Mandeville The Fable of the Bees 1670 1733

Mandeville: The Fable of the Bees • 1670 -1733 • Born c Rotterdam • Studied medicine at Leiden • Visited England c 1862 -3, learnt English; immigrated to England in c 1695. • First publications – satirical poetry in 1703 • First prose works The Vigin Unmask’d (1709) • The Female Tatler 1709 -10 • The Grumbling Hive 1714 • Fable of the Bees 1723

…significance… • Attack on the prevailing pieties about virtue and morality • and on the republican attack on luxury and commerce • Beginning of a line of argument about the way in which the • • things we value are tied up with social status, pretentions, fame and honour. Simple theory of appetitive motivation, plus an account of how people’s desires and aspirations are exploited by the rich and powerful to serve their interests and to secure order. Provides the basis for development of theory of the mutual interdependence of interests and the idea that from private vices spring public goods and virtues. As such – a founding text in economics Widely influential – Montesquieu uses it to inform his account of commercial monarchies. Rousseau for account of Discourse on Inequality, Adam Smith… etc.

Two models of individual vs society Interests/passions/preferences → agreement/contracts → society and government • Society/language/order → role/place/norms → interests /passions/preferences • Two models of liberty – • Hobbes ‘absence of impediment to the satisfaction of wants • French tradition – ordered relation between wants/preferences and the means of their satisfaction • (Pascal and the Wager)

MONTESQUIEU 1689 -1755

Major works • Persian Letters (1721) • Considerations on the Causes of Rome's greatness and decline (1734) • Spirit of the Laws (1748) • Pensées

Law • Laws, taken in the broadest meaning, are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of things; and in this sense, all beings have their laws: the divinity has its laws, the material world has its laws, the intelligences superior to men have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man has his laws. (I, 1, 3) • Before there were intelligent beings, they were possible; therefore they had possible relations and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were possible relations of justice. (I, 1, 4)

Law as norm not determinism • Man as a physical being, is governed by invariable laws like other bodies. . he is subject to ignorance and error, as are all finite intelligences. . . As a feeling creature, he falls subject to a thousand passions. Such a being could at any moment forget his creator; God has called him back to him by the laws of religion. Such a being could at any moment forget himself; philosophers have reminded him of himself by the laws of morality. Made for living in society, he could forget his fellows; legislators have returned him to his duties by political and civil law. • I, 1, 5. (cf L 83 in Persian Ltrs)

Law in General – and in Particular • A. Law in general is human reason insofar as it governs all the peoples of the earth; • B. the political and civil laws of each nation should be only the particular cases to which human reason is applied. Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another. • Laws must relate to the nature and principle of the government that is established or that one wants to establish, whether those laws form it as do political laws, or maintain it, as do civil laws. They should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate. . . to the properties of the terrain. . . ; to the way of life of the peoples. . . ; they should be related to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established.

State of nature • The natural state is one feature of human existence, but it is not the only one, and it has almost no role as a standard against which to measure society - one which might be used to justify resistance to public authorities. • Book 26 Natural Law claims (ch. 3) • If a slave, says Plato, defends himself, and kills a freeman, he ought to be treated as a • • parricide. 1 This is a civil law which punishes self-defence, though dictated by nature. The law of Henry VIII which condemned a man without being confronted by witnesses was contrary to self-defence. In order to pass sentence of condemnation, it is necessary that the witnesses should know whether the man against whom they make their deposition is he whom they accuse, and that this man be at liberty to say, "I am not the person you mean. " The law passed during the same reign, which condemned every woman, who, having carried on a criminal commerce did not declare it to the king before she married him, violated the regard due to natural modesty. It is as unreasonable to oblige a woman to make this declaration, as to oblige a man not to attempt the defence of his own life. The law of Henry II which condemned the woman to death who lost her child, in case she did not make known her pregnancy to the magistrate, was not less contrary to self-defence. It would have been sufficient to oblige her to inform one of her nearest relatives, who might watch over the preservation of the infant. What other information could she give in this situation, so torturing to natural modesty? Education has heightened the notion of preserving that modesty; and in those critical moments scarcely has she any idea remaining of the loss of life.

