Learning to Disagree Project Leadership in times of

Learning to Disagree Project Leadership in times of turmoil Variety of Viewpoints developed by Zsolt Vodli

About Leadership in times of turmoil This variety of viewpoints presents three leaders, Kádár in Hungary, Husák in Czechoslovakia, and Jaruzelski in Poland, and their reactions to popular revolts and to the threat of Soviet invasion. It touches upon many controversies related to questions of how leaders could and should behave in times of turmoil. Firstly, how can leaders navigate between competing obligations which task them with taking into account the potential consequences of their actions and with remaining loyal to their country and their conscience? Secondly, what is the fine line between being a courageous fighter and a collaborator when it comes to saving your country? Thirdly, what circumstances would make people choose between freedom or subjugation? You can use this collection of viewpoints to teach about the events in a single country (Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland, 1981), or to ask students to compare and contrast between the three cases. This variety of viewpoints is accompanied by discussion questions, a timeline, and context information for each

A Speech from János Kádár about the foundation of his government (Szolnok Speech) https: //commons. wikimedia. org/wiki /File: J%C 3%A 1 nos_K%C 3%A 1 d%C 3 %A 1 r_1962. jpg – CC-BY-SA-3. 0 NL We must put an end to the excesses of the counterrevolutionary elements. The hour for action has sounded. We are going to defend the interest of the workers and peasants and the achievements of the people's democracy. […] • Point 3: The Government will not tolerate the persecution of workers under any pretext for having taken part in the most recent events; • […] • Point 9: On the basis of the broadest democracy, workers’ management must be realised in factories and enterprises; • […] • Point 11: Securing democratic elections of existing administrative bodies and revolutionary councils. Sources: UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957), Chapter VIII. B, para 596 (p. 185). and alphahistory (https: //alphahistory. com/coldwar/Kádár s-15 point-program-1956/)

Glossary. • Counter-revolutionary = when something is against a revolution, we say that it is “counter-revolutionary”. In this case, Kadar is saying that the government of Imre Nagy (who was in power at the time) is counter-revolutionary because it goes against the principles of the socialist revolution (against the interest of the workers and peasants and the achievements of the people's democracy). • Persecution of workers = we call persecution the act of treating someone without respect or punishing someone on the basis of a specific characteristic. Persecution of workers can take many forms, from fines, to imprisonment, to being fired. • in this case, Kadar is promising that all the workers that took part to the revolt in October will not experience any of this. • Revolutionary councils = were small governing bodies that were created across Hungary during the revolt.

Context Information – Kádár’s biography János Kádár (1912 - 1989), was prime minister of Hungary (1956– 58, 1961– 65) and first secretary (1956– 88) of Hungary’s Communist Party (=the ruling party in Hungary, supported by the Soviet Union and based on the principles of Soviet Communism). He led a life that some might define as full of contradictions. Although he did not have a higher education degree - he was trained as a mechanic - he soon became a prominent member of the Communist Party, up to the role of minister of the interior (1949), after the war. In 1950, he came into conflict with the Stalinists (=the members of the Communist Party that were supporting Stalin and his policies) and consequently was expelled from the party, imprisoned (1951– 53), and allegedly tortured. Rehabilitated in 1954 (after Stalin’s death), he joined Imre Nagy’s short-lived government, which had been brought to power right after the Hungarian revolt (started October 23, 1956). Nagy's reformist faction gained full control of the government, admitted non-communist politicians, dissolved the Secret Police, promised democratic reforms and unilaterally withdrew Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. On 04 November 1956, Soviet troops invaded Hungary, and Kádár declared the formation of a government that would be against the revolution enacted by Nagy’s government. He became prime minister of this government, and kept this position until 1958. Unable to implement Nagy’s reforms, Kádár resorted to repressive measures to curb the revolt. He also played a key role in Hungary’s transition into a pro-Soviet regime that followed. At the same time, Kádár managed to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops and allow Hungary internal independence after quelling the popular revolt in the county. The text reported above is part of a speech that he made on the national Hungarian radio on 04 November 1956, when he founded the new government. In this speech, he listed 15 steps with which the reforms promised by Nagy would be reverted (=cancelled) and socialism would be restored in Hungary. Text based on: https: //www. britannica. com/biography/Janos-Kadar

