IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARISATION OF SPACE Dr Raji Rajagopalan

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IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARISATION OF SPACE Dr. Raji Rajagopalan Distinguished Fellow and head, Nuclear &

IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARISATION OF SPACE Dr. Raji Rajagopalan Distinguished Fellow and head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative Observer Research Foundation www. orfonline. org rpr@orfonline. org; rajeswarirajagopalan@gmail. com http: //securitystrategyrajagopalan. blogspot. com/

CHANGING ASIAN STRATEGIC ORDER • Asian strategic order in flux - changing regional and

CHANGING ASIAN STRATEGIC ORDER • Asian strategic order in flux - changing regional and global military balance; growing trend of militarisation (weaponisation); securitisation of political issues means greater emphasis on hard power; signs of arms race, incl. in OS • Other spacefaring powers re-examining their options, strategies, capabilities – assigning a greater security role to their space assets • Major factors • • Changing military balance incl. in OS Declining US power (relative) N Korea - Possible future Japanese reactions Internal factors - but different for each power • Consequences difficult to predict • Competition to pick up including potential arms race in OS

SPACE SECURITY CHALLENGES • Advanced military space programmes, growing counter-space capabilities • No weapons

SPACE SECURITY CHALLENGES • Advanced military space programmes, growing counter-space capabilities • No weapons in outer space yet; ground-based assets significant threat • Increasing space debris, risking civilian assets • Larger than 10 cm more than 21, 000; bet 1 and 10 cm approx. 500, 000; smaller than 1 cm exceeds 100 mn • Civil space cooperation and possible diversion for mil space programmes – NK, Iran • Close to 80 active players • Proliferation of small satellites – mini, micro and nano satellites • Large number of state and non-state players; difficulty of detection of small sats • Satellites must for well-coordinated and synchronised tactical capability, integrating weapon systems, missile, radars and sensors, unmanned vehicles, electronics and communication networks, aerial capabilities, logistics and support systems, and defence forces in a vast geographical area • State of the outer space regime - Lack of consensus among major powers

DETERRENCE • In the absence of successful multilateral efforts, states will be forced to

DETERRENCE • In the absence of successful multilateral efforts, states will be forced to rely on deterrence • Deterrence effects will cascade: if one state relies on deterrence, others will be forced to also • Consequence will be negative for all • Will lead to increasing suspicions that will make cooperation difficult • Deterrence model not yet policy for any state re. space, so possible to prevent it • Necessary too, before states proceed down this path

STRATEGIC STABILITY • Strategic stability: maintenance of predictable and non-escalatory relations between states •

STRATEGIC STABILITY • Strategic stability: maintenance of predictable and non-escalatory relations between states • Common strategic understanding between states – absence of it makes stability fragile and questionable • Thus not just absence of war, but absence of fear of even escalation, even if relations otherwise are poor • Suggests some level of confidence in all states that no one would gain unilateral advantage • But emerging trends in space security could affect strategic stability • Moving from militarisation to early signs of weaponisation

ASATS • Development of ASATs, co-orbital satellites or any weapon that might disrupt or

ASATS • Development of ASATs, co-orbital satellites or any weapon that might disrupt or destroy space system (orbital, link or terrestrial elements) • ASAT missiles putting low earth and geosynchronous orbits at risk • Co-orbital ASAT weapons • Missile defense interceptors that might be used as direct ascent ASATs • Ground-based high-energy lasers • Examples: Chinese trio satellites - Shiyan-7, Chuangxin-3 and Shijian-15; Roaming Dragon; Russian Kosmos 2499; US X-37 B pilotless space drones

IMPACT OF ASATS • Potential to disrupt strategic stability and step up the possibility

IMPACT OF ASATS • Potential to disrupt strategic stability and step up the possibility of war • Arms race instability • Benign environment for two decades but beginning to change from 2007 • Technological sophistication of new ASATs; leading to possible ASAT arms race • Crisis instability • Use of ASATs or lasers to disrupt communications could complicate the command & control dynamics; also reduces the possibility for crisis control mechanisms to play out • Loss of surveillance satellites would have similar impact • Could undermine crisis management and exacerbate the potential for escalation

STRATEGIC STABILITY – CHALLENGES • Establishing clear linkages between space and strategic stability difficult

STRATEGIC STABILITY – CHALLENGES • Establishing clear linkages between space and strategic stability difficult • Emergence of a large number of actors – no major technologies in space but new actors bringing out the salience of some of the old technologies including counter-space technologies • US and Soviets several ASAT tests until early 1980 s • Changed circumstances in which states find greater incentives/ willingness to develop and potentially use offensive counter-space cap make the situation more precarious • Greater reliance on space for mil ops as against earlier emphasis for strategic ops • Not in a vacuum – global power transition and shifting Asian balance of

