JOINT PROGRAMMING REGIONAL WORKSHOP Working Better Together Joint
JOINT PROGRAMMING REGIONAL WORKSHOP Working Better Together: Joint Programming update Djibouti, 26 May 2017
EU Global Strategy Moving towards a joined-up external action
Shared Vision, Common Action: Global Strategy for a Stronger Europe • Delivering Peace, security, prosperity and rules-based global order. Living up to our democratic values • Four priorities: Security, Resilience, Approach to conflicts, Regional Orders • Four principles: Unity, Engagement, Responsibility, Partnership • A Union's action more credible, more responsive and joined-up • Follow-up: HRVP, Commission, Council to "take the work forward"
Links with 2030 Agenda • On Prosperity: most of the growth outside Europe investing in SD • On Resilience: not just state security but accountability, rule of law and social inclusiveness • On Means of impl. : quantum leap needed for investment PPP • Peace, governance, migration seen as multi-sectors' engagement • A strong Human Rights principled approach (although pragmatic) • EU champion of SDGs/CC commitments delivering internally/ externally • Review of Consensus, post-Cotonou, involving private sector all in line with 2030 Agenda
Links with Development Policy • • Development, human dignity, energy, trade, migration, culture, research… all connected Security and Migration nexuses with Development, especially in prevention and post-trouble Development policy expected to play a key role in the Comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises Promote resilience of Neighbourhood + surroundings down to Central Africa, eastward to Central Asia Focused cooperation with AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, EAC, CELAC, ASEAN, … Promoting regional integration, local governance, civil society participation Cross-Borders coop security; energy, water, food; climate resilience; infrastructure Overall: development policy to be more flexible and aligned to strategic priorities
Breaking policy silos and joining-up EU action • • EU Foreign Policy: an orchestra playing from the same score More flexibility and responsiveness to unpredicted changes, incl. in Development More joined-up action (EU/MS/EIB/private sector) and combination of internal/external policies Less barriers: Joint Programming, Comprehensive approach, Economic Diplomacy Education, communication, culture, youth, sports, interfaith all needed for CVE Beyond silos and regions triangular cooperation across the Red Sea All EU external engagements to be conflicts/rights/migration sensitive Less numerous and more flexible External Financing Instruments
Joint Programming in the Global Strategy “Joint programming in development must be further enhanced. New fields of our joined-up external action include energy diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and economic diplomacy. A more prosperous Union calls for greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the EIB and the private sector. We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies. ”
Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy A Joined-up Union • Joint Programming in development must be further enhanced. A more prosperous Union calls for greater coordination between the EU and MS, the EIB and the private sector. We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies. • We will develop stronger links between humanitarian and development efforts through joint risk analysis, and multiannual programming and financing. A Responsive Union Resilience • We will also pursue greater information sharing and joint reporting, analysis and response planning between MS embassies, EU Delegations, Commission services, EU Special Representatives and CSDP missions. • Echoing the SDGs, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its MS.
New European Consensus on Development Working Better together: Joint Programming and joint implementation
Joint Programming in the new European Consensus on Development 1. Re-affirming the principles of Joint Programming: voluntary, flexible, inclusive and tailor-made to the country context, and allow for replacement; 2. National development strategy and priorities to guide the Partner Country's engagement, appropriation and ownership; 3. EU and MS to take account of all available means for development financing, in line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda; 4. Joint monitoring and results frameworks to be core elements of joint responses; 5. Remain open to other relevant donors and international actors when assessed relevant at country level (EU and MS)
Joint Implementation in the new European Consensus on Development includes the following : (1) EU and MS support partner countries through joint implementation in support of 'country-owned shared objectives'; (2) Joint implementation is open to all EU (and non-EU) partners/ stakeholders that agree on a common vision; (3) it is specific to the country-context; (4) it can be implemented at national, regional or global level and can possibly link to other areas of external action; (5) it can be implemented through various financial (and non-financial) means/modalities; (6) it should be based on the sharing of best practices and experiences; (7) it has to be grounded on joint analysis, as well as being monitored and evaluated.