A memory of Mátyás Szűrös on Kádár’s conversation with Harriman I remember a story related to János Kádár. I think that the ‘Hungarian Question’ ceased to exist in 1962 and sometime prior to that, János Kádár met Harriman, an influential member of American diplomacy, in the company of Khrushchev. They met at a stadium in a sports event where Khrushchev introduced Kádár to Harriman. Kádár said: "Look, sir, we are in a special situation. We gave Mátyás to the Soviets, and we gave Cardinal Mindszenty to you. We have drawn some conclusions from our history so we would like that the Hungarian Question would not exist anymore and Hungary would be treated as a sovereign state”. It was most likely a rather specific phenomenon and I don’t think that the leader of any other socialist country would have been in a similar situation. Khrushchev opened a new historical era with the 20 th Congress by criticising the personality cult of Stalin. It was his main historical merit and also the opening to the West. János Kádár was a partner in this. Source: http: //www. rev. hu/ords/f? p=600: 2: 21573700939761

Glossary. • Hungarian Question = originally, the Hungarian Question referred to the fact that, since the end of the First World War, in Hungary there was a high amount of national minorities (inhabitants that were not ethnically / culturally Hungarian), and to how these minorities were treated. In the case of this viewpoint, however, the term draws attention to the role Soviet troops played in crushing the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 thus threatening the Hungarian sovereignty. • American Diplomacy = here, Mátyás Szűrös uses “American Diplomacy” to underline that Averell Harriman was an official representative of the United States in Europe. In particular, he was one of the main American diplomats to manage the relation between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. • Sovereign State = a state is sovereign when it has full control on its territory and internal and foreign politics, without being influenced or controlled from other countries.

Context Information Mátyás Szűrös was a Hungarian politician and diplomat, and a former member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. In this text, he remembers a specific conversation between Kadar, Harriman, and Khrushchev (at that time, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In this conversation, Kadar asked Harriman that the USA should leave it to Hungary to deal with its internal politics. To give weight to his request, he underlines that Hungary is in a “special situation” as it has good relations with both the USA and the USSR: proof of this is the fact that Hungary removed Mátyás Rákosi from leadership positions and had him move to the USSR, while Cardinal Mindszenty was allowed to require political asylum (=protection) to the United States and to move there. According to Szűrös, this speech was the reason why Hungary started to be recognised as a sovereign state by both the USA and the USSR. He also underlines that this could happen only in Hungary, because it was in a very special situation: Kadar was following the example of Khrushchev and creating diplomatic links between Hungary and the West.

A speech by János Lázár on Kádár and his government But can we talk about the victory of '56 when, according to some of our fellow countrymen, Kádár is still one of the greatest statesmen, one of the largest Hungarian politicians? (. . . ) Kádár, who planned and executed the retaliation after '56. (. . . ) calling in the Soviets, organising the forty-year military occupation was perhaps the most serious betrayal of our nation’s history – can only be compared to the treason of Szálasi, who collaborated with the German invaders. János Kádár was a murderer. János Kádár was a collaborator. And János Kádár was a traitor. However, it is rather unfortunate that many of our fellow countrymen are still not aware of this. Source - http: //www. kormany. hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/aminiszter/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/lazar-janos-oktober-22 -enszentesen-elmondott-beszede

Context Information János Lázár is a Hungarian politician. He was a member of the Hungarian Parliament, and member of the Prime Minister's Office in 2016. This viewpoint is part of a speech he did at the inauguration of the memorial on the 60 th anniversary of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence in Szentes. In this viewpoint, he compares Kádár to Ferenc Szálasi, who was Head of State and Prime Minister during the last six months of the Second World War, when Hungary was under German occupation. In this period, he was openly supporting Fascism, and collaborated with the deportation and execution of many Jews. After the war, he was tried for crimes of war and crimes against humanity, judged guilty and executed.

