge. 10

Moral Knowledge Consider… n n Renford Bambrough’s example (see note 2 [final slide for this Section]). Joel Kupperman’s example (see note 3 [final slide for this Section]). 11

To Consider… Relate the argument for moral cognitivism from such examples to the case for moral realism. 12

Further Support for Realism n Some moral beliefs are more securely held than any ground for questioning them could be. 13

Cognitivism & Realism § The grounds supportive of moral cognitivism & of moral realism are mutually supportive. 14

Notes 1. 2. 3. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1966). Renford Bambrough, Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 15. Joel J. Kupperman, Ethical Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin and New York: Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 130 -131. 15