Lobbying Introduction GOVT 747 Legislation and Lobbying 1
Lobbying: Introduction GOVT 747: Legislation and Lobbying 1
Introduction The power and influence of lobbying, particularly at the federal level has been widely reported on. Congress: According to the Center for Responsive Politics, nearly 15, 000 registered lobbyists spent more than 3 billion dollars in 2008 attempting to influence Congress. States: Scholars have noted a similar trend in the states, where both the number and importance of lobbying has increased sharply since the late 1980 s (Mooney 1991; Gray and Lowery 1995; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Alexander 2002; Rosenthal 2001). 2
Introduction Measurement Problem: Despite the growth of lobbying at state and national levels, as well as a corresponding expansion of scholarly interest, it has been difficult to demonstrate how lobbying influences legislative outcomes. 3
Introduction Research Question: How do lobbyists influence legislative outcomes, and thus win in competition with other interest groups? If influencing legislative outcomes is central to the task of lobbying, and success often entails one interest group winning over another, how such influence, and thus success is achieved, remains a subject of considerable uncertainty. What is Lobbying? 4
What Shapes Legislative Behavior? A study of lobbying highlights which theoretical approach? Leadership (White House) Leadership (I, $) Institutionalism Political Economy Business and Labor Interests (I, V, $) Rules, Norms, Trends Rational Choice Member Interest Groups (I, $) Preferences? Voters (I, V, $) Pluralism
What Shapes Legislative Behavior? Does a study of lobbying highlight the power of institutional variables? Executive: Nat. Leadership (White House) Leadership (I, $) Institutionalism Rules, Norms, Trends Executive: State Leadership (Governor) Member Sources: 1. Dodd and Oppenheimer; Sinclair; Green and Burns; Pearson and Schickler a. Rise of a Powerful Speaker (1970 s to Pelosi) and Special Rules b. Influence of the Bush White House 2002 -2006 (Medicare Drug Benefit, Tax Cuts) c. Trends: Polarization, Low Retire. , Careerism, Partisan Redistricting (incumbency) 2. Sinclair; Lee, Wright a. Trends/Norms: Rise of Individualist, Partisan Senate with weakened Leadership. b. Rules: Deliberative process of Senate is making the Chamber Irrelevant c. States: Personal Politics of Power and Comm. Assign. , Variation in States (Speaker)
What Shapes Legislative Behavior? Does a study of lobbying highlight the role of rational choice calculations? Rational Choice Member Preferences?
What Shapes Legislative Behavior? Or does it reveal the importance of pluralistic forces in US politics? Member Source: 1. Mc. Donough; Dodd and Opp a. Normative v. Self-Interested leadership b. limits of the const. service, governmental intervention; c. which interests matter in a district; who has access, faith in the system, partisan basis of incumb. Voters (I, V, $) Interest Groups (I, $) Pluralism
What Shapes Legislative Behavior? Or does it reveal the importance of pluralistic forces in US politics? Member Source: 1. Mc. Donough; Dodd and Opp a. Normative v. Self-Interested leadership b. limits of the const. service, governmental intervention; c. which interests matter in a district; who has access, faith in the system, partisan basis of incumb. Voters (I, V, $) Inter. Grps/Lobbyists (I, $) Pluralism
Introductory Literature Review: Lobbying Literature: The scholarly literature is, for the most part, defined by two distinct approaches: 1) Exchange Theory 2) Persuasion Theory 10
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: According to exchange theories of interest group advocacy, lobbying involves a form of barter or trade between lobbyists and legislators (Denzau and Munger 1986). Contributions LB LG Roll-Call Votes 11
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Persuasion Theory: Lobbyists, in the persuasion view, either influence or gain access to legislators by strategically providing lawmakers with information that is at once favorable to the lobbyists’ position, but may also be helpful to the legislator for the purposes of either passing legislation or grappling with the uncertainties of reelection. LB Information LG Critique of the Literature: Each approach captures important aspects of the lobbying process. Yet both has struggled to account analytically for how influence actually occurs 12
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Limitations: Evidence Mixed, Contract? Strengths and weaknesses of “Vote-buying” theories. Contributions and votes can be tracked. Contributions LB LG Roll-Call Votes Influence: But it is difficult to determine if the money shaped the LG’s vote. Contract: How the “contract” implied in exchange relations is enforced, given the illegality of direct payoffs for votes is unclear. 13
