Is There KnowledgeHow Borut Cerkovnik University of Ljubljana
Is There Knowledge-How? Borut Cerkovnik University of Ljubljana The paper challenges Stanley-Williamson’s criticism of Gilbert Ryle’s view in favor of the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, and their “positive account of knowledge-how” as a species of knowledge-that. With regard to Ryle’s “argument” for a distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, Stanley and Williamson ignore the fact that it is related to the question, if action F is action according to Φ(F), and Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. Ryle understands knowledge-how as the ability to follow a rule. Therefore Stanley-Williamson’s detailed linguistic analysis and their proposal that sentences (propositions), which express knowledge-how, contain embedded questions and so express knowledge-that, do not concern Ryle’s (Wittgensteinian) distinction.
“To do something thinking what one is doing is, according to this legend, always to do two things; namely, to consider certain appropriate propositions, or prescriptions, and to put into the practice what these propositions or prescriptions enjoin. It is to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice. ” (CM, 29)
(a) Contemplating appropriate expression of a rule is a necessary condition for acting according to the rule.
“I argue that the prevailing doctrine leads to vicious regresses, and these in two directions. (1) if the intelligence exhibited in any act, practical or theoretical, is to be credited to the occurrence of some ulterior act of intelligently considering regulative propositions, no intelligent act, practical or otherwise, could ever begin. . . (2) If a deed, to be intelligent, has to be guided by the consideration of a regulative proposition, the gap between that consideration and the practical application of the regulation has to be bridged by some go-between process which cannot by the presupposed definition itself be an exercise of intelligence and cannot, by definition, be the resultant deed. ” (CP, 213)
“The crucial objection to the intellectualist legend is this. The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. ” (CM, 30)
(1) If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F. (2) If one employs knowledge that p, one contemplates the proposition that p. RA: Knowledge how to F is knowledge that Φ(F).
(1) If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F. (a’) If one employs knowledge how to F, one contemplates the proposition Φ(F). RA: Knowledge how to F is knowledge that Φ(F).
Ryle (1) an infinite regress of form C(Φ(F)))) etc. (2) an infinite regress between initial Φ(F) and action F
(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. (1) “is true relative to a context c if and only if there is some contextually relevant way w such that Hannah stands in the knowledgethat relation to the Russellian proposition that w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle, and Hannah entertains this proposition under a practical mode of presentation. ” (Stanley & Williamson, 430)
Knowledge-That English “Hannah knows that penguins waddle” Slovenian “Hana ve, da pingvini racajo” Knowledge-How English “Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle” Slovenian “Hana zna voziti kolo” German “Hanna kann das Fahrrad fahren”
- Slides: 10