LAND REFORM POLICIES AND PASTORALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

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. LAND REFORM POLICIES AND PASTORALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

. LAND REFORM POLICIES AND PASTORALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

Property rights • Role of the state in setting boundaries and relationships between stakeholders;

Property rights • Role of the state in setting boundaries and relationships between stakeholders; • Formal legislation governing pasture access; • Actual implementation by officials; • Customary user rules and internal structures of local pasture management organisations.

Property rights systems influence: • Environmental impact of livestock raising; • Contribution of pastures

Property rights systems influence: • Environmental impact of livestock raising; • Contribution of pastures to livestock production systems; • Access to pastures by different categories of user.

Different systems • Open access • Individualised (private/rented) • Common property • State managed

Different systems • Open access • Individualised (private/rented) • Common property • State managed systems • Mixed systems Debates on the relative merits of these different systems have now arrived in Central Asia

Central Asia: a natural experiment • Until 1991 the five republics had a common

Central Asia: a natural experiment • Until 1991 the five republics had a common mechanism of pasture management; • They then adopted very different systems of pastoral property rights; • State control, common property, leasehold systems and private ownership all exist today.

The natural environment: Major migrations in pre-Soviet Kazakhstan In Zhambakin 1995

The natural environment: Major migrations in pre-Soviet Kazakhstan In Zhambakin 1995

The Soviet Period • State farms allocated seasonal pastures in multiple locations; • Migration

The Soviet Period • State farms allocated seasonal pastures in multiple locations; • Migration supported by the state; • Intensification enabled reduction in mobility and growth in numbers.

The 1990 s • De-intensification; • Deterioration of infrastructure; • Drop in livestock numbers

The 1990 s • De-intensification; • Deterioration of infrastructure; • Drop in livestock numbers in some republics; • Increase in privately owned animals;

Change in livestock distributions • Economic barriers to seasonal pasture use. • Large areas

Change in livestock distributions • Economic barriers to seasonal pasture use. • Large areas of pasture abandoned; • Livestock concentrated around settlements; • System fragmentation.

System fragmentation: Almaty province

System fragmentation: Almaty province

The new livestock owners • Range from smallholders to commercial livestock operations; • Livestock

The new livestock owners • Range from smallholders to commercial livestock operations; • Livestock ownership volatile; • Smallholders access remote pasture through collective herding systems.

Typical livestock ownership distribution Ownership frequency 45 40 35 30 25 2003 2011 20

Typical livestock ownership distribution Ownership frequency 45 40 35 30 25 2003 2011 20 15 10 5 0 1 -20 21 -100 101 -300 301 -500 Flock size 500+

Legal change • Many pastures initially accessed informally; • Formal legislation increasingly applied to

Legal change • Many pastures initially accessed informally; • Formal legislation increasingly applied to grazing lands; • Legislation usually concerned land codes designed for arable land reform.

Kyrgyzstan • Pasture and arable land not subject to same rules in land code;

Kyrgyzstan • Pasture and arable land not subject to same rules in land code; • A leasehold system was introduced to govern access to pastures; • Smallholders did not obtain formal leases.

Criticism of the leasing system • Conflicts between lessees and others - negative impact

Criticism of the leasing system • Conflicts between lessees and others - negative impact on pasture access by the poor; • Pastures no longer managed as grazing systems - different seasonal pastures no longer come under a single authority. -> Pressure for change

Kyrgyz 2009 pasture law • Seasonal pastures under the administration of local government; •

Kyrgyz 2009 pasture law • Seasonal pastures under the administration of local government; • Borders established by boundary commission; • Management devolved to local Pasture Users Associations; • Access rights to pasture by purchase of tickets, sold on an annual basis to members.

Tajikistan • Both pasture and arable land subject to same legislation; • Access mode

Tajikistan • Both pasture and arable land subject to same legislation; • Access mode permanent heritable use; • Some previously common pasture privatised by minority. • Collectively used pastures split into many tiny shares on paper; © Aga Khan Foundation / Jean-Luc Ray.

Tajik 2013 pasture law • Includes clauses enabling allocation of grazing lands to Pasture

Tajik 2013 pasture law • Includes clauses enabling allocation of grazing lands to Pasture User Associations; • Some pasture already permanently privatised; • Options for exclusive individual property right continue to exist in the new law.

Kazakhstan • Mixed tenure arrangements; • No formal group contracts; • Administrative fragmentation; •

Kazakhstan • Mixed tenure arrangements; • No formal group contracts; • Administrative fragmentation; • Village-based grazing led to localized pasture degradation & low livestock productivity; • But large livestock operations increasingly common and relatively mobile; • Strong relationship between livestock ownership and registered pasture.

Uzbekistan • Leasehold system exists but used by minority; • Most livestock are held

Uzbekistan • Leasehold system exists but used by minority; • Most livestock are held in households with no formal pasture access; • Most pasture held in state reserve or managed by state enterprises. © Amr flickr

Turkmenistan • State & collective farms transformed into ‘farmers’ associations’; • Livestock managed by

Turkmenistan • State & collective farms transformed into ‘farmers’ associations’; • Livestock managed by members on a leasehold basis; • Non-leaseholders have informal access to pasture; • Uzbekistan &Turkmenistan are designing legislation to cover private owners. © Cara Kerven

Key points to consider for system design • Intensification is challenging; • Natural pastures

Key points to consider for system design • Intensification is challenging; • Natural pastures continue to play key role in livestock production; • Role can be enhanced by better matching needs to resources.

…. • Studies have shown that herders are rational actors; • When economic and

…. • Studies have shown that herders are rational actors; • When economic and administrative barriers to pasture access are low, they tend to improve the matching of stocking rates to resources available; • Illustrated by correlation between herd size and mobility.

Herd size and migration distance (Kazakh village, 1998)

Herd size and migration distance (Kazakh village, 1998)

Property rights system should: 1. Treat pastures as grazing systems rather than as ‘fields’;

Property rights system should: 1. Treat pastures as grazing systems rather than as ‘fields’; 2. Match user rights to user needs; 3. Include mechanisms mitigating economic barriers to pasture access.

Flexibility or security: common questions • How can need to invest in pastures be

Flexibility or security: common questions • How can need to invest in pastures be reconciled with flexible user rights? • Is commercialisation compatible with common property resource management? • How can groups manage pasture sustainably? • How can flexibility be incorporated into individualised systems?

THANK YOU!

THANK YOU!