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Persuasion Theory: Limitations The importance of various forms of “persuasion” has also been difficult to define and thus track. Information plays a critical role in lobbying: It helps LGs to appear productive, knowledgeable and responsive. LB LG Information LB have an opportunity, and thus an incentive to mislead LG. Influence: But LG are privy to information from many sources. Given LG cannot trust the information, and LB target allies, how much persuasion is going on? 14
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Analytical Limits of Current Interpretations: There is, then, a core analytical weakness in the lobbying literature. Challenges of Operationalization: But what evidence either approach has produced of actual “influence” on the part of lobbyists over legislators is circumstantial at best. The problem, in many ways, is one of operationalization, or the challenge of identifying some working element of the lobbying process capable of being examined for the purposes of measuring influence. 15
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Limitations: Evidence Mixed, Contract? Strengths and weaknesses of “Vote-buying” theories. Contributions and votes can be tracked. Contributions LB LG Roll-Call Votes Influence: But it is difficult to determine if the money shaped the LG’s vote. Contract: How the “contract” implied in exchange relations is enforced, given the illegality of direct payoffs for votes is unclear. 16
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Analytical Challenges 1. Enforcement Problem. 2. Lack of Evidence that “Vote-buying” occurs 3. If money buys influence, why concentrate on allies? Proposed Solutions: Enforcement 1. Synder (1992, 18): LB make long-term investments in politicians… 2. Stratmann (1998, 88): suggests it is a contract with “contemporaneous payoffs. ” Courting Allies? 1. Denzau and Munger (1986) and Hall and Wayman: contributions “are intended not to buy undecided votes but to buy the time or activity of already sympathetic allies. ” 17
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Hall and Deardorff Theory Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy (72) “We propose a different theory of lobbying. Direct lobbying, in our view, typically is not a strategy for changing legislative preferences over policies. Nor is it about keeping them from being changed. ” “Rather, it is an attempt to subsidize the legislative resources of members who already support the cause of the group. ” Budget of Lobbying: Lobbyist (LB) “operates on the LG budget line, not on his or her utility function. ” 18
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Hall and Deardorff Theory Lobbying as a Legislative Subsidy: “A matching grant of costly policy info, pol intell, and labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. ” Objective: “Not to change minds, ” but “assist natural allies in achieving their own coincident objectives. ” 19
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Lobbying as a Legislative Subsidy: Rests on 5 Assumptions: 1) “For a legislator to have much influence on policy, she must work at it. ” “That is, she must participate or otherwise expend “effort” in the legislative process (e. g. , Evans 1991; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000). ” “A key feature of such activities, with the noteworthy exception of voting, is that they require costly effort by the legislator. ” 2) Legislators’ resources are scarce. “Together with their staffs, legislators form what Salisbury and Shepsle (1981) call a legislative “enterprise, ” whose mission is to advance the legislator’s goals. ” “However, such enterprises have limited capacity—–in time, information, labor, and hence agenda space—–to address the numerous issues on which the legislator wants to be involved. ” 20
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Lobbying as a Legislative Subsidy: Rests on 5 Assumptions: 3) For any given period, individual legislators care about (e. g. , Evans 1989; Fenno 1973). 4) Legislators care about some issues more than others (e. g. , Hall 1996; Sinclair 1989). 5) Relative to legislators, lobbyists are specialists (Esterling 2004). “Whereas most legislators simultaneously care about multiple issues, a lobbyist focuses on relatively few. ” Legislators Are Interested in “Progress” In general, legislators are interested in issues on which they wish to make “progress. ” Progress in this context could mean that the legislator moves a policy closer to his or her preferred policy, say, by amending a bill or intervening with a regulator. ” 21
