IAEA Approach to the Safety Case and Safety
- Slides: 33
IAEA Approach to the Safety Case and Safety Assessment for Predisposal Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources and Radioactive Waste INT 9176 INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP Application of the IAEA Methodology and SAFRAN Tool for the Safety Case and Safety Assessment for Predisposal Management of DSRS Monika Kinker, WES/NSRW IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INT 9176 “Mediterranean Project” Objectives • Improved capacities and capabilities for the cradle to grave management of SRS • Staff of RBs & DSRS management organizations trained in … SA methodologies and tools Key Activities Implemented: Safety Demonstration • Implementation in SAFRAN Tool of a Generic SC & SA for Predisposal Management of DSRS • Provision of Assistance in the development of SC and SA for DSRS end of life management options • IAEA • • Original MSs : Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Montenegro, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia. Joined the project in 2012: Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, Jordan, and The Frmr. Yug. Rep. of Macedonia Did not join yet, but invited: Algeria, Israel, Syria 2
Waste Management at the IAEA • Department of Nuclear Safety and Security • Nuclear Installation Safety • Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety • Waste and Environmental Safety Section • Department of Nuclear Energy • Nuclear Power • Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology • Waste Technology Section IAEA overview of safety standards International Atomic Energy Agency 3
Activities of the Division • Safety Standards Development • Support for International Conventions • Joint Convention, Code of Conduct • Application of Standards: • Information Exchange (e. g. Conferences, workshops, meetings, . . . ) • Technical Cooperation • Training & Education • Appraisals, Peer Reviews IAEA overview of safety standards 4 International Atomic Energy Agency 4
Vision for the IAEA Safety Standards Outcome: • A harmonized high level of protection for people and the environment worldwide based on the IAEA safety standards as the global reference Output: • Global reference for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. • Integrated, comprehensive and consistent • Up-to-date, user friendly, fit-for-purpose and high quality • Provide for a worldwide harmonized high level of protection for people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. IAEA 5
Strategies • Clear categories of safety standards consistent with • • Member States’ needs and use Clear, logical and integrated structure based on a unified philosophy of safety Consensus at the highest level on what constitutes a high level of safety and the related best international practices Transparency and rigour of the process Effective feedback mechanisms User - friendliness Manageable number of safety standards Clear scope: areas covered and level of detail Harmonized terminology IAEA 6
Safety Standards Categories Fundamental Safety Principles Requirements – Legal, Technical, & Procedural Safety Imperatives Safety Fundamentals Safety Requirements IAEA Safety Guides Guidance on Best Practice to Meet Requirements International Atomic Energy Agency 7
Safety Fundamentals • Policy document of the IAEA Safety Standards Series: Ø States the basic objectives, concepts and principles involved in ensuring protection and safety Ø Comprised of 10 safety principles Ø Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations. People and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation risks Safety Fundamentals Safety Requirements Safety IAEAGuides overview of safety standards 8
Safety Requirements • Elaborate on the basic objectives and concepts of SF-1 as they apply to a specific activity or facility • Should be concise and reflect the ‘What’ and ‘Who’ of safety management associated explanatory text should describe ‘Why’ the requirements exist • Use “shall” statements Safety Fundamentals Safety Requirements Safety IAEAGuides overview of safety standards 9
Safety Guides • Focus on ‘How’ safety requirements can be met • Guidance on best practices to meet requirements • Use “should” statements Safety Fundamentals Safety Requirements Safety IAEAGuides overview of safety standards 10
