IMPORTANCE OF JUDEA SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES IN THE

IMPORTANCE OF JUDEA & SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES IN THE ERA OF MODERN WEAPONRY Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

of Contents 1. Has Saddam's demise eliminated "Eastern Front" threat? 3. US Generals on J&S mountain 2. Centrality of ridges ground barriers 5. Is technology a substitute for land? 4. Land deployment of reservists surprise attack 8. SECURITY – WISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF J&S MOUNTAIN 6. Judea & RIDGES Samaria vs. Sinai. 9. Israel's unique vulnerability 8. Uniqueness of Israel's 10. Peace security boundaries in predicament the Mideast.

HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT THREAT" TO ISRAEL? Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT THREAT" TO ISRAEL? NEXT • In 1967, Israel obliterated Egypt, Syria and Jordan, producing a "No Threat" delusion. The delusion was crashed in 1973, when Israel barely escaped annihilation. • In 1979, Iran was abruptly transformed from an ally (of US and Israel) to an enemy. • The 1989, demise of the USSR gave rise to the illusion of global peace, but the world has become more violent. • In 1948, King Abdullah (Jordan) promised Israel to stay away from war, but reneged. In 1966 King Hussein met with Israel's leaders, but bombed Jerusalem in 1967, and provided the PLO with terrorist infrastructure in 1968 -70. In 1990 Jordan was a key supply channel to Saddam.

HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT THREAT" TO ISRAEL? NEXT • The 1993 Oslo vision of peace produced a nightmare of unprecedented terror • War on terrorism is Bush's top priority; will his successor follow suit? A possible US retreat from Iraq would exacerbate terrorism. • Saddam's regime was perceived doom in 1991, became a non-conventional threat in 2002 and was eliminated in 2003. When will a brutal regime resurface in Baghdad? • How would the Mideast be impacted by a demise of the current Hashemite, Saudi or Egyptian regimes? back

HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT THREAT" TO ISRAEL? NEXT • Mideast precedents - in the most unpredictable, volatile and violent region in the world - behoove Israel to be prepared for realistic scenarios, including "The Eastern Front Threat. " back content

CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES NEXT • Thousands of tons of daily bombing did not end the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 70% of the bombing was inaccurate. • Saddam was brought to submission when the ground forces reached Baghdad • Ballistic missiles cause damage, but they don't conclude wars. An Arab tank battalion in Tel Aviv would be more significant than a shower of missiles on Tel Aviv. • Without ground forces, the 1991 and 2003 wars would've been prolonged, causing more casualties and tension with allies, allowing Saddam to declare victory • The centrality of ground forces suggests the centrality of ground barriers (geographic depth and topographic edge).

CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES NEXT • "Enduring Relevance of Landpower", US Army's Institute of Land Warfare, Oct. 2003: "Land force (is) the cornerstone of deterrence. . . Ground units can both destroy and occupy. . . sustain land dominance and achieve a lasting decision. . . Remote precision strikes will not provide this capability, as was demonstrated (in Afghanistan and Iraq). . . Determined adversaries are seldom defeated quickly. Achieving a lasting decision requires the ability to conduct sustained, multidimensional joint operations. Land forces provide these qualities. . . During the Afghan campaign of 2002, precision air strikes were critical, but they neither annihilated opposition nor finished the enemy. . . In the 1999 Kosovo operation, the air war created the conditions for negotiations, but it was the ground forces that created the stability that now exists. In 1995, in Bosnia, the threat of airpower did not significantly deter Serbia. It took the ground forces to create the conditions for the Dayton Accords. In 1991, months of strike operations did not achieve decision. The four-day ground war led to Iraqi surrender. . . (In 1989 in Panama), the surrender of Noriega was the result of soldiers on the ground. . . " back

CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES NEXT • The US - the #1 ballistic power - stations 200, 000 GIs (125% increase since 2001) in overseas military land installations in 120 countries. • All wars are conventional, requiring ground forces (India-Pakistan, US-Afghanistan, US-Iraq, USPanama, Britain-Argentina, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Mauritania, etc. ). back content