From Joint Programming Council Conclusions to Heads of Mission report analysis: ways forward for Joint Programming
May 2016 Council Conclusions Stepping-up Joint Programming EU and its Member States collectively contribute to implementing the policy commitments made at global and EU level Consolidate and expand JP in fragile & and conflict countries, in prevention/postconflict contexts, as well as accompany PCs in transition to higher income levels JP documents should evolve to include strategic issues, issues such as migration, climate change, fragility, security and democracy Effort and commitment by EU & MS are necessary in countries where partners have recognised Joint Programming's potential to become the preferred approach EU AND MS STRONGER as DEVELOPMENT ACTORS
" Head of Mission report analysis: analysis Overall Assessment, Specific Findings and Way F orward
• 47 Ho. M/Ho. C reports and 16 Notes received between Oct-Dec 2016 showed that May 2016 CC gave new impetus to Joint Programming – Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania • Joint Programming is making headways, headways as part of EU donors being increasingly recognised as "European family". • JP as a vehicle in implementing 2030 Agenda/ SDGs
Overall Assessment: • Joint Programming (i) contributing to development effectiveness AND (ii) providing stronger political clout for the EU and MS are core findings of Ho. M analysis • Reluctances exist from Partner Countries, Countries but many cases indicate these can be overcome; also, other external priorities (trade, migration, etc) may divert efforts away from JP aims
Specific Findings (1): § More countries engage with Joint Programming (since 2015): Ø Ø Ø 20 new partner countries since 2015 4 with Roadmap 6 with Joint Analysis 4 with Joint Response 11 have joint monitoring/results frameworks 7 started a new cycle of JP § Increased political leverage and visibility towards partner governments and the wider donor community § Possible synergies between other EU and MS joint exercises: esp. CSO roadmap, GAP and HRDS
Specific Findings (2): § Positive development effectiveness results recorded, with challenges remaining: Ø Ø Ø Increased alignment to national development strategies Improved division of labour Replacement issues tackled Some joint monitoring and joint results frameworks in place Joint implementation actions used as a pragmatic cooperative way § Persisting hurdles: ü ü Difficulties in reconciling trade, migration and security priorities with JP Country ownership Synchronisation of programming cycles Political/Policy guidance from HQ (EU and MS)
Joint Programming - State of Play by country (as of May 2017) 16 • Feasibility and Scoping • Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, CAR, Guinea Conakry, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Zambia 14 • Countries with Roadmaps • Azerbaijan, Benin, El Salvador, Georgia, Haiti, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malawi, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Tunisia Prep steps Joint Strategy 6 20 56 • Countries with Joint Analysis • Armenia, Belarus*, Burkina Faso*, Egypt, Moldova, Morocco* • Countries with Joint Strategy (joint analysis and response) • Bolivia (2016), Cambodia (2014), Chad (2014), Comoros (2015), Ethiopia (2013), Ghana (2014), Guatemala (2013), Kenya (2015), Laos (2016), Mali (2014), Myanmar (2014), Namibia (2014), Nicaragua (2016), Niger*, Palestine, Paraguay (2015), Rwanda (2014), Senegal (2014), Togo (2016), Uganda (2015) Active countries 11 7 7 • Joint Monitoring / Results Framework • Bolivia, Cambodia, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Laos, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Palestine, Rwanda • Replacement • FR in Comoros, FR in Kenya, EU in Laos, DE and FR in Mali, EU in Palestine, EU in Senegal • Second cycle of Joint Programming** • Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Laos, Mali, Namibia, Senegal *drafts ** "Second cycle" refers to the process of thoroughly revising the Joint Strategy or producing a whole new document
Head of Mission Analysis report: Way Forward I. Diverse approaches to Joint Programming II. Linking Joint Programming to other areas of external action III. New European Consensus on Development and 2030 Agenda/SDG IV. Joint Results
I. Diverse approaches to Joint Programming (1) • Sectoral approach: Ø When overarching strategic plan is not feasible Ø Sectoral coordination in selected area(s) to reduce overlap and functionally build-up trust Ø Increase policy dialogue at sector level – Examples: Zambia, Bangladesh, Georgia • Conflict-situational approach: Ø Building trust in unstable local conditions Ø Shared understanding of complex and sensitive circumstances Ø Establishing a coordination framework – Examples: Jordan, CAR, Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon
I. Diverse approaches to Joint Programming (2) • Middle-Income Countries: q. Differentiating relationships emerge with PC governments q. New topic acquire importance, such as trade, security q. Higher demand for peer exchanges and learning q. JP to be a tool to better leverage diminishing ODA – Lower Middle-Income countries: Ø 17 Ho. M analysis reports Ø At minimum, a roadmap in place Ø Increased policy dialogue at sector level – Upper Middle-Income countries: Ø 9 Ho. M analysis reports Ø No well-established processes in place Ø Limited desire for future engagement
II. Linking Joint Programming to other areas of external action • More strategic use of Joint Programming to foster coherence of EU external action: Ø Climate change and environment (Bolivia, Morocco) Ø Migration/Partnership Frameworks (Ethiopia, Senegal) Ø Trade (Mozambique) Ø Security (Jordan, Mali) Ø Economy/EPA (Senegal) • Joint messages, declarations, demarches Ø Burkina Faso: CSO, GAP, HRDP to be linked to policy dialogue
III. New European Consensus on Development and 2030 Agenda/SDG (1) • New generation of JP and existing ones to align to SDGs, as specified in the national implementation plans, incl. the use of common results frameworks: Ø Examples: Nicaragua, Ghana, Senegal NDPs already aligned • MTR (incl. new phase of ENI programming) as an opportunity to align to the SDGs and 2030 Agenda: Ø Examples: Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nepal Ø MTR to allow addressing donor/sector gaps and/or changing circumstances
IV. JOINT RESULTS FRAMEWORKS • Positive trend identified in increased inclusion of Joint Results Frameworks in Joint Strategies • It allows for a meaningful measurement of agreed objectives and strategic dialogue between Partner Country and the EU+MS group • SDG indicators to measure results at country level
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