A memory of Mária Wittner on returning to Hungary following Kádár’s promise of amnesty If only I’d known what I was coming home to! I was so stupid! That was the conclusion I reached about myself several times in prison and when we were sitting in the condemned cells. And Kati as well, who came home from Switzerland because her fiancé sent her a message saying she wouldn’t be harmed in any way, because Kádár had promised everyone immunity. Lying to such an extent was extremely cruel! Lying to such an extent that it costs people their lives! To entice as many people as possible back home, just so as to string up as many people as possible! That was more than cruelty, it was villainy! Source: http: //server 2001. rev. hu/oha/index_hu. html

Context Information Mária Wittner was a freedom fighter in Hungary in 1956. After the revolution was stopped by Soviet intervention, she escaped to Austria, where she remained until Kadar said he would grant amnesty to all freedom fighters who would go back to Hungary. When she arrived back in Hungary, she was arrested and sentenced to death in 1958. This is what she is remembering in this viewpoint. Later, she was freed, and she is still alive as of today (2019). She has been a member of the Hungarian Parliament until 2014. By the end of October 1956, border controls were gradually abolished on western and southern borders of the country. In these few weeks, some 200, 000 people fled the country, mostly across the green border. Of these, by the summer of 1957, 11, 000 returned, accepting the amnesty promised by Kádár’s government. Kádár began to consolidate his government with a variety of promises made in the press and in personal talks, suggesting that they would fulfil a substantial part of the revolution's demands, withholding the hardline against old Communist leaders, but would not punish those who took part in the uprising. He did not promise that the country would remain neutral, but that the Soviet troops would leave Hungarian territory. Most of the promises were not fulfilled. For example, no amnesty was granted by the government.

A speech of Gustáv Husák on the Czechoslovak Radio (August 1968) There are tendencies to slow down the democratisation process, close that door a bit. Even before the Slovak Communist Party Congress, it is possible to observe such a vivid attempt of people in positions they should have already left to hold onto these positions and the power and in this or that amount. I’m firmly convinced that this new wave, represented by comrade Dubček is that strong, even in the Czech and the Slovak nations, that there’s no power for anyone to close the door, to put us back or even to close more perspectives for us. https: //commons. wikimedia. org/w iki/File: Gust%C 3%A 1 v_Hus%C 3%A 1 k_-_o%C 5%99%C 3%ADznuto. JPG Source - text: https: //www. radio. cz/cz/rubrika/udalosti/corikal-husak-20 -srpna-1968 These recordings of Czechoslovak radio were confiscated after August 1968 by the State Security and stored in their archives

Context Information This speech was done by Husák on Czechoslovak Radio in August 1968, when he was in favour of Dubček’s reforms. He says that even before the Communist party came into power, there were, in the elites (= among those who were already in power) of Czechoslovakia, tendencies to hold on to power and fight the democratisation process. What Dubček is doing, he says, is to try to counter these tendencies, promoting the democratisation process in Czechoslovakia and taking away power from the elites.

Context Information – Husak’s biography Gustav Husák (1913 -1991) was the Communist leader of Czechoslovakia from 1969 to 1989. From 1933, he participated in underground Communist activities. During World War II he was imprisoned by Slovakia’s German-backed puppet government in 1940– 43. After his release, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, and he helped direct the antifascist Slovak national uprising of 1944. After the end of the war, he began a career as a government official and party functionary in Czechoslovakia, which lasted until the Stalinist purge of the Communist Party’s leadership. He spent 1954 – 1960 in prison and was restored as a member of the Communist Party in 1963. He became a deputy premier of Czechoslovakia in April 1968, during the period of liberalisation under party leader Alexander Dubček. Then, when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, he started calling for a reversal of the liberal reforms. He was appointed leader of the Communist Party of Slovakia in August 1968 and became first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in April 1969. Husák reversed Dubček’s reforms and purged the party of its liberal members, focusing on managing the nation’s economy while keeping internal dissent under control. He persuaded the Soviet leaders that Czechoslovakia was a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact, had the constitution amended to embody the newly proclaimed Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily if it perceived socialism anywhere to be under threat. Due to his opposition to Mikhail Gorbachev’s (the leader of the Soviet Union) programme of perestroika, the policy to reform and reconstruct the economic and political system of the Soviet Union, he abandoned his role as secretary general of the Communist Party in 1987, and resigned as president in December 1989, after the collapse of communist rule in the country.

Glossary. • Puppet government = when the government of a country follows the indications and requests of another state, we say this is a “puppet government”. • Purge = the act of removing unwanted features, conditions, feeling. In politics, we talk about purges within parties whenever all the people that support viewpoints that are different from the mainstream are removed from the party and from positions of power. • Stalinist purge = the removal, from communist parties, of all politicians who were following interpretations of communism different from that of Stalin.