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Money and Influence: How Scholars have sought to measure the influence of money: 1. Relationship between money Contributions (PACS ) and roll-call voting. Results: mixed (16) Challenges: 1. Direction of causation: It is difficult to deter direction of causation: do contrib. lead to votes, or votes to contributions? (3) 2. Motivation: How can we know what really motivated a LG to act (money or personal beliefs)? 22
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Synder’s Theory Longterm Consideration Important for PACS. This can be seen in the pattern of congressional contributions. Specifically, this claim is based on three (3) facts about the pattern of congressional contributions. (19 -20) Fact 1: There is a remarkable degree of persistence in PACs contribs overtime Fact 2: Older representatives receive fewer investor contributions than younger reps. Fact 3: Investor contribs interested in dev. a long-term relationships will consider the LG current office and future when making contributions decisions. 23
END 24
Introduction Title: Assessing the Impact of Lobbyist-Proposed Language on the Formulation of State Environmental Policy Topic: My topic is State-Level Lobbying and Its Impact on Environment Policy. Specific Policy: I’m looking at specific policy area: Electronic Waste or cocalled E-Waste. 25
Introduction The power and influence of lobbying, particularly at the federal level has been widely reported on. Congress: According to the Center for Responsive Politics, nearly 15, 000 registered lobbyists spent more than 3 billion dollars in 2008 attempting to influence Congress. States: Scholars have noted a similar trend in the states, where both the number and importance of lobbying has increased sharply since the late 1980 s (Mooney 1991; Gray and Lowery 1995; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Alexander 2002; Rosenthal 2001). 26
Introduction Measurement Problem: Despite the growth of lobbying at state and national levels, as well as a corresponding expansion of scholarly interest, it has been difficult to demonstrate how lobbying influences legislative outcomes. 27
Introduction Research Question: How do lobbyists influence legislative outcomes, and thus win in competition with other interest groups? If influencing legislative outcomes is central to the task of lobbying, and success often entails one interest group winning over another, how such influence, and thus success is achieved, remains a subject of considerable uncertainty. 28
Introduction My Argument: It is my argument that looking at the role of lobbyist-proposed legislative language offers one way of measuring “influence” and thus examining the conditions under which lobbying enables one interest group to win in contests with other interests. But before preceding, I want to give you an overview of lobbying as an issue… 29
Introductory Literature Review: Lobbying Literature: The scholarly literature is, for the most part, defined by two distinct approaches: 1) Exchange Theory 2) Persuasion Theory 30
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: According to exchange theories of interest group advocacy, lobbying involves a form of barter or trade between lobbyists and legislators (Denzau and Munger 1986). Contributions LB LG Roll-Call Votes 31
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Persuasion Theory: Lobbyists, in the persuasion view, either influence or gain access to legislators by strategically providing lawmakers with information that is at once favorable to the lobbyists’ position, but may also be helpful to the legislator for the purposes of either passing legislation or grappling with the uncertainties of reelection. LB Information LG Critique of the Literature: Each approach captures important aspects of the lobbying process. Yet both has struggled to account analytically for how influence actually occurs 32
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Limitations: Evidence Mixed, Contract? Problems with “vote-buying: ” Contributions and votes can be tracked. Contributions LB LG Roll-Call Votes Influence: But is difficult to determine if the money shaped the LG’s vote. Contract: How the “contract” implied in exchange relations is enforced, given the illegality of direct payoffs for votes is unclear. 33
