HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND BOARDS in Naval Aviation

HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND BOARDS in Naval Aviation CAPT James Fraser MC USN Naval Safety Center USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Naval Aviation Mishap Rate 776 aircraft destroyed in 1954 FY 50 -97 25 aircraft destroyed in 1997 Angled decks Aviation Safety Center Naval Aviation Maintenance Program established in 1959 (NAMP) RAG concept initiated NATOPS Program initiated 1961 Squadron Safety program System Safety Designated Aircraft ACT ORM 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 60 70 Fiscal Year 80 90

16 14 12 Human 10 8 6 4 Year USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 1991 1989 1987 1983 1981 1979 0 1985 Mechanical 2 1977 Class A, B, & C Mishaps/100, 000 Flight Hours All Navy/Marine Corps Mishaps CY 1977 -92

Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards WHY DO WE NEED HFC/HFB? 4 Aircrew error is the leading cause of mishaps 4 In many instances, mishap causal factors were previously known to supervisors or peers, but unknown to the CO 4 The insidious nature of human factors requires that they be reviewed on a regular basis USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards WHAT ARE WE LOOKING FOR? 4 Performance trends, training currency and proficiency 4 Psychological, physiological, social and professional factors 4 Medical conditions, emotional and interpersonal stressors USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards PURPOSE 4 To provide a formal mechanism of human factors feedback to the CO 4 To provide the CO with the information necessary to make decisions regarding the mishap potential of personnel USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards GOALS 4 Identify potentially hazardous factors before they become causal factors in a mishap. 4 Assist aviators in the recognition and successful elimination of these safety hazards. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Human Factors Councils 4 Informal and quarterly (USN) or monthly (USMC) review of all aircrew 4 Chaired by the CO 4 Recommended composition: CO, ASO, Flight Surgeon, Operations/Training Officer, Junior Officer, Leading Chief/MCPOC or enlisted aircrew 4 No unrelated business shall be discussed USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Human Factors Councils 4 Strictly confidential and not to be used in disciplinary action 4 CO may defer discussion of detailed sensitive, personal, or professional matters to a more appropriate forum USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

HFC Assessment Process 4 Operations: Provide flight data for documentation as needed 4 OPTEMPO 4 Individual flight time summaries 4 Training: Provide data to assess 4 Aircrew qualifications and professional progress 4 NATOPS/instrument/physiology survival swims quals/upgrades USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

HFC Assessment Process 4 All members should discuss the following as related to each individual: 4 Skills and Qualifications 4 Systems Knowledge 4 Aircrew Coordination Performance 4 Professional Discipline 4 Risk-taking Behavior 4 Career Development USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

HFC Assessment Process 4 Critical Assessment Process 4 Declining performance: failure to meet required standards or qualifications process 4 Known violations or instances of poor flight discipline 4 Presence of major job or life stressors 4 Recommended Action - shall not be disciplinary in nature USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Human Factors Boards 4 Convened for cause by the CO 4 Focused reviews of an individual 4 Shall provide a plan of action 4 Composed of the Executive Officer (chairman), Flight Surgeon, ASO School graduate, and another experienced officer USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

Human Factors Boards 4 If enlisted member is subject, a senior enlisted shall be a member 4 Members from outside command may be used USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

HFB Assessment Process 4 Notify individual that HFB will be convened 4 Identify specific problem areas to be considered 4 Presence of aircrew under review is required 4 Document performance deficiencies and recommend to CO an appropriate course of action USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

THE FNAEB/FNFOEB 4 Administrative Boards convened to evaluate performance, potential and motivation 4 Convened by superior in command: 4 Faulty judgement in flight situations 4 Lack of general skill 4 Habits, traits, tendencies that make his/her flight status questionable 4 Minimum flying requirements not met 4 Questionable AA 4 FNAEB: Three pilots and FS 4 FNFOEB: Three NFOs and FS USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

FNAEB/FNFOEB Outcomes 4 Type A: Continuation in flight status 4 A 1: Retain in present duty assignment 4 A 3: Transfer to another activity not within same command operating same or different aircraft 4 A 4: Probationary flight status (with appropriate Type B associated) 4 Type B: Termination of flight status 4 B 1: Retention of right to wear insignia 4 B 2: Revocation of insignia USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator 4 “Best pilot” USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator 4 “Best pilot” 4 Persistent poor performer USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator 4 “Best pilot” 4 Persistent poor performer 4 Overstressed aviator USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

“Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He. . . made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, . . . Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had the opportunity to influence his judgement, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose. ” Anonymous USMC Rotary Wing, 1997