Metaethics revision summary Key Words to be happy

Meta-ethics revision summary

Key Words to be happy with meta-ethics – behind ethics, theories of meaning ‘analytic’ – necessarily true statements ‘synthetic’ – statements that could be true or false universalisability – moral statements apply to everyone emotivism – moral statements are expressions of emotion intuitionism – moral statements are expressions of intuition prescriptivism – moral statements prescribe (strongly commend) actions naturalistic fallacy – you can’t derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’

Key issues: Is “goodness” a natural feature of the world? Is “goodness” knowable by reason? What do I mean when I say “stealing is wrong” or “generosity is good”? Is moral language like any other language, or is it a special type of language? Are there such things as “moral facts”? Or is morality only about beliefs and feelings?

The naturalistic argument Moral facts exist as features of actions, they are observable features of an action. Utilitarians argue that pain and pleasure can be observed and experienced as a posteriori truth. Virtue ethicists like Mac. Intyre argue that goodness exists as an a posteriori feature of flourishing. Natural Law theorists like Aquinas argue that goodness is a natural feature of action defined by the ends we naturally pursue as rational beings. These three are forms of naturalism open to accusation of committing the naturalistic fallacy.

Hume’s fork: a logical problem Hume argued that statments about the real world were either analytic or synthetic. An analytic statement is true by definition: all dwarfs are small, all bachelors are unmarried. So you cannot ask an open question like “John’s a bachelor, but is he married? ” A synthetic statement can be true or false. It makes sense to ask: is John a bachelor? Moral statements are neither analytic nor synthetic and so are expressions of feeling (subjective).

Ways out of the fallacy If you want to be a naturalist, there are ways of escaping the fallacy. 1. Hume’s fork is itself a fallacy as it restricts the options. Moral language is a third type of language, which has prescriptive meaning. Poetic language is a fourth type, which has metaphorical meaning. 2. John Searle (1964) argues that the logical sequence described in the next slide is what we do all the time when saying “this is good/bad”.

John Searle’s escape route Tricia says, “Brian, I promise to pay you £ 500” (a fact). So Tricia has promised to pay Brian £ 500. So Tricia has put herself under an obligation to pay Brian. (Obligation is a logical feature of promising). So Tricia is obliged to pay Brian £ 500. So “Tricia ought to pay Brian £ 500” (an ought or value). We’ve just derived an ought (value) from an is (fact)! Note: either obligation is a logical feature of promising as RM Hare suggests, or a natural feature, because Tricia has agreed to join the institution where promise = obliged. This “promising institution” may, of course, be culturally relative.

A map of the territory

Some terms Cognitivists believe moral facts can be known objectively. Non-cognitivists believe moral facts cannot be known. Naturalists believe these facts are natural features of the world (pain, pleasure, flourishing, happiness). Non-naturalists believe these moral facts are not reducible to external facts, but known by intuition. Remember. . . if you are a naturalist you commit the naturalistic fallacy. . . which itself may be a fallacy!!

GE Moore’s intuitionism Good is like “yellow”. Good is a simple, unanalysable, property. Although a utilitarian, Moore is a non-naturalistic utilitarian. Goodness is a “simple notion”: just as I say “that’s yellow” so I point to an action and say “that’s good”. I know this by intuition.

WD Ross: intuitionism as deontological relativism WD Ross argues that we know our prima facie (at first sight) duties by intuition. He gave some examples (here are four): - duties of fidelity (eg promise keeping) - duties of reparation (eg righting a wrong) - duties of justice (eg treating people equally) - duties of beneficence (eg helping an old lady) The duties may conflict. . . then I decide in the situation what is the right thing to do (so, not absolute duties). NB A big advantage of Ross’ theory: it can solve dilemmas

AJ Ayer’s emotivism Ayer (1910 -1989) starts with Hume’s fork (see back). Moral statements cannot be verified true or false. There are no facts we can refer to in the real world on which to make a judgement. Boo/hurrah theory: in saying “murder is wrong” we are saying “boo to murder” (expressing a feeling). “It’s as if I said, “You stole that money” in a peculiar tone of horror. . . Ethical terms do not serve only to express feelings, but are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so stimulate action”. Language, Truth & Logic

Problems with emotivism May be based on a fallacious view of language. This view reduces language to something less than it is. We may be referring to a fact in the real world, like pain. If most people are doing this, how can it be ruled out by definition, as in Hume’s fork? It cannot arbitrate between the statement “genocide is wrong” and “genocide is fine”. The verification principle is itself neither analytic or synthetic, so presumably, must also be meaningless (!).

RM Hare’s prescriptivism RM Hare (1919 -2002) is a modern utilitarian who argues that moral language is of a certain type. Moral language has three properties: - Universalisable: when I say “killing is wrong” I mean “no-one should kill”. - Prescriptive: I also mean “you shouldn’t kill”, and create imperatives “don’t kill!”. - Overriding: the moral “good” is the strongest and overrides any other, eg “that’s a good picture” is a different, weaker meaning.

Evaluating Hare Does give moral language a stronger meaning, closer to what we think we are doing when we say something’s wrong. . . BUT Hare admits in Freedom and Reason that it doesn’t stop the fanatic like the suicide bomber saying “bombing is good” meaning, “I think I should bomb, and so should you!”. Universalisable prescriptions are not truth claims: Hare is not an objectivist (despite being a preference utilitarian!).

Discuss “Moral statements are merely matters of opinion” Discuss. Are the realists or the anti-realists right? Is morality objective or subjective? In meaning “X is universalisable” (prescriptivism) I don’t mean “morality is universal” (as Aquinas argued it is). Discuss. What do you think you’re doing when you say “genocide is wrong”? Does this make you a naturalist or non-naturalist?