Natural law 4 plausible candidates for natural laws: seeking peace; seeking nourishment; attraction; and the desire to live in society arising out of the capacity for knowledge. But: As soon as men are in society, they lose their feelings of weakness; the equality that was among them ceases, and the state of war begins. To settle this state of war requires two orders - a law of nations to settle matters between peoples; and internal laws: political ones to govern matters within a society, between governed and governors, and civil ones to govern those between citizens. So - inversion of Social Contract – war follows from society

Climate • Book XV • Ch 2, ch 12 and 13 (On England) and see XIX ch 27. • = = Despotism!

forms of government • i. three types of government: republican - where the people (democracy) or part of the people (aristocracy) hold supreme power; monarchical - where a single person governs, but by fixed and established laws and despotic - where a single man, unrestrained by law, dominates all by his will and caprice. • ii. There are certain basic laws which flow from these types, without which the nature of the government would change: e. g. , In a democracy we need to define who will vote, we need fixed rules and clear criteria for citizenship; there must be a system for naming of ministers and election of councils or senate, and some method by which the people can enact their laws or ratify them. The most important distinction which Montesquieu draws is between monarchy and despotism(II, 4, 17)

principes of government: republics While the nature of the government describes its special and fundamental laws, the principle describes the human passion which set it in motion. ‘Dans cette œuvre capitale, qui rencontra un énorme succès, Montesquieu tente de dégager les principes fondamentaux et la logique des différentes institutions politiques par l'étude des lois considérées comme simples rapports entre les réalités sociales. ’ Republics • Democracy - virtue In a democracy 'when virtue no longer exists, ambition enters the hearts capable of it, and avarice becomes universal. ' 'What I call virtue in republics is the love of one's native land, that is the love of equality. ' Where there is no virtue in a republic, then the state is ready to fall. • Aristocracy - Members of the aristocracy need virtue among themselves so as to maintain order. The customary distinctive trait of stable aristocracies is a lesser virtue - moderation.

monarchies • Monarchy - not moved by virtue, but by honour: by self- interest, ambition, and the pursuit of honour. Montesquieu depicts courtiers as pretty wretched creatures - 'ambition combined with idleness, meanness mixed with pride, desire of riches without work, aversion to truth, flattery, treason, bad faith, failure to carry out commands'. • 'Monarchy is a state of tension, which always degenerates into despotism or republicanism. Power can never be divided equally between prince and people: it is too difficult to keep the balance. '

despotism Moved by fear. The prince must hold his people constantly in fear, or else they will destroy him. crainte, not peur Peur concerns the sudden response we have to danger. Crainte is more like a constant psychological and indeed, physiological state - involuntary, uncontrollable, and undercutting every other activity - making enjoyment impossible.

Book VIII Moderate vs Immoderate Governments: The potential extremism of the principles. • Democracies become corrupt when all inequalities are levelled so that the people can brook no authority; • Monarchies become corrupt when the king can brook no other authority in his state. • Despotisms are corrupt by their nature. Moderate government, then, means a government in which power is not abused, but is limited, constrained and regulated in its exercise. Moderation is achieved in part through moeurs, good laws, and ‘fit’ between the type of rule and the size of the state, and to its religion, climate, commerce and familial life. Moderation is the disposition of rulers to accept law as a constraint on their will and passions. the principles of government depend for their stability on a broader range of factors - ie. , the conditions under which people can brook the rule of law. Part One (1 -8) examines the fundamental political structures that define and organise three basic forms of state; Part two (9 -13) looks at laws that determine the liberty of a state (first concerning defensive and offensive capabilities, then looking at different forms of liberty Part 3 (14 -19) concern the impact of climate and geography; Part 4 (20 -24) concern commerce; Part 5 (25 -6) religion; Part 6 (27 -31) Various legal systems and their institution.

Moderation and liberty • Books 11 (esp ch 6) and 12. Ch 6 glosses the English constitution, and the doctrine of the separation of powers. These books pick up from Book 8 the idea of moderate government as well-regulated liberty (that is a liberty under the law) and they ask about what constitutional structures can help preserve this good. • So combines a normative and constitutional project • But he also describes England as a republic masquerading as a monarchy – effectively identifying a commercial republic as a new type of order, influenced by Mandeville.