A speech from Gustáv Husák, April 1969 We won’t retreat against enemy forces, against antisocialist, against right-wing elements. They threw a glove down to fight, last time in that March, let’s pick up the glove and lead the party into political struggle with these forces. I’m absolutely sure about the political victory. Because it is a fight, we won’t pretend that it is a children’s game. Source - Michal Macháček, Gustáv Husák, 2018 Glossary. To throw a glove down to fight / to pick up the glove = in the past, whenever someone wanted to challenge someone to fight, they would slap them with their gloves. Alternatively, they threw it at their feet. If the person slapped them back or picked up the glove, this meant they accepted the fight. This idiom is still used in English language.

Context Information In this speech from April 1969, Husák is reverting is position on all the liberal developments of 1968. He refers to ‘enemy forces’, which he identifies as anti-socialist and right-wing elements, and to the fact that in March 1968 they challenged the Communist Party (inviting it to make liberal reforms). The Communist Party, he says, is ready to fight, and will do it seriously (without thinking they are doing “a children’s game”). He says he is sure Communism will win the fight.

A letter from Václav Havel to Dr. Husák, 1975 On the contrary: even if they never speak of it, people have a very acute appreciation of the price they have paid for outward peace and quiet: the permanent humiliation of their human dignity. The less direct resistance they put up to it––comforting themselves by driving it from their mind and deceiving themselves with the thought that it is of no account, or else simply gritting their teeth––the deeper the experience etches itself into their emotional memory. The man who resists humiliation can quickly forget about it, but the man who can long tolerate it must long remember it. In actual fact, then, nothing remains forgotten. All the fear one has endured, the dissimulation one has been forced into, all the painful and degrading buffoonery and, worst of all perhaps, the feeling of having displayed one’s cowardice ––all this settle and accumulates somewhere at the bottom of our social consciousness, quietly fermenting. Source - text: https: //www. vhlf. org/havel-quotes/letter-to-dr-husak/

Support for analysis In this letter, that Havel wrote to Husák in 1975, Havel mentions that to live in peace and quiet people in Czechoslovakia had to sacrifice their dignity. He says that people let go of many humiliations and of all the fear for a lot of time. As a consequence, he ends on the letter, all the pain and anger has accumulated “at the bottom of our social consciousness”, in everyone’s shared ideals, and is bound to bubble up until it explodes in a new revolt. He is warning Husák that the repression of the Prague Spring, which only ended in 1975, might have serious and dangerous consequences for the country. Context information Vaclav Havel was a Czech playwright, poet, and political dissident, who, after the fall of communism, was president of Czechoslovakia (1989– 92) and of the Czech Republic (1993– 2003). He was a prominent participant in the liberal reforms of 1968 (known as the Prague Spring), and, after the Soviet repression of the protests, his plays were banned and his passport was confiscated. During the 1970 s and ’ 80 s he was arrested many times and spent four years in prison (1979– 83) for his fight to promote human rights in Czechoslovakia. After his release from prison Havel, he remained in Czechoslovakia. Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, at https: //www. britannica. com/biography/Vaclav-Havel

Václav Havel on playwriting in Czechoslovakia in the 1960 s My early beginnings as a playwright coincided with the 1960 s, a remarkable and relatively favourable era, in which my plays, despite being so different from what had been permitted until then, could actually reach the stage, something that would have been impossible both before and after that. I don’t suppose I need to emphasise how important this was for my writing. It was not just the formal fact that my plays were permitted; there was something deeper and more essential here: that society was capable of accepting them, that they resonated with the general state of mind, that the intellectual and social climate of the time, open to new self-knowledge and hungry for it, not only tolerated them but––if I may so––actually wanted them. And of course every such act of social self-awareness––that is, every profound and genuine acceptance of a new work, identification with it, and the integration of it into the spiritual reality of the time––immediately and inevitably opens the way for even more radical acts. With each new work, the possibilities of the repressive system were weakened; the more we did, the more we were able to do, and the more we did, the more we were able to do. It was a state of accelerated metabolism between art and its time, and it is always inspiring and productive for a phenomenon as social as theatre. Source of the text https: //www. vhlf. org/havel-quotes/intro-to-several-playsprinted-by-68 -publishers/