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Persuasion Theory: Limitations The importance of various forms of “persuasion” has also been difficult to define and thus track. Information plays a critical role in lobbying: It helps LGs to appear productive, knowledgeable and responsive. LB LG Information LB have an opportunity, and thus an incentive to mislead LG. Influence: But LG are privy to information from many sources. Given LG cannot trust the information, and LB target allies, how much persuasion is going on? 34
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Analytical Limits of Current Interpretations: There is, then, a core analytical weakness in the lobbying literature. Challenges of Operationalization: But what evidence either approach has produced of actual “influence” on the part of lobbyists over legislators is circumstantial at best. The problem, in many ways, is one of operationalization, or the challenge of identifying some working element of the lobbying process capable of being examined for the purposes of measuring influence. 35
Study Language: Lobbyist-Proposed Language: Ultimate Form of Persuasion To address this weakness in the literature, I propose examining what might be described as the ultimate form of persuasion: lobbyist-proposed legislative language. Advantages of Language: There are clear advantages to studying lobbyist-proposed legislative language: 1) Methodological Advantages: Language an be Tracked 2) Explanatory Advantages: Language helps to identify the Conditions under which lobbying is “successful. ” 36
Study Language: Lobbyist-Proposed Language: Explanatory Advantages: What does Language do? It provides lobbyists a means of overcoming several of the barriers common to persuasive lobbying. Language Works: Language works because it: 1) Communicates to legislators a general desire to work with rather than against filed legislation. 2) provides legislators a cost-effective way, in terms of time and resources to respond to lobbyist’s ideas. 37
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Persuasion Theory: Explanatory Advantages: Why Language Works: Influence: Language helps to reduce LGs uncertainty about LB’s information as well as makes it less costly for LG’s to be productive, knowledgeable and responsive. LB Language LG 38
A Study of Language: Lobbyist-Proposed Language: Ultimate Form of Persuasion Hypothesis: Accordingly, it is our contention that lobbyists who provide legislators with language are more likely to influence legislators and thus win in competition with other interest groups. 39
Focus of Study: E-Waste Legislation: To test this hypothesis, I look at recent changes at the state laws regulating the disposal of electronic waste, or e-waste that pitted two powerful, and similar interest groups, so-called legacy and non-legacy television manufacturers against each other. State Overview: Currently, nineteen states (19) regulate the disposal of electronic waste, with each state taking a slightly different approach. 40
Focus of Study: E-Waste Legislation “Producer Responsibility” Laws Many state and environmental leaders have advocated for so-called “producer responsibility” laws that require the manufacturers of electronic equipment to assume the costs of redemption. Return Share Initially, most of these filed legislation was based on the concept of “return-share, ” where manufacturing responsibility is determined by the percentage of e-waste made up of a manufactures’ products. That is, they pay proportional to the number of their products that are discarded. Fees and WPS A number of states also proposed or adopted flat, or prorated fees based on the yearly weight of products sold. 41
E-Waste: State Producer Responsibility Laws, 2010 Electronic Takeback Coalition (http: //www. electronicstakeback. com/legislation/state_legislation. htm) 42
Study of E-Waste Legislation TVs as an Issue: Toxic, but Expensive One major area of disagreement has been whether or not the law should include televisions. TV Lobbying: Market Share TV manufacturers are divided on the issue, with a number of “legacy” manufacturers, or companies that did, but no longer manufacture TVs, arguing for “market” rather than return share provisions in producer responsibility laws. Market Share limits a company’s recycling responsibilities to their current share of national TV sales. 43
Opposing Market Share Non-legacy manufacturers, on the other hand, as well as lobbyists for newer entrants into the TV market, were less likely to propose language in part because they responded to the inclusion of TVs into e-waste legislation by trying to kill rather than modify the legislation that included TVs.
Goal of Market Share: The goal, then, of legacy manufacturers was either to outright replace return share provisions or to amend less specific fee or weight requirements, the implications of which were not always certain, with precise market share language.
