Kant on teleology Seminar Kant Critique of the

Kant on teleology Seminar “Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment” University of Iceland Session 11 10/10/2007 Text: Critique of the Aesthtical Power of Judgment (61 -67) Claus Beisbart References third Critique: Guyer/Matthews

Teleology – introduction Consider a simple fact, say, the fact that it was raining yesterday. One might ask: Why did this happen? An answer will provide an explanation. Attention: An explanation is not a justification.

Aristotle's theory of explanation (I) Four types of causes: - material cause (causa materialis, the underlying material) some bronze is the material cause of a statue - final cause (causa finalis, the purpose) health might be the final cause of a walk - efficient cause (causa efficiens, the cause in a narrow sen the potter is the cause of the pottery he did. - formal cause (causa formalis, the idea, conception) the ratio 2: 1 is the formal cause of the interval of th octave) Examples from Metaphysics V. 2

Aristotle's theory of explanation (II) Remarks: Obviously, Ari speaks of causes in a very broad sense. The different causes are not exclusive regarding a single event/thing. Example: The statue formed by a sculptor

How efficient and final causes explain Terminology: explanandum (what is to be explained) explanans (what does the explaining) efficient cause: explanandum is the effect of efficient cause x. (call this causal explanation) final cause: explanandum took place for the sake of the final cause x. (call this teleological explanation)

When are explanations successful? Causal explanations: 1. The explanans has to exist 2. There has to be an appropriate relation to our explanandum. Realist interpretation: Causal explanations have to reflect the real causal in the world. relations Teleological explanations: 1. The explanans has to exist 2. There has to be an appropriate relation to our explanandum. Realist interpretation: Teleological explanations have to reflect the sake of”-relations in the world. real “for

Modern science mostly concerned with efficient causes. Question: what makes something happen, how is something brought about? final causes came under attack. Suspicion: teleological explanations are anthropomorphic, they might be okay for human action, but not for nature.

Causality came under attack as well (Hume's Treatise) Kant's reply: causal notions are a necessary condition on the possibility of experience at all. Why couldn't he say the same on teleological explanations? Well, it seems that teleological explanations are restrited to certain types of beings. They cannot thus depend on the conditions of experience in general.

Questions and problems Are there facts (e. g. the existence of certain beings) that can only be explained teleologically? Can we think that there is a “for the sake of” relation out in the world? That is, is the realist interpretation of good teleological explanations okay? And if yes, what the relation to causality?

A problem What exactly would a teleological explanation be like? Well, we have paradigm examples of teleological explanations: explanations of actions. What we would like to have is something like this, but not quite it. After all, very often, teleological explanations seem appropriate, although there is no will.

Kant on teleology Guiding questions: 1. Why is he interested in teleological explanations? 2. What is his conception of the “for the sake of”? 3. Does he think that certain facts need teleological explanations? 4. If yes, what is the status of these teleological explanations. 5. How does Kant reconcile causation and teleology?

1. Kant's interest The power of judgment as a mediator between the different worlds/the legislations of understanding and reason. Provides for a new perspective on nature: certain beings are purposive. That makes it easier to assume that the legislation of reason can have a bearing on the world of appearances (nature).

2. Kant on “for the sake of” purposiveness subjective objective material internal formal relative

Subjective vs. objective purposiveness subjective purposiveness: - not really defined by Kant, anyway look at sec. 11 - related to aesthetic judgment - purposiveness without a purpose, only form of purposiveness - purposive for us objective purposiveness: - not just related to aesthetic judgment - not just purposive for us.

Formal vs. material objective purposiveness Formal purposiveness: in mathematics (sec. 62) not interesting. What is material objective purposiveness (sec. 63, 270) a free translation: “[we have] objective and material purposiveness, if a relation between cause and effect is to be judged that we can only understand as lawful, if we put the idea of the effect at the base of the causal influence of the cause as a necessary condition for the cause and its causal influence. “

Schematically Idea(effect) Cause Effect Note that this definition has an epistemic twist: Kant doesn't require that the idea of the effect is basic, he only requires that we can only understand the relation between this cause and its effect by underlying it the idea.

Actions fit the scheme Idea(Money) House Money The house is in a way the cause for the money (rent), but we have to put the idea of money at the base of this causation, because the house was only built in order to give money.

Internal vs. relative material objective purposiveness sec. 63 internal material objective purposiveness: “we regard the effect immediately as a product of art” (239) Note again he doesn't say that it is a product of art.

3. Are there facts that need a teleological explanation? Kant: the existence of organized beings (they are natural ends, in his terms). nature as a whole see Jutta's presentation.

4. /5. The status of teleological explanations Dialectics: Two maxims for the (reflective) power of judgement: “All generation of material things and their forms must be judged as possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws. [. . . ] Some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an entirely different law of causality, namely that of final causes). ” (sec. 70, p. 258 f. )

The Dialectics: One might try to base these maxims on the following assertions: “Thesis: All generation of material things is possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws. Antitheis: Some generation of such things is not possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws. ” Obviously, these assertions are incompatible.

The resolution Kant: The maxims don't conflict. It's just wrong to base them on assertions about the world. It's wrong because the maxims belong to the reflective power of judgment, they are not just applications of prior principles (which would be a task for the determining power of judgment). So what is confused, is the reflective and the determining power of judgment.