Support for analysis This text is part of the introduction that Havel wrote to an anthology of his plays that was published in Toronto by the publishing house “ 68 publishers” in the mid-80 s, while he was banned at home. In here, he remembers nostalgically how it was to write plays in the 60 s in his home country. He defines the period as a favorable era, and underlines that his plays would not be accepted either before or after that period in the country. His plays, in fact, were a parody of bureaucracy and life in Czechoslovakia at the time. This is why he refers to the acceptance of the plays as an act of social selfawareness: the Czechoslovak population was able to laugh of its own flaws. And, Havel continues, the more the population became self-critical, the more the repression of the state was weak. It is a hopeful (and nostalgic) depiction of the years that preceded the Prague Spring.

A memory from Jiří Pehe on the repression of the Prague Spring “I still remember people going to the tanks and going to the soldiers and talking to the soldiers who did not even know where they were, they were saying: ‘This is a terrible mistake. What are you doing here? Why did you come? ’ We were young kids and like all of my other schoolmates, we were raised with this idea that the system might have problems, but that it was a humane system. This was drummed into us. After 1968, this all ended. We realised this was all a lie. ” Source: New York Times, 50 year after Prague Spring, Lessons on Freedom (and a Broken Spirit), 2018, available at https: //www. nytimes. com/2018/08/20/world/europe/prague-springcommunism. html

Context information Jiří Pehe is a former political adviser to Vaclav Havel, the first president of post. Communist Czechoslovakia. Since 1999, he is the director of New York University’s academic centre in Prague. He was 13 when the Prague Spring started, and remembers vividly the events. The text above is part of a longer interview he released to the New York Times when they were writing an article for the 50 th anniversary of the Prague Spring, in 2018. The title of the article is “ 50 years after Prague Spring, Lessons on Freedom (and a Broken Spirit)”.

An extract from a report that warns NATO of the risks of a Soviet intervention in Poland The scenario of operations for the intervening armies envisages a regrouping of armies to all major Polish Army bases to conduct manoeuvres with live ammunition. Then, depending on how things develop, all major Polish cities, especially industrial cities, are to be sealed off. […] According to the plan of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Polish Army will remain within its permanent units while its "allies" are regrouping on Polish territory. The only exceptions will be supervisory officers and military traffic control units, which will ensure a collision-free regrouping of the SA, CLA, and NVA armies from the border to the territories of future operations. Four Polish divisions (the 5 th and the 2 nd Tank Divisions and the 4 th and 12 th Mechanised Divisions) will be called into operation at a later point. Source: December 1980, Report Warning of Soviet Intervention available at: https: //digitalarchive. wilsoncenter. org/document/111999

Support for analysis This report was created by "Jack Strong" (code name for Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish colonel and spy for NATO during the Cold War). In it, Kuklinski tells about a secret Soviet meeting that outlined plans to bring the Soviet Army (SA), the National People's Army of the GDR (NVA), and the Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA) into Poland to stop the revolution. The deployment of these troops would be the first step to establish the Martial Law in all Polish major cities. Glossary • Manoeuvres with live ammunition = military operations where the troops are allowed to shoot. • Martial Law = the law administered by military forces that is invoked by a government in an emergency when the civilian law enforcement agencies are unable to maintain public order and safety (definition from the Merriam-Webster dictionary, at: https: //www. merriam-webster. com/dictionary/martial%20 law).

An extract from an interview to Jaruzelski in 1992 on Soviet Military Intervention in Poland Given the strategic logic of the time, I probably would have acted the same way if I had been a Soviet general. At that time, Soviet political and strategic interests were threatened. Source – text (German): http: //www. spiegel. de/spiegel/print/d-13680621. html https: //commons. wikimedia. org/ wiki/File: Gen. _Wojciech_Jaruzels ki_13_grudnia_1981. JPG

