J M E Mc Taggart The Unreality of

J. M. E. Mc. Taggart “The Unreality of Time” (1908) by Kieran Naylor

Also JME

The Argument § Mc. Taggart argues that time is unreal because our descriptions of time are either contradictory, circular, or insufficient. To frame his argument, Mc. Taggart identifies two descriptions of time, which he calls the A-series and the B-series.

A-Series § ". . . the series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future. . . " § Mc. Taggart says, "the distinctions of past, present, and future are essential to time and. . . if the distinctions are never true of reality, then no reality is in time. " He considers the A-series to be temporal, a true time series because it embodies these distinctions and embodies change.

B-Series § "The series of positions which runs from earlier to later. . . " § The B-series is temporal in that it embodies a direction of change. However, Mc. Taggart argues that the B-series on its own does not embody change itself. § Attacking the B-series, Mc. Taggart argues that time involves change, but because earlier-later relationships never change (e. g. the year 2010 is always later than 2000), the B-series must be an inadequate account of time.

C-Series § ". . . this other series — let us call it the C-series — is not temporal, for it involves no change, but only an order. Events have an order. They are, let us say, in the order M, N, O, P. And they are therefore not in the order M, O, N, P, or O, N, M, P, or in any other possible order. But that they have this order no more implies that there is any change than the order of the letters of the alphabet. . . " § According to Mc. Taggart the C-series is not temporal because it is fixed forever. He also says that adding "change" to the C-series is not sufficient to get the B-series, because this would not determine the direction of time.

General Argument § Mc. Taggart's argument for the unreality of time has two parts. In the first part, he argues that the B-series alone is insufficient for time to exist. In doing so, he also argues that the A-series is essential to time. Time demands change, and both the B- and C-series without the A-series do not involve change. Therefore, time must be described using the Aseries.

General Argument 2. 0 § In the second part, he argues for the conclusion that the Aseries is incoherent because it leads to contradiction. Specifically, he argues that since every event that occurs will at one time be the future, at another time be the present, and at a third time (and forever henceforth) be past, every event exemplifies or instantiates every temporal property: futurity, presentness, and pastness.

General Summary § Since these properties are mutually exclusive (they cannot be co-instantiated), the A-series conception of time generates an absurdity, a contradiction. If both parts of his argument are sound, then time must just be an illusion; it has no genuine ontological status.

So, what do you think?

Is time an illusion?

Or is it just a linguistic problem?

Is Mc. Taggarts argument sound and coherent?