SPACE WEAPONS • Technologies with peaceful applications – such as satellite inspection, refueling and

SPACE WEAPONS • Technologies with peaceful applications – such as satellite inspection, refueling and repair (on-orbit satellite servicing) or technologies to clean up space junk – can also be used • Office of the US Director of National Intelligence, 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: “We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil or commercial space system. ” • Dual use nature of space assets add to the complexities • Not just dual use assets but launches with multiple payloads make it complex

WHY ACT NOW? • Growth trends • More states mean overcrowded space • More

WHY ACT NOW? • Growth trends • More states mean overcrowded space • More regional space agencies? • Private sector participation • Why proliferation? • Supply side: • Growing prosperity = greater resources for space programs • Industrial/technology spread = space tech spreads • Demand side: • Competitive pressures

SSA – CRITICAL IF ONE HAS TO BE IN THIS BUSINESS • Better awareness

SSA – CRITICAL IF ONE HAS TO BE IN THIS BUSINESS • Better awareness about the OS environment and how it impacts on our activities in OS • Three essential components: Tracking of objects in space; Monitoring space weather; Characterization of space objects – these can help avoid collisions (debris, solar) • Close to 80 states and non-state entities operate more than 2000 sats; operate in an environment that contains estimated 500, 000 pieces of space debris that damage or destroy these sats thru’ collision • Solar storms and explosions of charged particles damaging sats or even power grids on Earth • Characterisation of objects gives the ability to understand the behaviour of OS objects - electromagnetic signals and emissions, radar and optical imaging can provide clues as to their function and capabilities. • Helps in predicting threats by developing a catalogue of OS objects and detecting new events

SPACEBOOK CREATED BY AGI: HTTP: //APPS. AGI. COM/SATELLITEVIEWER/

SPACEBOOK CREATED BY AGI: HTTP: //APPS. AGI. COM/SATELLITEVIEWER/

COUNTER-SPACE CAPABILITIES • Existed in the past but the conditions today quite different •

COUNTER-SPACE CAPABILITIES • Existed in the past but the conditions today quite different • Greater willingness to develop and use such capabilities • Kinetic capabilities, in which there is physical destruction of a space object, difficult to hide • Electronic and cyber-attacks not so easy to detect; they can be developed and deployed or even used without others being aware or certain about who is doing it • OOS and RPO not new – more than 50 years of experience with human spaceflight, but increasing robotic interface automation, new challenges – also, more countries/industries engaged in testing RPO cap. • Change in orientation • Cold War, OS utilisation primarily for strategic operations, like strategic intelligence gathering, nuclear attack early warning and executing arms control agreements • Today far more pertinent role in conventional military operations bc operational and tactical benefits • Offensive or defensive counter-space ops today impact not just security but social and economic, and across continents due to large-scale civilian dependency on space-based applications • OS so vital to both civilian and military ops reflects the danger of inadvertent escalation and conflict, if there is, for instance, a disruption or denial of service during a period of heightened

COUNTER-SPACE; CONTD. • Mil ops becoming extremely net-centric one - shorter timeframes, high tech

COUNTER-SPACE; CONTD. • Mil ops becoming extremely net-centric one - shorter timeframes, high tech environment - integration of space assets absolutely critical • Operation Desert Storm & Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the ‘force-multiplier’ nature • Supports activities including Space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), positioning navigation and timing (PNT), satellite communications (SATCOM), information gathering, weather, environment and terrain observation • Can have a multiplier effect in terms of gaining greater sense of predictability of the operating environment, reduce uncertainty, facilitate better command decisions (due to better awareness) • The very benefits a vulnerability as well – China has been investing to find the US’ Achilles heel for instance – the heavily networked US mil ops

Categories of Counterspace Weapons Kinetic Physical: Weapons intended to create permanent and irreversible destruction

Categories of Counterspace Weapons Kinetic Physical: Weapons intended to create permanent and irreversible destruction of a satellite or to ground support infrastructure through force of impact with an object or a warhead. Such weapons include direct-assent ASAT missiles and co-orbital systems. The coorbital weapons are satellites placed on similar orbits and can be directed to intercept or interference with close orbital rendezvous. Non-kinetic Physical: Weapons meant to create interference or temporary damage and physical impact on space systems without physical contact. Categories of these weapons include Electromagnetic pulses or directedenergy (laser beams or microwavebombardments). Electronic: Weapons that use radiofrequency energy to interfere with or jam the communications to or from satellites but do not cause permanent physical damages. Cyber: Weapons that use software and network techniques to compromise, control, interfere or destroy computer systems that are linked to satellite operations.