U. S. GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

U. S GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • • The late Admiral Bud Nance: ” The eastern mountain ridge of the West Bank is one of the world's best tank barriers. Invading tanks will have to climb a 3, 000 ft steep slope from the Jordan Valley. The western mountain ridge, which is a 2, 000 ft gentle slope, constitutes a dream platform of invasion to Israel's narrow (8 -15 miles) coastal plain. Control of the West Bank provides Israel the time to mobilize its reservists, which are essential to its survival during a surprise attack. ” General (ret. ) Al Gray, former Commandant, US Marine Corps: “Missiles fly over any terrain feature, but they don't negate the strategic significance of territorial depth. The key threat to Israel will remain the invasion and occupation by armored forces. Military success requires more than a few hundred missiles. To defeat Israel would require the Arabs to deploy armor, infantry and artillery into Israel and destroy the IDF on the ground. That was true in 1948, 1967 and 1973, and it remains true in the era of modern missiles. ”

U. S GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • • • Lt. General (ret. ) Tom Kelly, Chief of Operations in the 1991 Gulf War: "I cannot defend this land (Israel) without that terrain (West Bank). . . The West Bank mountains, and especially their 5 approaches, are the critical terrain. If an enemy secures those passes, Jerusalem and Israel become uncovered. Without the West Bank, Israel is only 8 miles wide at its narrowest point. That makes it indefensible. " 100 retired Generals and Admirals signed an Oct. 1988 advertisement in the Washington Times: Israel should not withdraw from J&S, lest it fail to provide security to its People. It is impossible to demilitarize J&S effectively The late Admiral Bud Nance: "No logical reason for Israel to give up one inch of the disputed areas. Quite to the contrary, I believe if Israel were to move out of the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it would increase instability and the possibility of war, increase the necessity for Israel to preempt in war and the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used to prevent an Israeli loss, and increase the possibility that the US would have to become involved in a war. " back

U. S GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earl Wheeler: The minimum required for Israel's defense includes most of the West Bank and the whole of Gaza and the Golan Heights (a secret document submitted to the Secretary of Defense on June 29, 1967). Wheeler realized that in the Mideast peace is based on deterrence back content

LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS - SURPRISE ATTACK Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS SURPRISE ATTACK NEXT • • The transition from peace to war, in the Mideast, is as abrupt and unpredictable as Mideast inter-Muslim politics. A surprise attack provides Arab regular forces (tanks and infantry) a 7: 1 advantage adjacent to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area. 50 hours are required to mobilize Israel's reservists (75% of IDF), in order to close the gap and block the Arab invasion. The more advanced the Arab weaponry, the faster and more destructive is the surprise offensive, the longer it takes to mobilize Israel's reservists, the more essential are J&S mountain ridges for halting the invasion. Control of the mountain ridges enables a small Israeli force to block the invasion until the arrival of reservists The slimmer is Israel's geographic depth, the less time is available to mobilize reservists, and the more critical is the control of the mountain ridges. The demilitarization of J&S would provide Israel with merely 510 hours early warning time (50 hours are required to mobilize the reservists), before the invasion could reach Israel's "Soft Belly. "

LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS SURPRISE ATTACK • • • NEXT Most of Israel's reservist infrastructure is located in the "narrow waistline" of Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area (70% population, 80% industry and finance, key fuel depots and intersections), which is dominated by the J&S mountain ridges. The control of J&S determines the time available for the deployment of reservists and for blocking a surprise invasion. Primitive Scud missiles created havoc in the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area during the 1991 Gulf War. The more advanced are the missiles, the more vulnerable are population centers and air force bases (which are crucial to stop invading tanks). In 1967, Jordan shelled Israel's leading air force base by J&S-based artillery. Security arrangements, as a substitute for ground barriers, require geographic depth, which provides early warning time, should a peace accord collapse (as happens often in the Mideast). Israel does not possess geographic depth. Ground barriers was tactically pertinent in 1948. In 2003 - due to modern weaponry - ground barriers are strategically critical. back content

IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS? Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS? NEXT • • • High Tech of today always becomes Low Tech of tomorrow. But, High Ground of today remains High Ground tomorrow. One can always develop a superior response to any advanced weapon system. However, one cannot develop superior ground barriers to J&S mountain ridges. One can, eventually, jam any existing technology. However, one cannot jam the topographic edge of Judea&Samaria mountains A country does not alter its boundaries in accordance with the development of weapon system and technologies. The best surveillance systems, stationed in the Persian Gulf by the US, failed to detect Iraq's invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990). They caused over 1 million fatalities and a mega-billion dollar damage. In 1973, Israel's technology detected Egypt's and Syria's plans of invasion, but the human factor failed to comprehend the data, as happens often in other countries. Ground barriers, rather than technology, stopped the invasion and prevented annihilation

IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS? NEXT • • • Technology is fallible, while ground barriers enables one to overcome technological, intelligence and operational failures. In 1973, Sinai, Golan and J&S were the cushion, which spared Israel oblivion. US superior technology could not destroy Iraq's missile launchers in 1991. In 1999, "Newsweek" reported that China might have developed a technology, capable of neutralizing the US Air Force and paralyzing Taiwan's air defense. Advanced technology is not an effective substitute to ground barriers. It could be a temporary and uncertain improvement, deepening dependence on outside powers. Its supply can be suspended, curtailed or cancelled. The US does not consider technology as a substitute for ground barriers, and therefore it operates military land installations in 120 countries. content back

JUDEA&SAMARIA vs. SINAI Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

JUDEA&SAMARIA vs. SINAI NEXT • • The Sinai giveaway has constrained Israel's strategic maneuverability and Israel's potential of concessions in other fronts, including J&S. Sinai borders the Negev, while J&S borders Israel's "Soft Belly" (Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area), which contains 70% of the population, 80% of the industry and finance, key fuel depots and intersections. Sinai does not possess a topographic edge over the Negev, while J&S does possess a significant edge over Israel's coastal plain. The Negev (2/3 of pre-1967 Israel) is sparsely populated, constantly accommodating most of Israel's reserve maneuvers, and therefore can absorb a surprise offensive by Egypt. The densely populated sliver coastal plain may not be able to absorb a surprise offensive by a resurrected Eastern Front.

JUDEA&SAMARIA vs. SINAI NEXT • A demilitarized Sinai (22, 000 sqm) accords 40 hours early warning time for the deployment of Israel's reservists. A demilitarized J&S (2, 200 sqm) would accord 5 -10 hours, while the IDF requires 50 hours for full deployment • Retaking Sinai would be less difficult due to the Negev's similar topography. Retaking J&S would be more difficult due to J&S' topographic edge • The Sinai giveaway was a calculated risk. A J&S giveaway might be a lethal gamble. • A J&S giveaway would doom Jerusalem, transforming the Jewish capital into an enclave, connected to the coastal plain by a narrow 5 mile corridor, overtowered by J&S mountain ridges. content back

SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • • • The eastern mountain ridge of J&S - rather than the Jordan Valley - constitutes one of the world's best tank barriers (a 3, 000 ft steep slope over the Jordan Valley). The five roads traversing it are easily controllable by a relatively small regular force. The western mountain ridge of J&S (a 2, 000 ft moderate slope) constitutes a dream platform for invaders into the sliver coastal plain, for the firing of shoulder launched missiles at civilian aircraft, and for daily terrorism, which would transform the terror reality of the Gaza bordering towns to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area. The J&S mountain ridges constitute a platform for air defense, jamming and surveillance systems, which extend all the way to the Persian Gulf, and is essential for the "Arrow" anti-missile system. A Jordanian bomber could reach Israel in 4 minutes from the Jordan Valley, which is the minimum time required to deploy Israel's interceptors.

SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • J&S mountain ridges prevent Israel's coverage by Arab surveillance systems, thus enhancing Israel's defensive and offensive capabilities. • A J&S giveaway would exacerbate terrorism, dwarfing the 1994 -2003 losses. • Until 1967, Israel forced Jordan to limit its military force in J&S to 5, 000 soldiers, in order to preclude a lethal threat. In 2003, there are 40, 000 armed Palestinian terrorists in J&S, which are equal to 4 infantry divisions. back

SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • A J&S giveaway would induce Arab belligerence. J&S mountain ridges constitute the "Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. They enhance Israel's strategic profile and power of deterrence. They transform Israel from a strategic liability to a strategic asset. Without J&S, Israel wouldn't have been able to force a Syrian withdrawal from Jordan in 1970 and might not have been able to carryout the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 198. • The signing of the Oslo Accord radicalized Israeli Arabs. The current stage of Palestinian terrorism (since 2000) has exacerbated Arab-Jewish relations. A J&S giveaway would further deteriorate co-existence. content back

UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT • The world expects Israel to yield land, which it does scarcely NEXT possess. Israel's area is 0. 196% of the area of the Arab countries, which is 150% larger than the US and 130% larger than Europe. The West expects the Arabs to accord Israel peace, which they have yet to accord to one another (Arieh Stav, Executive Director of the Ariel Center for Policy Research).

UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT NEXT • The geographic depth of J&S, Golan Heights and Sinai enabled Israel to fend off the 1973 surprise offensive. The absence of geographic depth would require more preventive wars. • Israel has a zero margin of error during wartime, due to the violent and unpredictable nature of the Mideast, due to the lack of geographic depth, due to a critical topographic and geographic edge enjoyed by its enemies, and due to a sustained arms race conducted by them. • Topographic and geographic inferiority mandates Israel to transfer war, promptly, to enemy's territory. back

UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT NEXT • Unlike other countries - and due to the ideology and track record of its enemies - Israel has to win each war. The Jewish nation was defeated 2, 000 years ago, and the Jewish People was dispersed. In view of the ideology amplified daily by official Arab education, media and clergy, there would be no Diaspora, should Israel be currently defeated. . . • Israel's pre-1967 borders were the longest in the world per sqm (and therefore less defensible). They were 360 kilometers (225 miles) longer than the current borders, characterized by more complex geography, which requires more personnel and hardware back content

ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY NEXT • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8 -15 miles) is equal to the distance between JFK and La Guardia airports in New York. = +

ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY NEXT • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8 -15 miles) is less than the length of DFW airport in Texas, equal to the width of Washington DC, San Francisco and Miami and equal to the distance between Wall Street and Columbia University in New York. back

ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8 -15) is less than the distance between downtown London and Heathrow Airport and equal to a roundtrip distance between Albert Hall and the Tower of London, between Bois Du Boulogne and La Place De La Bastille in Paris and between the Kennedy Center and the RFK Stadium in Washington, DC. back

ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY NEXT • • • The late Admiral Bud Nance: "The entire state of Israel - including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights - is smaller than the gunnery range at Nellis Air Force Base. . . Israel is only 9 miles across at is center close to Tel Aviv. This is scarcely more than the distance from the Pentagon to Mount Vernon. A modern tank can traverse this distance in about 15 minutes. . . With the West Bank included, Israel is approximately 40 miles across at its mid-point. The city of Atlanta is more than 40 miles across. Israel's area - before 1967 - was just 6 times more than the largest ranch in Texas, King's Ranch. The US military declared a 25 kilometer radius area, in Bosnia, as a "killing zone", in order to ensure the safety of US soldiers. back

PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.

PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST NEXT • • • 1, 300 years of inter-Muslim and inter-Arab conflicts have transformed the Mideast into the most violent region in the world: No comprehensive inter-Arab peace, no inter-Arab ratification of all borders, no compliance with all inter-Arab agreements/treaties, no Arab democratic regimes and no Arab regime which stays in power without the use of violence. Is it logical to assume that the Arabs are ready to accord to the Jewish ("infidel") State that which they have yet to accord to one another? ! Peace in the Mideast is Peace of Deterrence The test of peace boundaries in the violent and unpredictable Mideast is not in their ability to entice a peace accord. Rather, it is in their ability to deter and/or withstand a typical Mideast scenario: An unpredictable violation of a peace agreement, by a concerted inter-Arab offensive against sliver Israel, led by a tank and infantry invasion, and backed up by a barrage of missiles, a wave of Palestinian terrorism and a possible insurgency by Israel's Arabs.

PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST NEXT • The durability of a peace accord in the Mideast is as durable as Mideast politics, which is the shiftiest and the most tenuous in the globe. • Peace accord enhance security as long as the parties adhere to the agreement. Peace accord undermines security, once it is violated, as a result of the territorial concessions made. • "Territories for Peace" is logically flawed: While Israel should, supposedly, concede territories in return for peace, would a reduced peace - through Arab violations - entitle Israel to retrieve territories? back

Hatikvah Educational Foundation www. acpr. org. il/hatikvah Tel. 6911145 -03 Written and edited by Yoram Ettinger Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3, 000 ft above the Jordan Valley and 2, 000 ft above the 8 -15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.