Lecture 8 Foreign Policy Decision Making Part I

Lecture #8 Foreign Policy Decision Making Part I: Leaders’ Beliefs and Personal Characteristics

Introduction • Models that focus on regime types, power distributions, and other structural forces identify important causal factors in IR • But individual human beings (particularly elite decisionmakers such as presidents, prime ministers, kings, and dictators) can sometimes have an important impact on foreign policy and IR: • Leaders’ beliefs and personalities may affect policy • Psychological biases that affect all humans will affect these key decision-makers and may shape outcomes in IR (Misperceptions, Groupthink, etc. )

Conditions When Leader’s Personality Impact International Relations Greatly

Conditions under which leaders’ beliefs/personalities are more likely to influence foreign policy • Leader has an interest/expertise in foreign policy (Bush 41 vs. Clinton) • Dramatic means of assuming power • Ambiguous external situation (leaders must define the situation and in the absence of compelling evidence they rely on their preconceptions to do so)

Conditions under which leaders’ beliefs/personalities are more likely to influence foreign policy • Crisis situations (short decision time, high threat, surprise): decision-making authority contracts upward to a small group of leaders • Greater institutional authority over foreign policy (e. g. , presidential vs. parliamentary systems) • Foreign policy bureaucracy is less developed

Types of beliefs and personal characteristics that may affect foreign policy decision-making • Operational Codes (Holsti, Walker) • Images (Herrmann) • Problem Representations (Sylvan) • Conceptual/Integrative Complexity (Hermann, Tetlock, Suedfeld) • Locus of Control • Motives: need for power, achievement, affiliation • Orientation Toward Constraints (Keller): “constraint challengers” vs. “constraint respecters”

Operational Codes

History of Operational Codes • The term was first coined by Nathan Leites in his two now classic works, The Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and A Study of Bolshevism (1953). • Leites conceptualized the responses of the Politburo to political decisions as a series of decision-making rules and axioms that constituted their worldview. • He then drew on psychoanalytic theory and social psychology to account for this worldview and analyze the primary motivations and goals of Soviet leaders.

Operational Codes • The Operational Code does not encompass all the beliefs that influence the behavior of a given individual. • It is instead a subset of political beliefs that are especially relevant in the context of political decision making. • It is divided these beliefs into the: • Philosophical Beliefs: general assumptions regarding the fundamental nature of politics, conflict, and the individual---the nature of world politics and character of one’s adversaries • Instrumental Beliefs: more specific beliefs concerning the methods leaders should use to attain the ends they desire---which policy instruments and approaches are most effective

The Operational Code Questions: Philosophical P-1: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other? P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? P-4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction? P-5: What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development? Instrumental I-1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? I-2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? I-3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? I-4: What is the best timing of action to advance one’s interest? I-5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests? Source: George 1969.

Operational Code Implications: • These beliefs structure and order reality for decision makers and help them to sort the signals in their environment from the noise. • They exert a tremendous influence on how leaders interpret information, perceive the social environment, and make decisions

Example • The foreign policy operational code of George W. Bush (GWB) over four distinct time periods: • (1) pre-presidential beliefs, • The transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 represents a change in GWB’s political role from governor and presidential candidate to president and thus allows us to examine whether beliefs change when one’s role changes substantially • (2) pre–September 11 th beliefs, • (3) post–September 11 th beliefs, • The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are representative of a second class of belief-changing event: the traumatic shock. • The third class of potential belief-changing event is one that can be termed the ‘‘learning in offi ’ model of belief change. • (4) end-of-term presidency beliefs. • In this case, we can see the effect of roughly six years of time spent as president of the United States and examine how belief change might occur in the absence of sudden shocks or role changes

Images

Images • The psychological theory is connected to a set of assumptions drawn from International Relations theory that suggest perceived strategic relationships can be conceived of as a function: • of perceived relative power, • perceived culture, • and the perceived threat or perceived opportunity that a subject believes another actor represents.

• Images (Herrmann) • 3 Dimensions: • Threat/opportunity, • Relative power • Relative culture • Resulting Images: • Ally, • Enemy, • Colony, • Degenerate, • Imperial, • Barbarian, • Rogue • Each image is associated with a specific “script” of likely policy actions

Group-Share • Using your knowledge of World History, American History, and current events, identify examples for ONE OF THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF IMAGES. • Then identify examples for at least FOUR OF THE DIFFERENT RESULTING IMAGES. • This will go in the Examples Column of your notes.

Problem Representations and Misperceptions/Selective Perceptions

Students Note: • Pages 129 -131 of Supplemental Reading • Make sure to add to the graphic organizer sections from the reading!

• Problem Representations (Sylvan) • World view shapes problem representation • Which in turn determines which options are generated as viable • Do not see the whole picture and leads to overlooking important factors

Misperceptions and Selective Perceptions • Taking in only some kinds of information when they compile information on the likely consequences of their choices. • Decision-making processes must reduce and filter the incoming information on which a decision is based; the problem is that such filtration often is biased • Information screens are subconscious filters through which people put the information coming in about the world around them. • Often they simply ignore any information that does not fit their expectations. • Information is also screened out as it passes from one person to another in the decision- making process.

• Foreign policies often deviate from rationality as a result of the misperceptions and biases of decision makers and populations. • Here, in 2012, North Korea’s new dictator Kim Jong-Un rides a roller coaster that could symbolize the West’s efforts to curtail his country’s nuclear weapons program. • These weapons will pose a much greater threat if Kim, who took over in 2011, is an irrational madman than if he turns out to be a shrewdly rational actor.

• Both individual misperception and group psychology encourage overconfidence and excessive optimism among decision makers. • This general tendency in every government especially marked the period of the U. S. invasion of Iraq. • Here, President Bush declares victory on an aircraft carrier, May 2003.

