Lesson 2 Begin With The End in Mind

Lesson 2 Begin With The End in Mind: Operation Desert Shield 1

Lesson Objectives • Understand be able to discuss the causes, conduct, and consequences (C³) of the Gulf War. • Develop a methodology for systematically studying the changes in war over time. • Begin to appreciate the impact of technology and logistics on modern war. • Establish recognizable end points for the major threads of modern war (weapons, logistics, communications, strategy, and operational art). 2

Operation Desert Storm Preview (Not available online) "The Circle of Modern War" and logo © Thomas D. Pilsch 2007 -2013

If you would understand a war … Study the War Before

Study the War Before Operation Desert Storm The War Before: Vietnam

Legacies of Vietnam Memorial Veterans Issues Weinberger Doctrine Agent Orange Suspension of Draft War Powers Act Weinberger Doctrine

Lessons Learned from Vietnam War Weinberger Doctrine Caspar W. Weinberger "The Uses of Military Power" National Press Club, Washington, D. C. Nov. 28, 1984 • Secretary of Defense under President Reagan • Drafted by his military assistant, Brig Gen Colin Powell

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. .

National Interest: the collection of issues that support our vision and goals 10

National Interest: � The security of the United States, its citizens, and U. S. allies and partners; � A strong, innovative and growing U. S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; � Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and � An international order advanced by U. S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. National Security Strategy of the US, 2010

Vital National Interests: those issues of such importance over which the nation is willing to go to war 12

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. . .

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. .

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. . • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. .

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. . • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. . • Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. .

Weinberger Doctrine • The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. . • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. . • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. . • Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. . • The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

Thesis The Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) was the only war in U. S. history where we successfully implemented the lessons of the previous war from the beginning.

Weinberger Doctrine Caspar W. Weinberger 1917 - 2006

From time to time, when you least expect it, when everyone thinks the world is quiet, someone pulls on Superman’s cape. General Colin Powell, USA Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff NY Times, August 17, 1990 21

The Middle East 22 US Military Academy, Dept. of History

Kuwait 23

Timeline of Events 1979 -1981 Iran Hostage Crisis 1980 -1988 Iran-Iraq War 24

Timeline of Events • Iraq invades Kuwait, Aug. 2, 1990 25

Reasons for Invasion • Iraqi heavily indebted to Saudi Arabia & Kuwait as a result of Iran-Iraq War • Kuwait’s disregard for OPEC oil production quotas severely impacted Iraqi economy • Iraq alleged Kuwait was drilling into its oil fields 26

Oilfield Disputes 27

Reasons for Invasion • Iraqi heavily indebted to Saudi Arabia & Kuwait as a result of Iran-Iraq War • Kuwait’s disregard for OPEC oil production quotas severely impacted Iraqi economy • Iraq alleged Kuwait was drilling into its oil fields • Iraq did not accept Kuwaiti independence • Iraq resented the restrictions on access to the sea imposed by Kuwaiti control of the mouth of the Euphrates River

US Unified Commands 29

US Central Command President Bush Sec. Def Cheney General Norman Schwarzhoph CINCCENT Op. Con CJCS Powell Advice & Resources

Guiding Principles of U. S. Policy • The immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait • The restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq • A commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf • The protection of the lives of American citizens abroad National Security �Directive 45 US Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait August 20, 1990

Levels of War 32 FM 3 -0

Runup to Gulf War (Not available online: ) "The Circle of Modern War" and logo © Thomas D. Pilsch 2007 -2013

Timeline of Events • Iraq invades Kuwait, Aug. 2, 1990 • Operation Desert Shield begins, Aug. 7 34

Timeline of Events Operation Desert Shield August 7, 1990 – January 16, 1991 Deployment of forces to protect Saudi Arabia Operation Desert Storm January 17, 1991 – February 28, 1991 Use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait Operation Desert Calm March 1, 1991 -- Redeployment of forces (unofficial)