Status of Safety Standards • IAEA Safety standards are • Binding for IAEA’s own activities • Not binding on the Member States (but may be adopted by them) EXCEPT in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA: • Integrated Regulatory Review Service • Technical Cooperation Fund work • States wishing to enter into project agreements with the IAEA overview of safety standards International Atomic Energy Agency 11
Development of Safety Standards Outline and work plan Prepared by the Secretariat Review by the Safety Standards Committees and the Commission on Safety Standards Drafting or revising of safety standard by the Secretariat and Consultants Review by the Safety Standards Committee(s) Member States Endorsement by Commission on Safety Standards Approval by the IAEA’s Director General or Bo. G * IAEA overview of safety standards Review period: about every 5 years * Safety Requirements approved by Bo. G * Safety Guides approved by DG International Atomic Energy Agency 12
Current status of development of IAEA Safety Requirements 0 1 20 Under development ed sh bli 11 0 2 in 09 20 09 0 2 Pu Under development IAEA Under development Pu in ed sh bli 2 1 11 20 Under development Pu s bli in Pu d he ed sh bli in 1 1 20 2 1 20 Under development
Life Cycle of a Radiation Source IAEA 14
Issues in Long Term management of DSRS Waste or Resource? • Disused Source: “a radioactive source which is no longer used, and is not intended to be used, for the practice for which an authorization has been granted” (Code of Conduct) • Radioactive Waste: “Radioactive material in gaseous, liquid or solid form for which no further use is foreseen…, and which is controlled as radioactive waste by a regulatory body under the legislative and regulatory framework …” (Joint Convention) IAEA
Disused sources in the Safety Standards IAEA
DSRS Long Term Management Options • • • Return to Commercial Suppliers Return to Country of Origin (Repatriation) Reuse/Recycle Storage at User Facility Storage in Dedicated (“Centralized”) Facility • Decay to clearance levels iaw national regulations • Interim storage pending future actions • Long Term (between 50 and 100 yr) • Disposal IAEA 17
Why Storage is not a Sustainable Management Strategy • • • Not a sustainable option in the long-term On-going financial liabilities Poor or no regulatory control in certain countries Limited expertise or capacity for managing sources Institutional and social stability • Potential health and environmental hazard • Safety, Security concerns IAEA 18
Disposal Options • Disposal at Landfill • Near-surface Repository Disposal • (with and without engineered barriers) including underground cavities (natural or engineered) at relatively shallow depths • Geological Repository Disposal • Borehole Disposal Co-disposal might be an option e. g. NSR & BDC IAEA 19
Factors Affecting Choice of Disposal Option • Nature of the waste • • (activity, half-life, toxicity) Quantity and location (volume, where is it? ) Site Characteristics (nature of the rock, water flow & chemistry, stability) Preferences concerning repository design and nature of engineered barriers Other Factors (national policy and strategy, availability of resources, stakeholder consensus) IAEA 20
Sustainable Management Requires: • Adequate Legal and Regulatory Framework • National Policy, Strategies that consider • Existing, future inventories • COMPLETE lifecycle • Adequate Resources and Infrastructure (technical, human, financial) • Regulatory Body with well defined responsibilities and functions • Authorization through process of licensing IAEA 21
RWM Licensing, Authorization in the Safety Standards 2010 2013 IAEA 22
IAEA Requirements for RW Safety Case, Safety Assessment … • GSR Part 5, GSG-3: Safety Case • A collection of arguments and evidence in support of the safety of a facility or activity. This will normally include the findings of a safety assessment and a statement of confidence in these findings. • GSR Part 4 , GSG-3: Safety Assessment 1. Assessment of all aspects of a practice that are relevant to protection and safety; includes siting, design & operation of the facility. This normally includes risk assessment and probabilistic SA. 2. Analysis to predict the performance of an overall system and its impact, where the performance measure is the radiological impact or some other global measure of the impact on safety. IAEA 23
