Hempels philosophical behaviourism Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy co uk
Hempel’s philosophical behaviourism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk © Michael Lacewing
Philosophical behaviourism • A family of theories that claim that we can analyse mental concepts in terms of concepts that relate to the body, and in particular, the concept of ‘behaviour’ • Focus not on metaphysics – what exists – but on language – mental concepts – Before we do metaphysics of mind, we need conceptual analysis © Michael Lacewing
Methodological behaviourism • A theory about how a scientific psychology works (Watson, Skinner) – To be properly scientific, psychology must deal with what can be observed, not what cannot – Therefore, psychology should aim only at the explanation and prediction of behaviour without appealing to ‘inner’ mental states • A claim about science and about how we know about mental states © Michael Lacewing
Philosophical behaviourism • What we are talking about when we are talking about the mind and mental states is behaviour – Our psychological terms are about what people do, and how they react – ‘The mind’ is not a thing • Different kinds of philosophical behaviourism – Hempel: ‘logical’, ‘analytical’, ‘hard’ behaviourism – But sometimes ‘logical’ = ‘philosophical’! – Ryle: ‘soft’ behaviourism © Michael Lacewing
Hempel on meaning • What is the meaning of a scientific statement? – To know the meaning of a statement is to know the conditions under which we would call it true and those under which we would call it false – So ‘the meaning of a statement is established by the conditions of its verification’ = the observations that we can make to check its truth • First implication: if we can’t, in principle, empirically check the truth of the statement, it is meaningless © Michael Lacewing
Hempel on meaning • Second implication: two statements have the same meaning if they are both true or both false in the same conditions – They have the same conditions of verification • Third, we can translate a statement into a series of statements that simply describe the conditions of verification – Translation: a statement with the same meaning, but expressed in different words or concepts – E. g. a statement with the concept TEMPERATURE can be translated into a series of statements describing the observations we make to establish whether the first statement, using TEMPERATURE is true © Michael Lacewing
The meaning of psychological statements • The meaning of ‘Paul has a toothache’ (or any other psychological claim) is its conditions of verification – Unless we can verify it empirically, it will be meaningless • Conditions of verification: – ‘Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and such kinds. ’ [bodily behaviour] – ‘At the question “What is the matter? ”, Paul utters the words “I have a toothache”. ’ [linguistic behaviour] – ‘Closer examination reveals a decayed tooth with exposed pulp. ’ [physical bodily states] – ‘Paul’s blood pressure, digestive processes, the speed of his reactions, show such and such changes. ’ [physiological changes] – ‘Such and such processes occur in Paul’s central nervous system. ’ [brain processes] © Michael Lacewing
The meaning of psychological statements • So psychological statements can’t be about private states of the person – They only have meaning if they can be publicly checked – So they must be about physical and behaviour states • These conditions of verification give us the meaning of the psychological statement – The conditions of verification don’t tell us only how we know, but what psychological concepts mean • So psychological statements can be translated, without changing the meaning of what is said, into statements that only use physical concepts © Michael Lacewing
Implications • There is no ‘essence’ to mental states that distinguish them from what is physical – Talk of mental states just is talk of behaviour and physical bodily changes • So there is no question of the mind-body interaction • This is not eliminativism – rather than say mental states don’t exist, Hempel says that there is no real question of whether they exist – To say ‘pain exists’ or ‘there are beliefs’ is to say that we can make certain observations of the person’s behaviour © Michael Lacewing
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