Operation Desert Shield Mobility Assets Limited Video 36

Desert Shield Airlift Winds of the Storm (You. Tube: 1: 30 -5: 12) "The Circle of Modern War" and logo © Thomas D. Pilsch 2007 -2013

Operation Desert Shield decision: General Schwarzkopf’s dilemma: With limited mobility resources, do you first: • Deploy fighting forces to defend Saudi Arabia? or Deploy forces to defend Saudi Arabia • Deploy logistics infrastructure to prepare for … and very aggressively! a bigger fight? 38

Operation Desert Shield “Some who questioned our policy in the Gulf felt this deployment was overkill, but General Norman Schwartzkopf had learned from Vietnam the problems of gradual escalation. ” Andrew Leyden “Summary of the Gulf War: Operation Desert Shield” Gulf War Debriefing Book Grants Pass, OR: Hellgate Press, 1997 What was different? Vietnam: 1964 – 1968 (536, 100 troops) Gulf War: Aug 1990 - Jan-Mar 1991 (533, 600 troops)* * 22 Feb 1991 Source: The Whirlwind War 39

Main Support Areas Difference from Southeast Asia: Existing infrastructure (ports, airfields, roads)

Coalition Warfare 34 nations* (29 sent forces) Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. 956, 600 troops * Additionally, Germany & Japan made financial contributions wikipedia

Coalition Warfare Nations Contributing Forces nationmaster. com

Timeline of Events • Iraq invades Kuwait, Aug. 2, 1990 • Operation Desert Shield begins, Aug. 7 • First call-up of Selected Reservists to active duty for 90 days, by executive order, Aug. 22

Timeline of Events • Iraq invades Kuwait, Aug. 2, 1990 • Operation Desert Shield begins, Aug. 7 • First call-up of Selected Reservists to active duty for 90 days, by executive order, Aug. 22 • Congress authorizes use of force against Iraq • Joint Resolution: Senate 52 to 47, House 250 to 183

Timeline of Events • Iraq invades Kuwait, Aug. 2, 1990 • Operation Desert Shield begins, Aug. 7 • First call-up of Selected Reservists to active duty for 90 days, by executive order, Aug. 22 • Congress authorizes use of force against Iraq • Joint Resolution: Senate 52 to 47, House 250 to 183 • NSD 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, authorized the use of military force, Jan. 15 47

National Security Directive 54 Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf. . . I hereby authorize military actions designed to bring about Iraqi’s withdraw from Kuwait. This authorization is for the following purposes: National Security Directive 54 January 15, 1991 48

National Security Directive 54 Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf National Security Directive 54 January 15, 1991 49

National Security Directive 54 Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf National Security Directive 54 January 15, 1991 50

National Security Directive 54 Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf National Security Directive 54 January 15, 1991 51

Timeline of Events • Iraq invades Kuwait, Aug. 2, 1990 • Operation Desert Shield begins, Aug. 7 • First call-up of Selected Reservists to active duty for 90 days, by executive order, Aug. 22 • Congress authorizes use of force against Iraq • Joint Resolution: Senate 52 to 47, House 250 to 183 • NSD 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, authorized the use of military force, Jan. 15 • Operation Desert Storm air war phase begins, 3 a. m. , Jan. 17, 1991 (Jan. 16, 7 p. m. EST)

Lesson 3 Begin With The End in Mind: Operation Desert Storm 53

Lesson Objectives • Understand how the military conduct of the Gulf War supported the strategic objectives of the conflict. • Be able to discuss the impact of technology and logistics on modern war. • Establish recognizable end points for the major threads of modern war (weapons, logistics, communications, strategy, and operational art). 54

End 55

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Coalition Warfare France: Opération Daguet 18, 000 men 6 e Brigade Légère Blindée (light armored brigade) Augmented and redesignated Division Daguet AMX-30 Main Battle Tank (MBT) 57