GSG-3: Safety Guide • Demonstrating the Safety of RWM • Safety Case • Role, Components, Documentation and Use • Safety Assessment !! ! W NE • Approach, Scenarios, Models, Analysis of Results • Specific Issues • SC evolution, graded approach, DID, facility lifetime, LTS • Regulatory Review Process Annex III Annex IV Examples of Hazards and Initiating Events Topical Issues for Review of SC Template of Regulatory Review Report SADRWMS Project Proposal to June 2010 WASSC -> CRAFT IAEA 24
GSG-3: Guidance on the SC and SA Safety Case Safety Assessment impact Non radiological environmental Scenarios Models Calculations Site and Engineering Radiological Impact Operational Safety IAEA Management System Safety Assessment 25
Elements of Safety Case: GSG-3 • INCLUDES: Context; safety strategy; facility description; safety assessment; limits, controls and conditions (LCOs); iteration and design optimization; uncertainty management; integration of safety arguments • NOT SPECIFIED but implied: criticality, radiation, hazardous material, surveillance & maintenance, emergency preparedness and response, decommissioning, management systems, interface with LCOs from other facilities (e. g. , waste acceptance criteria) IAEA 26
CRAFT (Complimentary Safety Reports: Development and Application to Waste Management Facilities) 4 Year Project • 1 st Plenary May 2011 • 2 nd, 3 rd Plenaries 2012, 2013 • Final Plenary October 2014 Objectives: • APPLY GSG-3, SADRWMS methodology, SAFRAN Tool • PROVIDE a forum for application of the methodology and SAFRAN tool • DEVELOP, document TECDOCs illustrating application of GSG-3 • Facility/process specific • Safety Case Process/Regulatory Review IAEA 27
SADRWMS Project Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions Long-term Project • 1 st Plenary Meeting in 2003 • Final Plenary in 2010 Objectives: 1. EXAMINE the application of safety assessment methodology (ISAM, ASAM) 2. DEVELOP, document • Safety Assessment Methodology • Regulatory Review • ---> GSG-3 3. INTEGRATE methodology into software tool (SAFRAN) IAEA 28
CRAFT Working Methods Radon Type Facility Application Case • develop illustrative test case(s) for applying the IAEA methodology/tools to RADON type facilities (basis: RW retrieval activity at Murmansk RADON); Storage and Processing Facility • Apply IAEA methodology/tools to facilities for the storage and processing of RW • Central Storage Facility in Slovenia, • Waste Processing Facility in Serbia, • LTS Facility in Cuba Regulatory Interactions • Apply IAEA methodology/tools in regulatory review of WG application cases, and provide recommendations IAEA 29
IAEA 30
Generic Safety Assessment (GSA) • A SA undertaken on a site-generic rather than sitespecific basis using a synthetic system • Can provide useful input to decisions concerning a variety of issues: • suitable designs, site characteristics & activity limits • Use of the GSA • Starting point for the SA of a specific site • Worked example that can be used to guide/inform a sitespecific assessment • Identify key waste and site attributes that need to be characterised IAEA 31
Concluding Remarks • Although valuable RWM experience has been collected worldwide, we are all still learning • This week is a good change for exchange of experiences between participants • We are looking for intensive and open discussion! • Try to use the presence of this group of experts from different countries to get maximal benefit for your project! IAEA overview of safety standards International Atomic Energy Agency 32
IAEA Thank you! 33
- Best case worst case average case
- Ssr-5
- Saris iaea
- Livechart iaea
- Iaea pcmf
- Iaea gsr part 4
- Rtc protective film
- Iaea
- Iaea
- Stefano monti iaea
- Iaea
- Iaea
- Iaea
- Iaea
- Iaea
- Iaea gsr part 7
- Pcmf iaea
- Film badge dosimeter
- Iaea
- Gsr part 2
- Difference between datagram and virtual circuit operation
- Deep learning approach and surface learning approach
- Long case and short case
- Binary search complexity average case
- Bubble sort best case and worst case
- Bubble sort best case and worst case
- Bubble sort best case and worst case
- Ambiguous case trig
- Cognitive approach vs behavioral approach
- Shower approach
- Multi approach avoidance conflict
- Bandura's reciprocal determinism
- Research approach meaning
- Approach to system development