Political liberty • Moderate government is government in which there is political liberty - ie. , • • where one citizen cannot fear another: ‘ Political liberty is that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each has of his own security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen. (ll, 6, 157) or 'Political liberty in no way consists in doing what one wants. In a. . . society in which there are laws, liberty can consist only in having the power to do what one should want to do and in no way being constrained to do what one should not want to do. . Liberty is the right to do everything the laws permit (11, 3, 155) Combining elements of books 11 and 12 - that is the distinction between when a constitution is free, because in it the exercise of power is moderated; and when a citizen is free, because they are secure. A moderate government is one in which law is king. Where government rules by fundamental laws and does so in the common interest, one has political liberty; one may also have security: - 'manners, customs or received examples may give rise to it, and particular civil laws may encourage it. ' (12, 1, 187)

Book XI (6) • i. There is a story about the separation of powers, and the existence of checks and balances - basically that no individual or group of individuals should be entrusted with the whole of the powers of the state, for while they may rule well in the short term there is no guarantee that they will do so for long '. . it has eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits' (11, 4, 155) To ensure that a ruler finds limits before encroaching on the citizen's liberty there must be some countervailing power. • ii. Montesquieu continues to appeal, beneath the separation of powers account, to a much older and more formidable theory of the doctrine of mixed government (expounded by Polybius and Machiavelli). The division between the commons the Lords and the Crown is another version of the one, the few and the many, and is a way of introducing a balance of social forces into the constitution. (King Charles’s Answer to 19 Propositions • iii. Although chap 6 is a long one, and although it does seem important to Montesquieu, its principle is not prominent enough to justify a separate book, or a more extended discussion - why should this be so?

Laws and security • The Spirit of the Laws starts out by looking at types of government, their natures, and • • the fundamental laws which seem required by this nature. Such laws, and the basic types and their principles play some part in determining the character of government and the quality of life of the inhabitants, but there are many other things as well. There is the size of the state, the climate, the customs, the religion, the mores, the state of commerce, and so on. Also two other developments in Montesquieu's position: i he moves from a concern with the different principles and types of government, to a more detailed and practical concern with those forces which constrain or are constrained by these principles. The ideal typical forms of government and their principles remain a central innovation, but there are more detailed, more particular forces which conspire to support or undermine the stability of one or other form of government. ii Also having sketched the three forms and their principles, Montesquieu is reinvoking a natural law perspective -trying to fix a normative baseline which he can use to guide the task of legislation - this becomes 'the tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each has of his security. ' There is no such security in despotisms - fear, craintre, penetrates into the very soul of the individual, and destroys the will of the agent. But elsewhere, security will depend on expectations, which will depend on customs and mores, these will be associated with laws, and these will be related to the climate and the sensibilities of men and women. This concern with security is a crucial element in the Spirit of the Laws - so much so that it frequently cuts across, and makes secondary, the tripartite distinction between forms of government, in favour of a bipartite distinction - moderate and immoderate. But it is also a modern concern.

History • i. Nostalgia for the classical republics, and a sense that modern states are too corrupt to allow the development of the degree of civic virtue, and public spiritedness which marked the classical world. • ii. The classical view of the rise and fall of states: (and climate) • iii. But there is also a third view of history canvassed by Montesquieu, which does much to tie together the different strands of his account, and which provides support for seeing the moderate/immoderate distinction as being closest to his heart. This is broached in his discussion of commerce, particularly in Book 21, chap 20, entitled How commerce in Europe penetrated barbarism. •

Commercial republics • Britain vs France • Self-interest and virtue • This does seem to be a feature of Montesquieu’s account – ie. , he thinks that the English commercial spirit has generated a huge commercial empire from the free activities of individuals who jealously guard their liberty from political interference. • In France the government interferes with manufactures and commerce and the core activity has become one driven to support the functioning of the monarchy and its competitive climate of luxury, as against the more egalitarian commercial activity of the English that spreads the benefits of trade throughout the country. • This suggests a division in forms of luxury, and a sense that one provides more secure revenues for the state through tax on commercial exchange, while the other risks despotism in orchestrating the activity of production and exchange around the court. But there remains in Britain a danger that commercial capital could become too closely linked to the crown, creating a joint interest in conspiring against the security of the people.