Kapitel 4 Grundzge der konomischen Theorie der Politik

  • Slides: 26
Download presentation
Kapitel 4 Grundzüge der ökonomischen Theorie der Politik (VL Theorie der WIPO WS 16/17

Kapitel 4 Grundzüge der ökonomischen Theorie der Politik (VL Theorie der WIPO WS 16/17 Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein)

4. 1 Das Problem • Ziel: Anwendung neoklassischer Mikroökonomik auf politischen Prozess • Mikroökonomik

4. 1 Das Problem • Ziel: Anwendung neoklassischer Mikroökonomik auf politischen Prozess • Mikroökonomik zeigt, dass es in Märkten zu Pareto-Effizienz kommt • NPÖ/Public Choice fragt, ob Anreize im politischen Prozess zu gleichen = effizienten Ergebnissen führen • Politischer Prozess als politischer Markt • Neben Markt- gibt es auch Staatsversagen 2 Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein, WIPO Kapitel 4 "Ökonomische Theorie der Politik"

4. 2 Voters 4. 2. 1 Voting Paradoxon —Rational voters will not vote —Downs

4. 2 Voters 4. 2. 1 Voting Paradoxon —Rational voters will not vote —Downs (1957): Net expected utility? Anthony Downs, * 1930 —In case of national elections: Own vote probably has no influence on election VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 3

4. 2 Voters 4. 2. 1 Voting Paradoxon —Rational voters will not vote —Participation

4. 2 Voters 4. 2. 1 Voting Paradoxon —Rational voters will not vote —Participation in elections – civic duty? —Participation as an expressiv action? VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 4

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Individuals elect according their own objectives Arrows (1963)

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Individuals elect according their own objectives Arrows (1963) has shown that collective order may exist: - collective rational (transitivity) - weak Pareto-priniple - Independeny from non-relevant alternatives - Non-dictatorship - Non exclusion of preferences Kenneth Arrow, *1923 Nobel laureate 1972 => Arrow´s Impossibility Theorem VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein 5

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Simple Majority Rule (50 % +1 Votes) Table

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Simple Majority Rule (50 % +1 Votes) Table 14. 2 Majority voting: cyclical (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 491) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein 6

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Simple Majority Rule (50 % +1 Votes) Table

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Simple Majority Rule (50 % +1 Votes) Table 14. 3 Outcome dependency on agenda setting (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 491) Intransitivity might be relevant, but must not be; Outcome depends on voting sequences VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein 7

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Non-cyclical preference Table 14. 4 Majority voting: non-cyclical

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Non-cyclical preference Table 14. 4 Majority voting: non-cyclical (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 492) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein 8

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Figure 14. 2 Preferences and outcomes (Cullis/Jones 2009,

4. 2. 2 Inconsistent Collective Decisions Figure 14. 2 Preferences and outcomes (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 493) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein 9

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 1 Median Voter decides Number of Voters Left VL

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 1 Median Voter decides Number of Voters Left VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein Right WS 16/17 10

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 2 Logrolling — Welfare Maximizing VL WIPO, Prof. Dr.

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 2 Logrolling — Welfare Maximizing VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 11

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 2 Logrolling — Welfare Reduzing Voter Project Melanie Rhett

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 2 Logrolling — Welfare Reduzing Voter Project Melanie Rhett Scarlet Hospital 200 -110 -105 Total Net Benefits -15 Library -40 150 -120 -10 Pool -270 -140 400 -10 VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 12

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 2 Logrolling — Welfare Maximizing VL WIPO, Prof. Dr.

4. 3 Politicians 4. 3. 2 Logrolling — Welfare Maximizing VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 13

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 1 Group Interest as a Collective Good Mancur

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 1 Group Interest as a Collective Good Mancur Olson 1965 (1932 -1998) Table 14. 5 Contribution to lobbying: the large number situation VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 14

2. 3. 4 Interest Groups 2. 3. 4. 1 Group Interest as a Collective

2. 3. 4 Interest Groups 2. 3. 4. 1 Group Interest as a Collective Good Table 14. 5 Contribution to lobbying: the large number situation (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 495) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 15

2. 3. 4 Interest Groups 2. 3. 4. 2 Rent Seeking Robert D. Tollison

2. 3. 4 Interest Groups 2. 3. 4. 2 Rent Seeking Robert D. Tollison *1942, 1998 + Gordon Tullock Figure 14. 3 The social costs of monopoly (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 496 VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 16

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 2 Rent Seeking VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 2 Rent Seeking VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 17

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 2 Rent Seeking Figure 14. 4 Rent-Seeking: Producers

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 2 Rent Seeking Figure 14. 4 Rent-Seeking: Producers versus Consumers (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 498) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 18

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 2 Rent Seeking Table 14. 7 Estimates of

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 2 Rent Seeking Table 14. 7 Estimates of rent-seeking costs (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 502) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 19

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 3 Regulation as an Instrument of Vote Maximizing

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 3 Regulation as an Instrument of Vote Maximizing George Stigler 1911 -1991 Nobel Laureate 1982 Figure 14. 7 Stigler’s analysis of regulation (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 503) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 20

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 3 Regulation as an Instrument of Vote Maximizing

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 3 Regulation as an Instrument of Vote Maximizing Samuel Pelzman *1940, 1976 VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 21

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 3 Regulation as an Instrument of Vote Maximizing

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 3 Regulation as an Instrument of Vote Maximizing Figure 14. 8 Regulation to vote-maximis (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 505) VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 22

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 5 Regulierung als Wettbewerb zweier Interessengruppen Gary S.