Market Share Language: The precise language, as it appears in the North Carolina law includes some variation on the following: “A television manufacturer's market share is the television manufacturer's prior year's sales of televisions…divided by all manufacturers' prior year's sales for all televisions. ” Source of Language: TV Lobby The legacy TV industry’s support for “market share” language is clear from a review of the public testimony that has been made in support either of amending or adopting producer responsibility e-waste legislation. 46
Research Design: Study of Language Research Design: To measure the comparative impact of a language-based strategy, I conducted a pre and post-test/panel study of filed and finalized e-waste legislation in each of the states (17 in total) that have passed such laws that include TVs since 2003. Specifically, to gauge the before and after effects of a language-based lobbying strategy, I ranked both the filed and finalized legislation from 1 to 5 based on its favorability from a market-share perspective. 47
Research Design: Study of Language Research Design: To calculate the effect of language, I scored each of the filed and finalized legislation from 1 to 5 based on its similarity with the market share concept, with: 1: representing return share, or the least similar to market share, 5: representing market share, or the most similar. Placeholder bills were scored low at 2, given their uncertainty, while fee and weight of products of sold were scored as either 3 or 4, based on their details of the legislation, since they generally focused on current, or nonlegacy manufacturers, but could be retro-active or broadly applicable. 48
Argument Finding: Significant Impact The results of my analysis show a clear effect of language on the probability of successfully influencing legislation, and thus winning in competition with other interest groups. The panel study produced an obtained t score of -3. 19, which is significant at both 95 and 99%. Pattern of Influence: Indeed, what a review of the state e-waste laws suggests is a clear pattern of influence over time on the part of lobbyists for legacy manufacturers to the extent that specific “market-share” language became part of the final legislation in majority of the states in which e-waste has been passed. This was true, despite the coordinated opposition of companies that still make TVs, who launched a similarly professional and sustained campaign to oppose e-waste laws altogether. 49
Analysis: Pattern of State Laws Of the 18 states that have enacted e-waste laws since 2004, six states – Hawaii, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia – excluded TV’s altogether in their legislation, and four --New Jersey, Maine, Washington and Oregon– initially used return share. 50
Analysis Power of Market Share: However, another seven states –Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Rhode Island -- based their laws on market share. Indeed, in Illinois, the law was written so that TV manufacturers would be covered by market share policy while most other electronics companies have to abide by return share. Moreover, four states –New Jersey, Maine, Texas and Hawaii– rewrote their e-waste laws just a year or two after enactment to drop return or to include TVs and have used market share language. 51
Analysis Summary What the evidence suggests, then, is a clear trend toward market share language after Maine, New Jersey and Washington State used versions of return share language in 2004 and 2006. Indeed, the evidence suggests that since 2008, no state except Oregon that has considered Producer Responsibility legislation has used anything but market share language. In total, then, of the 18 states that have enacted e-waste laws: - Four exclude TVs (22%) - Two have return share (11%) - Ten have Market share (55%) The remainder two (11%) have weak take back requirements. 52
STOP 53
Analysis Confounding Variables: Political Culture, Professionalization and Party Control appeared to have little effect on the success or failure of market-share e-waste lobbying efforts. Political Culture: Market share language was successful in individualist, moral and traditional states, and failed in both moral and individualist states. Professionalization: The same was true in terms of professionalization. It passed and failed in high, medium and low professionalized states. Party Control: And in each of the states where producer responsibility legislation was debated there was a Democratic majority, save for Indiana where the Democrats controlled the House and the Republicans controlled the Senate. 54
Analysis MS 55
Analysis Power of Market Share Two other states –Missouri and Texas– that also originally excluded TVs, now have market-share legislation pending. Return to Market Share Moreover, New Jersey, which had originally passed E-waste legislation that included TVs based on return share requirements in January 2008, amended its law in November 2008, replacing return with the market share language. And lastly, Maine has since amended its producer responsibility law to replace return with market share. Indeed, only two states ---Oregon and Washington-- have retained return share provisions. 56
Analysis Summary What the evidence suggests, then, is a clear trend toward market share language after Maine, New Jersey and Washington State used versions of return share language in 2004 and 2006. It is a change that a review of public testimony records indicates parallels the emergence of a coordinated lobbying campaign on behalf of TV manufacturers. Indeed, the evidence I suggests that have since 2008, no state except Oregon that has considered Producer Responsibility legislation has used anything but market share language. 57
