Is morality objective The state of the debate

Is morality objective? The state of the debate Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk © Michael Lacewing

Cognitivism • There is moral knowledge. In some sense, moral judgments can ‘fit the facts’. – Standard: moral knowledge is ‘universal’. – Bernard Williams: moral knowledge is relative to society. • G E Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’: moral values cannot be deduced from natural facts. – But there are still non-natural facts about moral values. – What kinds of ‘facts’ can these be? Aren’t values dependent on valuing?

Emotivism • A J Ayer: when two people disagree over a fact, the matter can be resolved (or at least, we know what would resolve it); when two people disagree over a value judgment, either they disagree over a (natural) fact, or there is no further way to resolve the disagreement. • Moral judgments express feelings of approval/disapproval.

Emotivism developed • Obj: this means there is no such thing as moral reasoning (only factual). • Charles Stevenson and Simon Blackburn: there is a disagreement in attitude, and attitudes are not held one-by-one. – My attitude of disapproval relates to beliefs about the action (my reasons for disapproving), desires towards it, and to other attitudes of approval and disapproval (similar feelings about similar actions). – Many attitudes can be involved in a single practical ethical issue, e. g. abortion. • Blackburn: very few systems of moral attitudes are internally coherent and psychologically possible.

Cognitivism developed • There are truths about moral reasons. – Moral judgments can’t be deduced from natural facts, but they can be rationally supported by them. – Whether some consideration is a moral reason is a fact, a fact about reasons. • Reasons are readily understandable, e. g. reasons for holding scientific beliefs. – Facts about reasons are normative facts.

Cognitivism developed • When two people disagree morally, they either disagree about natural facts or about normative facts. – At least one is making a mistake. • Moral reasoning is a matter of weighing up what reasons we have to act in particular ways.

Are moral reasons objective? • Blackburn: our judgments about what reasons we have are a reflection of our attitudes, not a description of independent normative facts. • Thomas Scanlon: our attitudes are reflections of our judgments about reasons, they are ‘judgment-sensitive’. – E. g. a desire reflects a judgment that the object of desire is good in some way. – Without this evaluative element, the ‘desire’ is not recognisably human (rational), but a mere ‘urge’.

‘Correct’ judgments? • Blackburn and Williams: what is it to judge moral reasons ‘correctly’? – Has someone who judges they have no reason to be moral made a mistake? • Modern intuitionism: Rawls’ ‘reflective equilibrium’ - what reasons we have is discovered by testing theory and intuitions against each other. – Cp. Scientific judgments re. ‘best explanation’ • Blackburn: this form of reasoning is equally available to non-cognitivism. • Williams: cognitivism retains additional idea of insight into normative reality.