China Fastest growing space power, making rapid progress including in counterspace capabilities Kinetic Physical

China Fastest growing space power, making rapid progress including in counterspace capabilities Kinetic Physical - - SC-19 DA-ASAT, DN-2 DA-ASAT, DN-3 DA-ASATs against deep space targets in Medium Earth Orbit and Geosynchronous Orbit possibly in the developmental/ experimental stage Dual-use - on-orbit servicing and inspection satellites for peaceful purposes and as CS threat – difficult to distinguish between the two Multiple tests of tech for close approach and rendezvous in both low earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary earth orbit (GEO) – SJ-7, Advanced Debris Removal Vehicle (ADRV) or “Roaming Dragon” - Could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability – not known to have done a destructive intercept RPOs – conducted RPOs between two Chinese sats in GEO many times (Nov. 16, Apr. 17 and Apr. 18) SJ-17 with Chinasat 5 A (circling several times before parking in a nearby orbit – Nov. 16); fresh maneuvers around the GEO belt with another sat Chinasat 6 A (Apr. 17); with Chinasat 20 in Apr. 18 - SJ-17 not engaged in RPO activities since Aug. 18 SJ-12 (launched in 2010) a series of remote proximity maneuvers with an older Chinese satellite, SJ-06 F (bet 12 June 2010 and 16 August 2010) – believed to be testing co-orbital jamming or other CS cap. High altitude launch capability - The 2013 test wherein a weapon designed to destroy satellites in geosynchronous orbit - the trajectory of the 2013 test – ASAT capable of reaching high altitudes, three times higher than the ASAT test in 2007, 2014 DA-ASAT and conventional mid-course missile interceptors (could be used as an ASAT) – primary targets in LEO

CHINA’S ASAT TESTS Date July 2, 2005 ASAT System SC-19 Target Unknown Altitude Comments

CHINA’S ASAT TESTS Date July 2, 2005 ASAT System SC-19 Target Unknown Altitude Comments Unknown (likely LEO) Likely rocket test February 6, 2006 SC-19 Unknown satellite January 11, 2007 SC-19 FY-1 C satellite Unknown (likely LEO) Likely flyby of orbital target 865 km Destruction of sat and debris creation January 11, 2010 SC-19 CSS-X-11 ballistic missile 250 km Destruction of target, no debris January 27, 2003 Likely SC-19 Unknown ballistic missile Not known Destruction of target and no debris May 13, 2013 DN-2 Unknown Around 36, 000 km Likely rocket test July 23, 2014 SC-19 Unknown Likely LEO Non-destructive test February 5, 2018 DN-3 Unknown About 100 km Possibly BMD test

China Non-kinetic physical Electronic - Cyber Directed-energy weapons – reports suggest China developed capabilities

China Non-kinetic physical Electronic - Cyber Directed-energy weapons – reports suggest China developed capabilities to blind or damage sensitive spacebased optical sensors, used for remote sensing or MD Developing laser weapons to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors; possible limited capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors already exists 2005: successful blinding of a sat in a test using a 50 - 100 [kilowatt] capacity mounted laser gun in Xinjiang 2006: China attempted to blind US spy sats flying over Chinese territory using high-powered lasers although not clear successful or not. Developing High Power Microwave (HPM) weapons for air and missile defense but could develop a mobile HPM system against sat – would require reductions in size, weight, power and other integration challenges Jamming – high priority area – proficient in jamming common sat communication bands, GPS signals, Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging - GPS easiest to jam because of weak signals and even low power jammers would degrade US DIA: China developing jamming technologies to target SATCOM over multiple frequencies, including military protected communication bands China Strategic Support Force (SSF) resp for cyber attacks - targeting an adversary’s Command &Control and logistics - In 2011, (the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission report): two US satellites compromised in 2007 and 2008 through a ground station in Norway; the attack, carried out via the internet, was traced to China - Though the US govt. did not accuse anyone outright, it said the nature of the attack linked to Chinese hackers and consistent with policy documents published by China’s military. Severity of the attack alarming bc in the 2008 attack, the hackers able to achieve all steps required to command the satellite, though no harm done - In 2014, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) confirmed one of its satellites hacked; no data compromise but published news reports blamed China - June 2018, Symantec report talked about the sophisticated hacking campaign launched from computers in China - - Oct 2018, NASA hacking - personal data of current & former employees found compromised, linked to China

 Russia Kinetic Physical Space capabilities somewhat degraded after the fall of Soviet Union

