Improving Public Sector Efficiency Challenges and Opportunities Fiscal

Improving Public Sector Efficiency Challenges and Opportunities Fiscal Policy Challenges in Europe Berlin 22 -23 rd March 2007 Teresa Curristine, Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division, Public Governance Directorate, OECD 1

Overview of Presentation Part 1: Institutional Drivers of Efficiency n Part 2: National Experiences of Incorporating n and using Performance information (PI) in the Budget process – Trends – PI in the budget process – Benefits and Challenges – Lessons learned 2

Part 1: Potential Drivers of Efficiency 3

Institutional Drivers Results orientation n budget practices & procedures n performance measurement arrangements Workforce issues n workforce size n workforce composition n extent and nature unionization n attractiveness of the public sector Increased flexibility n devolution/decentralization n agencification n intra-governmental coordination n HRM arrangements n e-government Strengthening competitive pressures n ownership n competition 4

Findings n n No blueprint for improving public sector efficiency Limited empirical evidence Positive findings: – Efficiency gains may be obtained by increasing scale of operations – Functional and political decentralization to subnational governments seems beneficial – HRM practices matter a great deal for efficiency Inconclusive findings for ownership, competition and agencification 5

Why lack of empirical evidence on efficiency impact? n n n Research is this area is extremely complicated Complexities in measuring efficiency Lack of pre-reform measures of efficiency Problems of isolating the effects of specific reforms from external influences Substantial differences between short-run and long -run effects – efficiency gains dissipating over time 6

Part 2: National Experiences of Incorporating and using PI in the Budget process 7

Trends in Developing PI n n n Widespread trend : 75% of OECD countries include non-finance performance data in budget documentation Long term trend: 40% of countries working on outputs for over 10 years (Source OECD 2005 Questionnaire on PI) Constantly evolving: 35% of countries introduced a new initiative in past year (Source OECD 2005 Questionnaire on PI) 8

Performance Budgeting Categories Type Linkage between PI and funding Planned or actual Main purpose in Performance the budget process Presentational No link Performance targets and/or performance results Performance informed budgeting Loose/indirect link Performance targets and/or performance results Planning and/or accountability Direct/formula PB Tight/direct link Resource allocation and accountability Performance results Accountability 9

Integrating PI into governmentwide budget process Changing the budget structure n Using PI in budget negotiations between Ministry of finance (MOF) and spending ministries n Using PI in budget negotiations between spending ministries and their agencies n 10

Budget negotiations between MOF and spending ministries n n Presentational PB – No formal mechanism incorporating PI into budget process e. g. Canada, Denmark, Sweden Performance Informed Budgeting- PI informs budget allocation along with other information – PI for planning purposes – loosely linking planned performance to funding e. g. NZ , UK, and Australia – Performance results for accountability purposes – loosely linking results to funding • Countries do not automatically link funding to results • Weight given to PI depends on policy area and context 11

Direct/Formula PB n n n Directly and explicitly links performance results to funding Limited use mostly in certain sectors and countries Sectors – higher education and health (diagnostic related groups) Requires clear and explicit output measures and information on unit costs Issues with – Dysfunctional behaviour and gaming in health sectorskimping, dumping, and creaming – Quality of service provision – Implications for aggregate financial control 12

Incentives available to MOF to motivate agencies to improve efficiency and performance Financial rewards and sanctions n Increase or decrease financial and managerial flexibility n Public recognition n 13

% of OECD MOFs that often use PI for the following courses of action Performance measures Evaluations To eliminate programmes: 4% To eliminate programmes: 11% To cut expenditure: 10% To cut expenditure: 15% To determine pay: 11% To determine pay: 5% 14

Financial rewards and sanctions n n MOFs do not automatically reward or punish agencies based on performance results Exception Korea- announced a 10% budget cut for ineffective programs Most MOF use PI as a signaling device and serves as a trigger to more closely monitor poor performing agencies With poor performing agencies most common course of action to hold resources constant and review during the year 15

PI in budget negotiations between spending ministries and their agencies n n n PI more often used by spending ministries Agency performance agreements and contracts e. g. Australia, Netherlands, NZ and Nordic countries Depending on flexibility in wider budget structure used to manage programs and redistribute resources Across and within countries wide variation in use of PI in decision making. Depended on quality of PI, political pressure, and strong organisational leadership 16

Factors influencing the use of PI in budgetary decision making Process to integrate PI into the budget process n Quality of PI n Institutional capacity of MOF and spending ministries n Wider economic and political institutional structure and context n 17

Reported benefits Greater focus on achieving results n Improves planning, especially when used in conjunction with MTEF n More information on – Government goals/priorities – How national programs fit in with goals – Actual results and performance n Improves transparency n 18

Reported benefits (Continued) n n n Signaling device highlights policies and programs that work and those that do not work Improves management Improving efficiency – Gap in research no comparative cross-country studies on impact on efficiency or even studies within countries – Although case studies and anecdotal examples support thesis – More evidence to support that direct/formula PB improves efficiency n Used to inform budget decisions in certain contexts 19

The Challenges Countries continuing to struggle with n Integrating PI into the budget process in a systematic manner n Measurement of outputs & outcomes n Improving the quality, credibility, relevance and timeliness of PI n Perverse incentives 20

The Challenges (continued) n n n Developing the capacity of MOF and spending ministries Overcoming resistance to change from public servants Convincing politicians to use PI in decision making 21

OECD General Guidelines for Developing and Improving the Use of PI in the Budget Process n n n Contextual variables – No one “best” model. A common whole of government planning and reporting framework PI should be integrated into the budget Avoiding government wide systems that tightly or directly link performance results to resource allocation Independence assessment of PI should be carried out 22

OECD Guidelines (Continued) Support of political and administrative leaders is vital n Reform approaches need to be adapted to evolving circumstances n Develop incentives to motivate civil servants and politicians to change behaviour n 23

Conclusion n n The road from incremental towards results-based budgeting: long and difficult PI has proven useful but not met expectations – problems remain However, most OECD countries cannot imagine operating a budget system today without PI Countries evolving their performance approach rather than discarding There is a need for more realistic expectations and greater efforts to get all stakeholders on board 24