Government and the Provision of Public Goods Public

Government and the Provision of Public Goods

Public Goods �Goods that are normally provided by Governments �Goods that are not provided by the private market or are insufficiently provided by the private market �Goods that are non-rivaled: consumption of good does not reduce availability of good for consumption by others �Goods that are non-exclusive: no one can be easily or effectively prohibited from using the good

Type of Goods Excludable Non-Excludable Rivalrous Private Goods: food, Clothing, cars, homes, furniture, toys Common goods: water, fish, hunting game Non-rivalous Collective good: Cable, Public Goods: Phone, Access to Internet National defense, national parks, clean air, clean oceans

Collective versus Individual Interests �Global Politics revolves around one key problem: �How can a group – such as two or more states – serve its collective interests when doing so requires its members to forego their national interests? � Example: Problem of global warning. Solving it can only be achieved by many countries acting together. �Collective goods problem � The problem of how to provide something that benefits all members of a group regardless of what each member contributes to it

Free Rider Problem �Free riders are those who consume more than their fair share of the public good yet do not contribute their fair share in providing it 1. National Defense: no one individual can be excluded from being defended by a state’s military forces 2. Public Parks: no one individual can be excluded from its use regardless of his/her contribution to its up-keep

Small Groups Versus Large Groups �In general, collective goods are easier to provide in small groups than large ones. �Small group: defection (free riding) is harder to conceal and has a greater impact on the overall collective good, and is easier to punish. �Collective goods problem occurs in all groups and societies �Particularly acute in global politics � No central authority such as a world government to enforce on individual nations the necessary measures to provide for the common good �Also acute for domestic politics of a state when de facto sovereignty is weak, the state is failed, or widespread corruption at the level of government

How can we assure that a Collective Good is Provided Internationally �Three basic principles offer possible solutions for this core problem of getting individuals or states to cooperate for the common good without a central authority to make them do so. �Dominance �Reciprocity �Identity

Table 1. 1

Dominance �Solves the collective goods problem by establishing a power hierarchy in which those at the top control those below � Status hierarchy � Symbolic acts of submission and dominance reinforce the hierarchy. � Hegemon �The advantage of the dominance solution � Forces members of a group to contribute to the common good � Minimizes open conflict within the group �Disadvantage of the dominance solution � Stability comes at a cost of constant oppression of, and resentment by, the lower-ranking members of the status hierarchy. � Conflicts over position can sometimes harm the group’s stability and well-being.

Reciprocity �Solves the collective goods problem by rewarding behavior that contributes to the group and punishing behavior that pursues self-interest at the cost of the group �Easy to understand can be “enforced” without any central authority �Positive and negative reciprocity �Disadvantage: It can lead to a downward spiral as each side punishes what it believes to be the negative acts of the other. � Generally people overestimate their own good intentions and underestimate those of opponents or rivals.

Identity �Identity principle does not rely on self-interest. �Members of an identity community care about the interests of others in the community enough to sacrifice their own interests to benefit others. �Family, extended family, kinship group roots, citizenship, ethnic/national identity �In domestic and international politics, identity communities play important roles in overcoming difficult collective goods problems. �Non-state actors also rely on identity politics.

Mancur Olsen and the Problem of Collective Action �The Logic of Collective Action (1968): Mancur Olson argued that people have no reason to join groups when the fruits of the group’s efforts are available to nonmembers as well as members. �F. ex. : Why should a worker join a union when the wage rise it negotiates goes to all employees? Why should a company pay a fee to join an industry association when the benefits the group obtains will help all the firms in that sector? �Smart move: to free-ride

Problem of Collective Action �Olson suggests that free riders do hinder collective organization. He argues that interest groups will only emerge in specific conditions. � Membership is compulsory: closed shop �When groups offer selective benefits, marked members only, rather than collective goods for the constituency at large �Olson’s analysis poses the problem of collective action—the difficulty of organizing rational actors to achieve what is in their collective interest.