INFORMATION OPERATIONS From information warfare to war of

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: From information warfare to war of narratives Miroslava Sawiris, Research Fellow Strategic Communication Programme, GLOBSEC Miroslava. Sawiris@globsec. org

NEW MEANS OF (DIS)INFORMATION DISSEMINATION in 2007, 55 % of households in the European Union had internet access. In 2017, 87 % of households in the European Union were connected to the internet (Eurostat, 2017) ⊲ Digital platforms: ⊲ • Facebook (2. 23 billion active users in 2018), large user bases on Whats. App and Messenger • Instagram, Twitter, You. Tube, Linked. In, Snapchat, VKontakte, Tik. Tok, etc. • Massive mediators & curators of content • ‘ 510, 000 comments and 293, 000 statuses are posted on FB every minute, and more than 300 million photos get uploaded per day’

DIGITAL PLATFORMS BECAME MAIN TOOLS FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION Users as producers of vast volumes of data vs Human attention span recommendation & relevance algorithms create personalised news feeds ‘echo chambers’ and ‘filter bubbles’ polarisation shareability of news and personal information monetisation of content and meta-data microtargeting advertising strategies Engagement figures as proxy for story relevance vs Traditional news editors as gatekeepers of information Sensationalist content has the highest traction generates highest revenue promotion of more radical content Cass Sunstein: internet will divide people into digital silos where they would only hear ‘louder echoes of their own voices’ (2007)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS TACTICS ⊲ Information operations are often sophisticated and tailor-made campaigns, which can consist of several stages, combining several tactics such as: • Character assassination • Manipulation of facts • Amplification of divisive narratives • Dissemination of propaganda • Dissemination of conspiracies • Gathering intelligence on the target (individual or group) • Hacking, manipulation of hacked material and its subsequent dissemination • Deployment of organised troll factories to silence dissent • Dissemination of disinformation

SLOVAK PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: INFORMATION OPERATION TACTIC - DISINFORMATION Typically a story / audio/ visual material which seeks to polarise or raise alarm by tapping into existing fears or stereotypes of the target audience, in this case Anti. Semitic prejudice of potential voters in Slovak presidential election. It is easier to ‘spot’ and hence remove from online space than more sophisticated methods used to sway public opinion.

SLOVAK PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: NARRATIVE DISSEMINATION Top 5 narratives before the 1 st round of the election

SLOVAK PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: NARRATIVE DISSEMINATION Top 5 narratives before the 2 nd round of the election

SLOVAK PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Information operations ⊲ Goals: twofold 1. discredit the liberal candidates 2. undermine Slovak citizens’ trust in the electoral process & democratic institutions more generally ⊲ Tactics: • tapping into population’s existing fears • exploiting racial, sexual orientation, gender prejudices and stereotypes to create cultural wars • utilising well-established conspiracy theories and creating new ones • implicating particular candidates in them, for example, by using digitally altered photographs

EP ELECTION IN V 4: Relevancy on FB disinformation channels

DISSEMINATION OF NARRATIVES

EP ELECTIONS IN V 4 Narratives by country

EP ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE Key findings Differing levels of activity on the monitored disinformation channels, with Hungary experiencing the most intense campaign while in the Czech Republic the campaign has been relatively mild ⊲ In Slovakia the campaign has been characterised by efforts to frame particular pieces of information in a manipulative way with occasional deployment of conspiracy narratives, rather than intense disinformation & character assassination campaign observed in the Slovak presidential election ⊲ The most often utilised narratives on average across V 4: Migration as a threat in combination with the EU being portrayed negatively. ⊲ Diversification of actors ⊲

INFORMATION OPERATIONS ACTORS Foreign state (Russia’s interference in US 2016 pres. Election) Foreign nonstate (Macedonian youth destabilising Western societies for ads revenue) Domestic homegrown (Local influential individuals with large follower bases) Domestic Governmental (Authoritarian states using infoops against their own populations, China) International (ISIS disseminating propaganda to harm Western societies and to recruit new members)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IMPACT Immediate or shortterm Long-term Achieving a desired election result, referendum or legislation Confusion paralysis Discrediting electoral candidates through character assassination Polarization paralysis Radicalization paralysis The effects of information operations are very real in that they spill over from virtual reality and gradually they lead to: • Erosion of citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and electoral processes • Increasing support for fringe politics of far-right, far-left and populism • Growing divisions in society through fanning the flames of hate and extremism • Dehumanisation and targeting of vulnerable sections of society such as women and minorities of all kinds • Doubt of expert communities/ science and subsequent health crisis (WHO lists vaccine hesitancy as 1 of top 10 global health threats of 2019) • Violence • Foreign Policy changes

IS THIS A LOSING GAME? Oxford Internet Institute found ‘growing evidence of computational propaganda around the world, with evidence of organised social media manipulation campaigns in 70 countries, up from 48 countries in 2018’ ⊲ Tactical change in information operations in the V 4 states during EP Elections. Disinformation content still plays a role, but the trend is a more sophisticated amplification of divisive narratives ⊲ Info-ops on Whats. App, chain emails and other difficult to monitor channels ⊲ As of beginning of October 2019, FB is introducing no factchecking on political advertising policy ⊲

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE Stronger regulation on EU level to address advertising and algorithm transparency, voluntary code of conduct is not sufficient ⊲ Data from platforms for research purposes for CSOs and universities ⊲ States need to recognise threat and adopt measures from those who already have rich experience in this area ⊲ Media literacy and concept of digital citizenship needs to be part of school curricula with trainings and education materials made available to all sections of society, particularly the most vulnerable ones ⊲

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PROGRAMME, GLOBSEC

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