4. 4 Interest Groups 4. 4. 5 Regulierung als Wettbewerb zweier Interessengruppen Gary S. Becker (1930 -2014, 2008) Nobelpreis 1992 VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 23

4. 5 Bureaucrats Max Weber, 1864 -1920 VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS

4. 5 Bureaucrats Max Weber, 1864 -1920 VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 24

4. 5 Bureaucrats William A. Niskanen 1933 -2011 1971 Figure 14. 11 Bureaucratic waste

4. 5 Bureaucrats William A. Niskanen 1933 -2011 1971 Figure 14. 11 Bureaucratic waste (Cullis/Jones 2009, S. 511 VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 25

Literature. —Cullis, John /Jones, Philip (2009), Microeconomics - a journey through life's decisions Harlow

Literature. —Cullis, John /Jones, Philip (2009), Microeconomics - a journey through life's decisions Harlow et al. (Prentice Hall), chapter 13. —Erlei, M. /Leschke, M. / Sauerland, D (2007): Neue Institutionenökonomik, Stuttgart (Poeschel), S. 354 -357. —Gruber, J. (2004). Public finance and public policy. Macmillan. —Rosen, H. R. /Gayer, T. (2013). Public Finance. Mc. Graw-Hill Higher Education, S. 33 -45, 106 -118, 263 -274. —Nicholson, W. /Snyder, W. /Luke, P. /Wood, M. (2008), Intermediate Microeconomics, London (Cengage Learning), S. 349 -361. VL WIPO, Prof. Dr. Thomas Wein WS 16/17 26

Loopscholing theorie WELKOM Loopscholing theorie praktijk Loopscholing theorieLoopscholing theorie WELKOM Loopscholing theorie praktijk Loopscholing theorie
Klinische Theorie der systemischen Therapie Theorie der PraxisKlinische Theorie der systemischen Therapie Theorie der Praxis
KONSEP DASAR ILMU POLITIK DEFINISI DARI POLITIK PolitikKONSEP DASAR ILMU POLITIK DEFINISI DARI POLITIK Politik
EKONOMI POLITIK DEFINISI EKONOMI POLITIK Ekonomi Politik adalahEKONOMI POLITIK DEFINISI EKONOMI POLITIK Ekonomi Politik adalah
Budaya Politik Pengertian Budaya Politik Tujuan Sosialisasi PolitikBudaya Politik Pengertian Budaya Politik Tujuan Sosialisasi Politik
SISTEM POLITIK SEBAGAI ARENA KEKUATAN POLITIK SISTEM POLITIKSISTEM POLITIK SEBAGAI ARENA KEKUATAN POLITIK SISTEM POLITIK
POLITIK BAHASA bahasa sebagai simbol politik Realitas PolitikPOLITIK BAHASA bahasa sebagai simbol politik Realitas Politik
Pengantar Ilmu Politik Pembangunan Politik Partisipasi Politik danPengantar Ilmu Politik Pembangunan Politik Partisipasi Politik dan
KONSEPKONSEP POLITIK TEORI POLITIK Teori politik adalah bahasanKONSEPKONSEP POLITIK TEORI POLITIK Teori politik adalah bahasan
Pengantar Ilmu Politik Pembangunan Politik Partisipasi Politik danPengantar Ilmu Politik Pembangunan Politik Partisipasi Politik dan
KEKUATAN POLITIK DAN PARTISIPASI POLITIK Pengantar Sistem politikKEKUATAN POLITIK DAN PARTISIPASI POLITIK Pengantar Sistem politik
POLITIK LOKAL ORANG MENTAWAI POLITIK LOKAL budaya politikPOLITIK LOKAL ORANG MENTAWAI POLITIK LOKAL budaya politik
Pesan Politik dan Pembicaraan Politik KOMUNIKASI POLITIK PertemuanPesan Politik dan Pembicaraan Politik KOMUNIKASI POLITIK Pertemuan
POLITIK UNIVERSITAS ESA UNGGUL JAKARTA POLITIK Politik seharusnyaPOLITIK UNIVERSITAS ESA UNGGUL JAKARTA POLITIK Politik seharusnya
KONSEP DASAR POLITIK ARTI POLITIK ILMU POLITIK teoriKONSEP DASAR POLITIK ARTI POLITIK ILMU POLITIK teori
Pengantar Ilmu Politik Pembangunan Politik Partisipasi Politik danPengantar Ilmu Politik Pembangunan Politik Partisipasi Politik dan
POLITIK DAN STRATEGI NASIONAL Politik Nasional Politik menyangkutPOLITIK DAN STRATEGI NASIONAL Politik Nasional Politik menyangkut
Politik Pertanian Pengertian politik pertanian Pengertian politik dalamPolitik Pertanian Pengertian politik pertanian Pengertian politik dalam
POLITIK ETIS Politik Etis atau Politik Balas BudiPOLITIK ETIS Politik Etis atau Politik Balas Budi
Penyimpangan POLITIK ETIS Politik Etis atau Politik BalasPenyimpangan POLITIK ETIS Politik Etis atau Politik Balas
Grundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 11 PRGrundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 11 PR
Grundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 3 VerbraucherGrundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 3 Verbraucher
Grundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 9 PRGrundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 9 PR
Grundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 11 PRGrundzge der Mikrokonomie Mikro I Kapitel 11 PR