Context Information – Jaruzelski’s biography Wojciech Witold Jaruzelski (1923 – 2014) was a Polish army general and political leader who served as prime minister (1981– 85), chairman of the Council of State (1985– 89), and president (1989– 90) during the final years of communist rule in Poland. Eventually, he oversaw the country’s transition to a market economy and multiparty democracy. Throughout 1981, the government was confronted with the demands of Solidarity, the first independent labour union in the Soviet bloc, which used a series of controlled strikes to back up its appeals for economic reforms, free elections, and for the involvement of trade unions in decision making at the highest levels. In an effort to crush the movement and restore economic stability, Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981 (when this report was made); the move was accompanied by mass arrests of political dissidents and Solidarity leaders, including Lech Wałęsa (the leader of the Solidarity Movement). With Solidarity suppressed, he lifted the martial law in July 1983. He was less successful in his efforts to restore Poland’s stagnant economy, and in 1988 he approved negotiations between the government and the outlawed Solidarity movement. Those talks culminated in April 1989 in an agreement providing for far-reaching reforms in Poland’s political system, notably the legalisation of Solidarity, the holding of free elections and a restructured Parliament. Jaruzelski was elected president by the Parliament in July 1989 and then withdrew from active politics in December 1990, after Lech Wałęsa became president. He later was charged with crimes related to the 1981 imposition of martial law. The trial began in 2008 but was suspended in 2011 when he was diagnosed with cancer. He died in 2014.

A memory from film director Agnieszka Holland on the consequences of Martial Law At the beginning of December 1981, I went to Sweden. I was visiting various cities while promoting my film ‘Provincial Actor’s and discussing the situation in Poland. On 16 th December, my husband was to join me with our little daughter – the Polish shops were empty – so we were to spend Christmas with our family in Gothenburg. During my journey, the fatalistic and catastrophic vision of what must happen in the country was growing bigger and bigger. Well, I had already had the Czech experience and remembered the Czech spring crackdown. I felt that something horrible would happen soon. I insisted that my family leave Poland earlier. It had no effect. On 13 th December in the morning, I arrived at Gothenburg where my cousin was waiting for me at the railway station. ‘What do you think will happen? ’ he asked. ‘Finis Poloniae, ’ I answered, thinking about my gut feeling. He understood I already knew and I had a verbal diarrhoea all the way to his home and I only shut up when I saw tanks on the streets of Warsaw on TV. Over the following days I felt like I was hypnotised. Swedish journalists bombarded me with questions, I was the only Pole known over there. I hesitated for a few days, but the feeling of duty towards those interned and persecuted won inside me: I started giving sharp interviews knowing that I risked a long ban on coming back to the country and seeing my beloved ones. And so it happened. I was in despair more than I was angry. A long night was ahead of me. I knew that my life and the lives of many other Poles would never be the same again. ” Source : The Day Poland Stood Still: Memories from the Introduction of Martial Law. Article by Mikołaj Gliński, published on 13 December 2016. Available at: https: //culture. pl/en/article/the-day-poland-stood-

Support for analysis Agnieszka Holland is a Polish film director. In this text, she remembers that she was touring Sweden to promote his movie in 1981, and was supposed to meet her family there on 16 December. Before this date, she was feeling that something was not right, and suggested that her husband leave Poland earlier than planned. He did not listen to her, and when Martial Law was installed (13 December 1891) her husband daughter were blocked in the country and could not leave. She tells how she felt angry and sad about it, and how she was the only known Polish person in Sweden. She decided to give interviews to Swedish newspapers on living conditions in Poland, and as a consequence was banned from going back to the country to her family. The text ends with her saying that life in Poland would never be the same after the martial law. Glossary • Finis Poloniae = Latin for “the end of Poland”. • Verbal Diarrhoea = colloquialism to describe when someone starts talking about a specific argument without ever stopping. This is often used to describe people that complain.

An Interview with Dr Maciej Wojtyński on the long term consequences of Martial Law in Poland “[. . . ] The memory of martial law should act as a warning. May it never happen again. [. . . ] I know that in communism, which limited our knowledge very often, one had to be guided by intuition, I do not want to relativise, I do not miss Jaruzelski and I do not want to justify his actions because he did a lot of evil. Martial law caused long-term damage to Poland. But I also remember the behaviour of colleagues, ordinary people on the street. . . I saw hope in them, a will to survive, although at times I saw the complete opposite, simply cowardice. On the one hand, praise be to those who had enough strength of character to say that someone who associates with the Soviets is a vagrant and one should stay away from them. On the other hand, a huge part of society, including the 10 million-strong Solidarity movement was made up of people who simply wanted to live a normal life, which is nowadays forgotten. This is not something that is easy to explain. We often make generalisations and state that several people at the top of the government are responsible for martial law. And what about the rest? Those who were really normal went underground, with no doubt that they had to oppose what was happening. Meanwhile, there was not a shortage of people trying to survive: opportunists or cowards. I myself was also not in the underground opposition movement, I was a coward […]. I am not proud of my attitude, but I have the courage to talk about it. [. . . ] The most important thing is to tell the truth and call things by their name. ” Source: “Martial law is one of the few cases when Poles took up arms against other Poles, and it seemed that the civil war was a step away, ” says Dr Maciej Wojtyński, a historian at the University of Warsaw. Article from: Rzeczpospolita, 14. 12. 2017. Available at https: //poland. pl/history-poland/martial-law-

