Hi Rad Mat hearing session safety file Outline

Hi. Rad. Mat hearing session: safety file Outline q q EDMS No: 1155047 Safety file ü Descriptive part ü Hazard inventory q Demonstrative part q Operational part q Feedbacks Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – EN/MEF Hi. Rad. Mat Hearing session CERN, July 27, 2011

Demonstrative part 2 Id 1. Hazards TNC is a high radiation area. Contaminated dust in TNC (from destructive work in TNC radioactive area) Risks External exposure Internal exposure Environment exposure Organisational measures - SPS access procedure in controlled area (EDMS 1138833) -Safety code F - Radiation Safety Manual - RP supervision -A 6 - The two-person rule of working -ALARA principles 2. Moving crane and moving PPG 6907 door Collision with Door opening people or procedure on crane equipment control panel 3. Moving crane Collision with -Overhead crane and lifting loads people or handling procedure equipment (EDMS 1145906) - Handling by qualified overhead crane drivers - Safety Regulation on mechanical equipment (SR-M) Technical measures - Access system and RP veto for PPG 6907 door. - Hand foot monitor control in BA 7. -Ventilation system. - Alara oriented design of the facility. - Ramses system Personal measures - Individual protective equipment IPE (safety shoes, auto-saving mask, helmet) - Individual and operational dosimeters - Overshoes - Depending on the nature of the work : -gloves if object handling in TNC -overall clothes + individual breathing mask if "destructive" work IPE Switch : if door closed, crane will stay off Manual door opening Slow motion IPE handling and safety perimeter

Demonstrative part 3 Id Hazards 4. Moving crane and lifting loads in radioactive area Electrical installation and equipments 5. 6. 7. 8. Risks Organisational measures Collision with people See point 1. and 3. or equipment External exposure Internal exposure Fire Electrocution Material Internal exposure (hooks or tools) used in TNC, exposed to contaminated dust Activated External exposure shielding when patrolling TNC Working at Fall heights when patrol PEE 7 Technical measures See points 1. and 3. Handling of crane remotely Personal measures See point 1. and 3. Safety inspections - Fire detection installation acceptance + Extinguishing means periodic inspections (see EDMS 1146217) Electrical equipment under norms : C 1 - Electrical safety code + IS 23 and IS 41 Dedicated RP training (EDMS Radiological control from 1079566) RP technician IPE + see point 1. Hi. Rad. Mat patrol procedure EDMS 1152694 See Point 1. Hi. Rad. Mat patrol procedure EDMS 1152695 See point 1. Red phones available Modifications improving safety in B. 846 (EDMS 1154768) See point 1.

Demonstrative part 4 Id 9. Hazards Risks Work near External exposure radioactive dump 10. Radioactive water Environment from dump cooling circuit pollution Internal exposure 11. Radioactive Environment condensate water pollution from air Internal exposure dehumidification in TNC Collision with 12. Lifting heavy hooks (13 kg) people or equipment 13. Contaminated air Internal exposure filter and bags in ventilation system Organisational measures See point 1. Collimator and TED exchange procedure Gaz and vacuum pump connection procedure Gaz and vacuum pump disconnection procedure Collimator and TED exchange procedure Technical measures Personal measures Collimator and TED See point 1. have been design to minimize dose exposure to personnel Circuit filling alarm monitoring system available Ramses system Condensate water evacuation Full tank alarm procedure monitoring system available Ramses system IPE + see point 1. Overhead crane handling Safety perimeter procedure (EDMS 1145906) - Handling by qualified overhead crane drivers Replacement of polluted Safety perimeter absolute filters procedure (EDMS 1154808) Handling by 2 qualified operators (EN/CV) in contaminated filters exchange IPE + see point 1. IPE Taped gloves Combinaison and protection mask P 3

Demonstrative part 5 Id Hazards Risks 14. Moving material Collision with lift in PA 7 people or equipment 15. TT 66 beam line - Collision with Electromagnetic equipment fields 16. TT 66 beam line - Internal exposure Vacuum Organisational measures Use of material lift by qualified personnel from transport EN/HE or subcontractor IS 36 – safety rule for the use of static magnetic fields at CERN (EDMS 335801) Mechanical analysis (EDMS 1108983) Technical measures Personal measures Material lift under veto RP IPE Access forbidden by access interlock (EDMS 1146079 + 1146094) Beam size measurement by BTV + additional C-C plate (see section 4) Main risks assessed: Ø Radiation Ø Beam Ø Vacuum Ø Fire Ø Environment Ø Decommissioning S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Risk Management Example 6 Stray radiation (external exposure) Design stage: � � � Organizational measures � � Frequent radiation survey of TNC tunnel Dedicated RP training ALARA, JOLI & DIMR preparation with all stakeholders On-site close RP monitoring Technical measures � � Fluka simulations CV and Ramses design Dedicated handling means (lifting jig and eyes) Prefabricated structure (easily removable) Activated material management plan Maintenance plan (reduced time in TNC) Airborne contamination decrease Access , ventilation and RP sectorization Ventilation system Ramses monitoring system Remote controlled PR 532 crane Personal measures � IPE, dosimeters, … Absolute Filter exchange Equipment remote handling S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Operation part 7 This part of the Hi. Rad. Mat Safety File is an inventory of all operational documents needed in order to optimize the exploitation of the project Hi. Rad. Mat especially in terms of safety. These operational documents are of three kinds: � Information note � Operational instructions and procedures � Control and test reports S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Operation part 8 Question Procedure EDMS How to get access authorized to the Hi. Rad. Mat facility ? Preparatory steps to take before accessing to Hi. Rad. Mat 1154948 How to get access to Hi. Rad. Mat Access procedure 1155061 How to escape from the facility ? Escape procedure 1153056 How to patrol the facility ? Patrol procedure 1152694 How to deal with activated material ? Activated material management procedure 1146265 How to handle alarms from HRM ? Alarm management procedure 1152693 How to maintain the facility ? Maintenance plan 1154793 How to deal with incidents ? Faulty situation and incident analysis 1154637 How to manage fire risk ? Fire prevention and fire risk management 1146217 S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Feedback part 9 This part of the Hi. Rad. Mat Safety File is an inventory of all feedbacks, mishap reports as well as experience gained reports which are very important to take into account in order to optimize the exploitation of the Hi. Rad. Mat facility especially in terms of safety. Document EDMS # REX T 9 modification 1146086 Comments on May 2011 TS (safety coordination) 1146084 Incident Sectorization gate PPG 6907 1154672 S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