Questions The data raises several questions: Did the first category of states, those that excluded TVs in their original legislation do so because of TV lobbying or not? Secondly, was there TV lobbying in New Jersey and Rhode Island? If so, why did the results here differ from the two states that adopted return share provisions and the eight that used market share? Moreover, how do we account for the TV lobby’s ability to effectively advocate for a change to market share once TVs were included in Hawaii, Maryland North Carolina. Finally, did the TV lobby face any effective resistance, and if so how was it overcome? 58
Older: Analysis: Pattern of State Laws The pattern of lawmaking that has followed Maine’s return-share e-waste law highlights the success legacy TV lobbyists have had influencing the legislative process with market share language. Of the 18 states that have enacted e-waste laws since 2004, seven states – Hawaii, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia – have excluded TV’s altogether, and only two, New Jersey and Rhode Island, used return share. The remaining nine –Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin -- all based their laws on market share. Among the seven states that initially excluded televisions from their e-waste, three – Hawaii, Maryland North Carolina– have since amended their laws to include TVs, and each adopted market share rather than return share responsibilities. Two other states –Missouri and Texas– that also originally excluded TVs, now have market-share legislation pending. 59
Analysis: Moreover, New Jersey, which had originally passed E-waste legislation that included TVs based on return share requirements in January 2008, amended its law in November 2008, replacing return with the market share language. And lastly, Maine has since amended its producer responsibility law to replace return with market share. Indeed the only state to still have return share is Rhode Island. 60
Questions: The data raises several questions: Did the first category of states, those that excluded TVs in their original legislation do so because of TV lobbying or not? Secondly, was there TV lobbying in New Jersey and Rhode Island? If so, why did the results here differ from the two states that adopted return share provisions and the eight that used market share? Moreover, how do we account for the TV lobby’s ability to effectively advocate for a change to market share once TVs were included in Hawaii, Maryland North Carolina. Finally, did the TV lobby face any effective resistance, and if so how was it overcome? 61
Introduction My Argument: It is my argument that looking at the role of lobbyist-proposed legislative language offers one way of measuring “influence. ” To address these weaknesses in the literature, I propose examining what might be described as the ultimate form of persuasion: lobbyist-proposed legislative language. But before preceding, let me give you an overview of lobbying as an issue… 62
Exchange and Persuasion theories: Exchange Theory: Limitations: Evidence Mixed, Contract? So-called “vote-buying, ” for example, or the trading of roll-call votes for contributions has been extensively studied. However, the results of this work are, as scholars note, “mixed” (Wright 1985; Snyder 1992, 16; Hall and Deardoff 2006) Contributions LB LG Roll-Call Votes Methodological Disdvantages: Contributions can be tracked 63
Study Language: Lobbyist-Proposed Language: Ultimate Form of Persuasion Methodological Advantages: Can be Tracked Language can be tracked, and thus offers not only a means of determining whether or not persuasive information has been translated into “influence, ” but under what conditions. 64
Elaborating on the Argument Transition to E-Waste Legislation: Access, then Support, and finally Influence. By looking at the role lobbyist-proposed legislative language plays at the state level within a particular policy area, e-waste legislation, we hope to draw on the insights of the persuasion theories to see how information can bring lobbyists first access, then support, and finally influence. 65
Elaborating on the Argument Critiques of both exchange and persuasion arguments raise fundamental questions about the nature of the lobbying process itself, specifically what is sought in the interaction, especially by lobbyists. Role of Information: While the importance if not necessarily the influence of money can be understood given the costs of reelection, the role of information is less clear, but more suggestive of how influence operates. Lobbying Allies: Suggest an Answer to Role of Information Indeed, the lobbying of allies might suggest an answer to the puzzle of lobbying. If we pause to consider what lobbyists think can be gained by targeting allies rather than opponents, we might began to understand the added value, certainly for lobbyists, and possibly for legislators, of persuasive information. 66
Elaborating on the Argument Persuasion into Influence If influencing legislative outcomes is the goal of lobbying, once allies and opponents have been identified, the challenge becomes finding specific ways to turn persuasion into influence, that is, action. Restate Core Argument I argue that specific legislative language, proposed by lobbyists is one way that lobbyists can bridge the gap between persuasion and actual legislative influence. If the language becomes law, persuasion has been turned into influence. Thus, working with allies, who are likely to adopt lobbyist proposed language is one way, and seemingly the most efficient way of achieving political influence. 67