Support for analysis In this interview, Dr Maciej Wojtyński, who is a historian at the University of Warsaw, talks about the long-term consequences of the Martial Law in Poland. He says that it caused long-term damage to the country, but that it also showed hope in people. At the same time, he underlines that, in his opinion, there is no clear-cut division between those who supported the state and those who went underground. A lot of people, he is saying, ‘tried to survive’: they did not go into hiding to continue the protests, but at the same time they did not support the regime. These are those who he calls “cowards”. He underlines that this is a truth often forgotten when talking about the Martial Law.

A Newspaper Article on the death of Jaruzelski “[. . . ] The memory of martial law should act as a warning. May it never happen again. [. . . ] I know that in communism, which limited our knowledge very often, one had to be guided by intuition, I do not want to relativise, I do not miss Jaruzelski and I do not want to justify his actions because he did a lot of evil. Martial law caused long-term damage to Poland. But I also remember the behaviour of colleagues, ordinary people on the street. . . I saw hope in them, a will to survive, although at times I saw the complete opposite, simply cowardice. On the one hand, praise be to those who had enough strength of character to say that someone who associates with the Soviets is a vagrant and one should stay away from them. On the other hand, a huge part of society, including the 10 million-strong Solidarity movement was made up of people who simply wanted to live a normal life, which is nowadays forgotten. This is not something that is easy to explain. We often make generalisations and state that several people at the top of the government are responsible for martial law. And what about the rest? Those who were really normal went underground, with no doubt that they had to oppose what was happening. Meanwhile, there was not a shortage of people trying to survive: opportunists or cowards. I myself was also not in the underground opposition movement, I was a coward […]. I am not proud of my attitude, but I have the courage to talk about it. [. . . ] The most important thing is to tell the truth and call things by their name. ” Source: “Martial law is one of the few cases when Poles took up arms against other Poles, and it seemed that the civil war was a step away, ” says Dr Maciej Wojtyński, a historian at the University of Warsaw. Article from: Rzeczpospolita, 14. 12. 2017. Available at https: //poland. pl/history-poland/martial-law-

Glossary • Entrench = establish • Futile = useless • “putting a saddle on a cow” = idiom that means to do something with little to no use. You cannot ride a cow, so why would you put a saddle on it? • Dour = severe • Ramrod posture = If someone has a ramrod back or way of standing, they have a very straight back and hold themselves in a rather stiff and formal way. • Politburo = policy making committee of a communist party

An interview to Lech Walesa about the Solidarity Movement and its role in the fall of the Berlin wall Walesa: The first wall to fall was pushed over in 1980 in the Polish shipyards. Later, other symbolic walls came down, and the Germans, of course, tore down the literal wall in Berlin. The fall of the Berlin Wall makes for nice pictures. But it all started in the shipyards. Spiegel online: There were, of course, a number of other attempts to revolt against Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. The Hungarians in 1956. The Czechs in 1968. Why did your Solidarnosc labour union succeed where others failed? Walesa: The communists always beat back such attempts with their superior power. And they also staged demonstrations aimed at showing their support among the population as a way of establishing legitimacy. In 1980 in the shipyards, we tried to use the communists' strategy against them. We organised the people -- including workers outside of the shipyards -- and we received support from people from other countries. The Pope, who played the most important role, arranged a collective prayer, not just in Poland but also elsewhere. We found that there were millions of us. For the first time, the communists were not able to stage a demonstration that was larger than ours. As a result, they felt weak, and this was an important element in their ultimate defeat. Source: SPIEGEL ONLINE Interview with Lech Walesa. 'It's Good that Gorbachev Was a Weak Politician', Interview conducted by Charles Hawley in Gdansk. 06 November 2009. Available at : https: //www. spiegel. de/international/europe/spiegel-online-interview-with-lech-walesa-it-sgood-that-gorbachev-was-a-weak-politician-a-659752. html