EDMS approval process status 10 Document EDMS Status Deadline Safety file – descriptive part 1145711 Under Approval 20/07 Safety file – Hazard inventory 1145836 Draft for discussion 02/08 Safety file – demonstrative part 1145719 Engineering Check 03/08 Preparatory steps to take before accessing to Hi. Rad. Mat 1154948 In Work Personnel access to Hi. Rad. Mat 1155061 In Work Escape procedure 1153056 Under Approval 20/07 Patrol procedure 1152694 Under Approval 20/07 Activated material management procedure 1146265 Under Approval 26/07 Alarm management procedure 1152693 Under Approval 20/07 Maintenance plan 1154793 In Work Faulty situation and incident analysis 1154637 Under Approval 25/07 Fire prevention and fire risk management 1146217 Under Approval 30/07 S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Other recommendations from safety review 11 Risk and incidents with fire RISK ASSESSMENT CABLES = THE MAIN HAZARD PREVENTION MEASURES IN PLACE (FIRE DETECTION, EXTINGUISHING FIRE IN THE HIRADMAT FACILITY – OPERATION MODE MEANS, AIR TIGHTENING CAMPAIGN) � FIRE IN THE HIRADMAT FACILITY – SHUTDOWN MODE � Shutdown mode means that the situation is not under control: all the doors could be or are open in the facility and people are present underground, i. e. human lives are at stake. FIRE IN THE SPS � Operation mode means that the situation is under control: all the doors are closed in the facility and nobody is present underground, i. e. no human life in stake. A fire in the SPS could than affect the Hi. Rad. Mat facility. Therefore it is proposed to equip the door PPG 6905 (separating TCC 6 and TJ 7) with lock springs in order to ensure that the door is closed at all times and thus prevents smoke to enter into the Hi. Rad. Mat facility area. COLD SMOKE EXTRACTION S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Other recommendations from safety review 12 Escape ways to be defined Two escape ways are considered depending on where the event causing the evacuation is triggered. The recommended way is passing through TJ 7, then TA 7, PA 7 and return to the surface via the BA 7 access point via the staircases. If someone is blocked in TNC and cannot escape using this recommended way, an alternative way is in place via the B. 846 shaft. S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Other recommendations from safety review 13 B. 846 shaft safety assessment as escape way Top escape pit -The yellow balk under the plafond can be used as anker point, if it can bear a load of 35 k. N. (if this is not the case, 2 points should be constructed as the point halfway the pit. -Red telephone with direct contact to fire brigade (in function) -Door to exit, which can’t be locked by keys End of HIRADMAT experiment - AUG (clear visible next to the escape door) - Red telephone (clear visible next to the escape door) 2 visits on-site with FB FB safety assessment Modifications in progress (deadline = september) Bottom escape pit -Red telephone at the bottom of the pit (separated from HIRADMAT experiment), with direct contact to fire brigade - Entrance door, which can be opened in emergency without key. - (to discuss) Sign that explains that before the use of this shaft the FB must be informed and contact with FB is mandatory once the top has been reached. If desired FB can secure ascension. Halfway ladder escape pit -Anker points (2 points, one of 35 k. N above the shaft and one of 10 k. N above the ladder) - Possibility to remove fence - Possibility to close the hole to stairs S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Other recommendations from safety review Search procedure 14 SPS sector 6&7 Seal on PPG 710 B. 846 shaft patrolled only if seal broken or patrol box dropped S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Other recommendations from safety review 15 Abnormal conditions and accident scenarios The various incidents and faulty situations that can occur in operating the Hi. Rad. Mat facility have been identified and are listed here below: � Vacuum window failure � Beam loss incident � Ventilation failure � PR 532 crane failure � Contamination spread around the test bed S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Other recommendations from safety review 16 Define access conditions Access to BA 7/TA 7, TJ 7, TCC 6 tunnels � 17 steps or actions identified involving user, CCC operator, RP technician before access is granted Access to BA 7/material shaft � idem Access to BA 7/TNC tunnels � Idem + work notification and DIMR Checklist for End of Access in Hi. Rad. Mat S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Outcome 17 Safety file Thanks to the fruitful collaboration of many of you, a complete set of safety documents is ready for approval It is not only safety documentation but some hardware modifications were implemented and communication among safety stakeholders is improved (CCC operators, Fire Brigade, …) Ways of improvement: � Information is somehow fragmented one single user document needed � Demonstrative part to be more specific Safety file will evolve in the course of the facility operation S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27