The Issue of Electronic Waste The manufacture and sale of electronics has grown steadily since the mid-1980’s into a worldwide industry that generated $178 billion worth of sales in electronics in 2008 (Consumer Electronics Association 2009). As consumer demand for electronic products continues to grow, and the lifespan of these products shortens, the result is a startling increase in the number of discarded electronic products. In the US alone, 400 million units of electronic products are discarded each year, making consumer electronics the fastest growing portion of the municipal waste stream by a factor of three (Schmidt 2002). They are also highly toxic… In addition to lead, circuit boards and batteries also contain small amounts of mercury, cadmium, beryllium, and hexavalent cromium, all heavy metals. 68
The Issue of Electronic Waste TVs and Landfills: 1999 Study In 1999, a landmark study published by the Florida Center for Solid and Hazardous Waste Management at the University of Florida attracted the attention of state environmental regulators and public health advocates alike, who had become increasingly concerned about the growing volume of electronic waste at municipal landfills (Townsend et al. , 1999). Findings: Led can leach from TVs The study demonstrated, for the first time, that lead could leach from color CRT’s (Cathode Ray Tube) under certain conditions. States Responded: Ban TVs from Landfills In response to public health concerns about potential environmental contamination, states began to take steps to ban CRT’s from landfills a year later. [in 2000. ] 69
Analysis Political Culture, Professionalization and Party Control Again, Political Culture, Professionalization and Party Control appeared to have little effect on the success or failure of market-share e-waste lobbying efforts. Political Culture: Market share language was successful in individualist, moral and traditional states, and failed in both moral and individualist states. Professionalization: The same was true in terms of professionalization. It passed and failed in high, medium and low professionalized states. Party Control: And in each of the states where producer responsibility legislation was debated there was a Democratic majority, save for Indiana where the Democrats controlled the House and the Republicans controlled the Senate. 70
Research Design: Study of Language Research Design: To test the comparative impact of a language-based strategy, specifically, whether legacy manufacturers’ use of specific market share provisions to challenge the use of return share principles that benefitted non-legacy manufacturers, we conducted a pre and post-test analysis of filed and finalized e-waste legislation in each of the states that have passed such laws that include TVs since 2003. By looking at changes in e-waste legislation in several states where lobbying efforts were made to substitute “market-share” for “return-share, ” and comparing these results to states where producer responsibility legislation was debated, but no similarly coordinated lobbying campaigns occurred, we hope to highlight the influence of lobbyists proposed language on legislative outcomes at the state level. 71
which adopted a EPR model where manufacturers shared responsibility with consumers, retailers and municipalities for proper disposal of e-waste. Return Share Just as important, for our purposes, Maine opted to apportion responsibility among manufacturers based on the concept of “return share. ” Exchange and Persuasion theories: Lobbying is thought to influence legislative action either through an exchange of contributions, financial and otherwise for votes, or by way of information-based strategic persuasion. Accordingly, it is our contention that lobbyists who provide legislators with language are more likely to influence legislators, either in terms of passing or killing legislation and thus win in competition with other interest groups. 72
And, in several states where TVs were either initially excluded – Missouri- or where ewaste has yet to pass –Colorado- market-share legislation is now pending.
The Issue of Electronic Waste California Acts First: “Advanced Recovery Fee” California became the first state in 2003 to pass electronic waste recycling legislation. California adopted a so-called advanced recovery fee system, which places an upfront fee on new purchases of televisions and computers in anticipation of their future recycling costs. Since California, All Use Producer Responsibility Since then nineteen (18) other states has enacted e-waste laws. But none has followed California’s lead of adopting a advanced recovery fee system. Instead, those states have adopted some version of extended producer responsibility. 74
Analysis: Pattern of State Laws The pattern of lawmaking that has followed California’s e-waste law highlights the success legacy TV lobbyists have had influencing the legislative process with market share language. Of the 18 states that have enacted e-waste laws since 2004, six states – Hawaii, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia – excluded TV’s altogether in their legislation, and four --New Jersey, Maine, Washington and Oregon– initially used return share. 75
- Slides: 75