Context Lech Wałęsa was a labour activist who helped form and led (1980– 90) communist Poland’s first independent trade union, Solidarity. The charismatic leader of millions of Polish workers, he went on to become the President of Poland (1990– 95). He received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1983. He was the son of a carpenter, received only primary and vocational education and in 1967 began work as an electrician at the huge Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. He took part in a series of demonstrations in 1970 and 1976. On August 14, 1980, during protests at the Lenin Shipyard caused by an increase in food prices, Wałęsa climbed over the shipyard fence and joined the workers inside, who elected him head of a strike committee to negotiate with management. Even though the managers agreed to the demands of the workers, he took charge of an Interfactory Strike Committee that united the enterprises of the Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia area and kept organising protests. After a while, the Interfactory Strike Committee was transformed into a national federation of unions under the name Solidarity (Solidarność), with Wałęsa as its chairman and chief spokesman. Solidarity was officially recognised by the Polish government in October 1980. On December 13, 1981, the Polish government imposed martial law, Solidarity was declared illegal, and most of its leaders were arrested, including Wałęsa, who was imprisoned for nearly a year. As the leader of the now underground Solidarity movement, Wałęsa was subjected to constant harassment until 1988, when Poland’s government was forced to negotiate with him and other Solidarity leaders due to new strikes and critical economic conditions in the country. Those negotiations led to Solidarity being declared legal again and to free elections for a limited number of seats in the parliament. Solidarity won the great majority of those seats in June 1989, and the parliament was forced to accept a Solidarity-led government. Initially, Wałęsa himself refused to serve as premier. He became president in 1990, winning Poland’s first direct presidential election. As president, Wałęsa helped guide Poland through its first free parliamentary elections (1991) and helped in the transition of Poland’s

Lech Walesa’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize, 1983 For the first time a Pole has been awarded a prize which Alfred Nobel founded for activities towards bringing the nations of the world closer together. The most ardent hopes of my compatriots are linked with this idea – in spite of the violence, cruelty and brutality which characterise the conflicts splitting the present -day world. We desire peace – and that is why we have never resorted to physical force. We crave for justice – and that is why we are so persistent in the struggle for our rights, we seek freedom of convictions – and that is why we have never attempted to enslave man’s conscience nor shall we ever attempt to do so. We are fighting for the right of the working people to association and for the dignity of human labour. We respect the dignity and the rights of every man and every nation. The path to a brighter future of the world leads through honest reconciliation of the conflicting interests and not through hatred and bloodshed. To follow that path means to enhance the moral power of the all-embracing idea of human solidarity. I feel happy and proud that over the past few years this idea has been so closely connected with the name of my homeland. In 1905, when Poland did not appear on the map of Europe, Henryk Sienkiewicz said when receiving the Nobel prize for literature: “She was pronounced dead – yet here is a proof that She lives on; She was declared incapable to think and to work – and here is proof to the contrary; She was pronounced defeated – and here is proof that She is victorious”. Today nobody claims that Poland is dead. But the words have acquired a new meaning. Source: Lech Walesa – Acceptance Speech*. Nobel. Prize. org. Nobel Media AB 2019. Sun. 17 Nov 2019. Available at: https: //www. nobelprize. org/prizes/peace/1983/walesa/acceptance-speech/

Context Lech Walesa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983 for “an ‘inspiration and an example’ and ‘an exponent of the active longing for peace and freedom which exists, in spite of unequal conditions, unconquered in all the peoples of the world’”. He was afraid that if he left Poland he would be not allowed to enter the country again (this process is called involuntary exile). For this reason, his wife Danuta traveled to Oslo in his place, reading the speech reported above. Sources: The New York Times, LECH WALESA WINS NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR UNION EFFORT, by John Vinocur. 06 October 1983, available at https: //www. nytimes. com/1983/10/06/world/lech-walesa-wins-nobel-peace-prize-forunion-effort. html. And Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at https: //www. britannica. com/biography/Lech-Walesa