Russia Kinetic Physical Space capabilities somewhat degraded after the fall of Soviet Union but has made significant progress in rebuilding its space and counterspace systems since 2010 • Most advanced ASAT & co-orbital ASAT, Naryad - altitudes as high as 40, 000 km, threat to GEO sats; could carry multiple individual warheads in a single launch – in use today as well • A-235/ PL 19 / Nudol, a rapidly maturing ground-launched ballistic missile designed to be capable of intercepting targets in LEO • Kontakt Air-launched missile interceptor to be used against targets in LEO orbits, on a multiyear development timeline • S-500 ABM air defense system (could serve a dual MD-ASAT purpose) • RPO since 2013 – several instances Russia maneuvered OS objects in LEO and GEO; the US initially identified as debris in the US Space-Track catalogue; later these objects were seen maneuvering and engaging in proximity ops Non-Kinetic Physical Electronic Cyber Turla malware • Completed the development of a laser based ASAT on A-60 and designated 1 LK 222 Sokol Eshelon but not integrated on an airborne platform • R-330 Zh jammer and R-381 T 2 ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio monitoring system for jamming • 2014, Russia jammed GPS signals in Ukraine, loss of GPS for radios and phones, the grounding of some UAVs • 2015: deployment of the Krasukha-4 truck-mounted jamming system in Syria • June 2017: the US Maritime Administration reported an apparent GPS spoofing attack in the Black Sea; over 20 other ships in the region complained as well

 The US Continues to maintain technological edge including in counterspace capabilities but increasingly

The US Continues to maintain technological edge including in counterspace capabilities but increasingly threatened by Russian and Chinese capabilities Kinetic Physical ASM-135 Air-Launched DA-ASAT Midcourse Missile Defence Systems as ASAT– SM-3 variants No openly acknowledged co-orbital capabilities but has latent technological capability to develop in a short period of time if it chooses to Multiple tests of tech for close approach and rendezvous in both LEO and GEO, which could develop into co-orbital Non-Kinetic Physical Electronic Counter Communications System (CCS) - can be deployed globally to provide uplink jamming capability against geostationary communications satellites; capable of jamming Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers (GPS, GLONASS, Beidou) within a local area of operation to prevent their effective use by adversaries Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) programme - the effectiveness of the system unknown. Supposed to assure the availability of GPS services for US military units in operations. Primarily to prevent adversarial electronic countermeasures from interfering with the operational use of GPS by: developing a new military signal, called M-code, which is much more secure than the universally available civil GPS code; new generations of GPS satellites, from GPS III launched in 2018, can broadcast Mcode. The US mil also developing new generations of receivers that can utilize Mcode and incorporate improved anti-jam and anti-spoofing tech Directed-energy weapons: no indication of moving past the research phase to operational cap - MD Agency studying the feasibility of space-based DEW for defending against BMs Cyber

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE • No effective governance mechanisms • OST does not cover

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE • No effective governance mechanisms • OST does not cover a range of new threats • Rule-making not easy because of new and numerous actors • Recent efforts failure for lack of clarity • Space weapon; defensive use of space • GGE, PPWT • Geopolitics playing into writing future rules of the road

WHAT MUST BE DONE? • No defence against ASAT as yet, nor any arms

WHAT MUST BE DONE? • No defence against ASAT as yet, nor any arms control measures or even TCBMs to address ASATs and other counter-space capabilities • Ways to control – global governance norms - legal, norms, GGEs, Co. C • Strengthen SSA capabilities • Building better redundancy, hardening of space capabilities, enhance the security of back ups • Make clear and public red lines and escalatory thresholds • Cross the speed bump re. global governance • Strengthen efforts at developing norms of responsible behaviour and legal instruments – not a choice but all must be promoted

SPECIFIC TCBMS • Space Traffic Management Measures • Pre-launch notifications • Notification measures for

SPECIFIC TCBMS • Space Traffic Management Measures • Pre-launch notifications • Notification measures for ballistic missile and space launches (HCo. C) • Standards for small-sats to ensure tracking • Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data exchange • “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” pledge • Solemn but unilateral pledge • With no clear definition on space weapon, important to focus on intentions – no attack on each other’s assets or not to have an arms race in outer space (be it thru’ placement of weapons or ground-based)

SPECIFIC TCBMS, CONTD. • ASAT test guidelines/ intentional orbital breakups rules • The UNIDIR

SPECIFIC TCBMS, CONTD. • ASAT test guidelines/ intentional orbital breakups rules • The UNIDIR proposal – no debris, low debris, notification • Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51 • Exercising the right to self-defense on an imminent threat, before the attack has occurred – dangerous trend • Many developing countries see this as particularly troubling because they see this clause as further opening the door to conflict in space and a pretext to weaponize their capabilities