Locus of Control

• Locus of Control: • The extent to which a person believes they have power over their successes and/or failures in life. • Affects risk-taking propensity

Locus of Control The extent to which a person believes they have power over their successes and/or failures in tasks. Internal Locus of Control External Locus of Control • Believes his or her successes are due to factors within their own control. • Believes his or her successes or failures are due to factors outside of their own control. • Behavior is guided by his/her personal decisions and efforts. • Behavior is guided by fate, luck, or other external circumstance.

Motives

• Motives: need for power, achievement, affiliation • Affect reliance on: • cooperative vs. competitive strategies • arms control • use of force, etc.

Group-Share • Using your knowledge of World History, American History, and current events, identify examples for the different types of motives. • This will go in the Examples Column of your notes.

Orientation Toward Constraints

• Orientation Toward Constraints (Keller): • “constraint challengers” vs. “constraint respecters” • “constraint respecters” tend to internalize potential constraints • “constraint challengers” are more likely to view them as obstacles to be overcome

Examples • President Kennedy---a “constraint respecter” during international crises • President Reagan---a “constraint challenger” during international crises

Group-Share—Goes in Example Column • Using your knowledge of World History, American History, and current events, think of examples for: • When did the chief decision maker in the country dominate the decisionmaking process and refused to listen to opposition? • To what extent can this behavior be attributed to the leader’s personality as opposed to situational factors? • Did the exhibited decision style depend on the issue under consideration? Explain. • When the chief decision maker in the country exhibit a more inclusive, participatory decision-making process? • To what extent can this behavior be attributed to the leader’s personality as opposed to situational factors? • Did the exhibited decision style depend on the issue under consideration? Explain.

Conceptual/Integrative Complexity

• Conceptual/Integrative Complexity (Hermann, Tetlock, Suedfeld) • Is a research psychometric that refers to the degree to which thinking and reasoning involve the recognition and integration of multiple perspectives and possibilities and their interrelated contingencies. • Refers to the extent to which individuals demonstrate two inclinations when they consider events and issues. • The first dimension, differentiation, relates to the capacity of individuals to adopt and to apply a variety of perspectives to appreciate an issue. • The second dimension, integration, refers to the capacity of individuals to recognize connections and similarities across divergent perspectives. • Hence, when integrative complexity is low, individuals tend to form simple and rigid attitudes and perceptions (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992). • Affects openness to information and deliberativeness

Example • Aggression • In general, when integrative complexity is low, aggression and hostility often prevail (Bruch, Mc. Cann, & Harvey, 1991& Winter. 1993). • As Winter (1993) showed, for example, if police officers do not exhibit integrative complexity, they are more inclined to act violently in stressful contexts. • Conceivably, when integrative complexity is low, other options to solve problems are less likely to be considered.

Example • Political Preferences • Many studies in this literature have examined the relationship between political preferences and integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1983, 1984& Tetlock, Hannum, & Micheletti, 1984). • In general, these studies show that liberal or moderate politicians exhibit complex rather than simple thinking styles. • That is, their integrative complexity is elevated, relative to their more conservative and extreme counterparts. • To explain this pattern of observations, Tetlock (1983, 1986) argues that individuals who do not engage in complex thinking feel threatened by the prospect of a dynamic, changing, and chaotic society. • They will, therefore, espouse political principles that attempt to stifle this change.

Factors That Affect Conceptual/Integrative Complexity • Stress • Several studies have shown how life events, especially stressful episodes, can affect the integrative complexity of individuals. • Showed that stressful life events can reduce integrative complexity. • Indeed, many studies have shown that stressful events can undermine integrative complexity. • Events such as war, economic decline, impending death, and international tension can reduce this form of complexity (Porter & Suedfeld, 1981& Suedfeld, Corteen, & Mc. Cormick, 1986& Suedfeld & Garanstein, 1995).

Factors That Affect Conceptual/Integrative Complexity • Personality • Tetlock, Peterson, and Berry (1993) examined the association between personality and integrative complexity. • As self report measures indicated, complex individuals report elevated scores on openness, but low scores on compliance and conscientiousness. • However, as ratings of observers indicated, these individuals also seemed antagonistic and even narcissistic. • Nevertheless, they also showed more initiative, as rated by managers, and more motivation to seek power, as gauged by a projective test called the PSE (see also Coren & Suedfeld, 1995).

Factors That Affect Conceptual/Integrative Complexity • Multicultural Engagement • When some people travel or work in other nations, they actively engage in other cultures, called multicultural engagement. • For example, they strive purposefully to learn about the customs, traditions, values and beliefs of other cultures. • In addition, they adapt their behavior to align closely with these cultures. • As Maddux, Bivolaru, Hafenbrack, Tadmor, and Galinsky (2013) showed, this cultural engagement tends to enhance integrative complexity, ultimately improving the future job prospects of individuals.

Hermann’s Final Analysis: Two Main Orientations • • Independent Leaders with strong nationalism Leaders with strong belief in their own ability to control events Leaders with a strong need for power Leaders with low levels of Conceptual Complexity Leaders with high levels of distrust of others Develop an independent orientation towards foreign policy Example: Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of Great Britain, and his policy towards Iraq War • • Participatory Leaders with low levels of nationalism Leaders with little belief in their ability to control events Leaders with a high level of affiliation Leaders with high levels of Conceptual Complexity Leaders with low levels of distrust Develop a more participatory orientation towards foreign policy Example: Jimmy Carter, former American President, and how he handled the Iranian Hostage Crisis

Group Activity • For the Example of Conceptual/Integrative Complexity, we are going to examine the controversial Latin American leader Hugo Chavez. • This will be done through a You. Tube Clip and short reading. • See Lesson Plan!