Governance of Public Schools The formation and governance

Governance of Public Schools “The formation and governance of the public schools probably constitute the most important aspect of government used to improve the condition of humankind. ” Chapter 4

Education as a State Function n Essential attribute of state sovereignty. n Power to tax, exercise police power, provide for the welfare of the citizenry. n Governed by the democratic legislative process. n State constitution is fundamental in matters of education.

Plenary Power n Complete, absolute, unqualified. n In actuality…legislative power is subject to definite limits imposed by federal and state constitutions.

State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF LEGISLATIVE ENCROACHMENT ON A PERCEIVED RIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. STATE TEXTBOOK SELECTION IS CHALLENGED. FEW ISSUES ARE MORE CONTROVERSIAL THAN TEXTBOOKS AND THEIR SELECTION. HERE, THE STATUTE MANDATES HOW TEXTBOOKS SHALL BE OBTAINED AND DISTRIBUTED. PROCESS EXCLUDES SOME BOOK COMPANIES FROM SELLING BOOKS TO LOCAL DISTRICTS BUT DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE LAW. "EX REL. " OR EX RELATIONE, MEANS UPON RELATION OR INFORMATION. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OR DISTRICT ATTORNEY (OR OTHER PROPER PERSON) IN THE NAME OF, OR ON BEHALF OF, THE STATE AT THE INSTIGATION OF A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS A PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE MATTER.

Points to Raise: Clark v. Haworth 1. PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE MATTERS OF STATE, NOT LOCAL, JURISDICTION. THE AUTHORITY OVER SCHOOLS "IS NOT NECESSARILY A DISTRIBUTIVE ONE, TO BE EXERCISED BY LOCAL INSTRUMENTALITIES, BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS A CENTRAL POWER, RESIDING IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE. ” 2. CAN THE LEGISLATURE CHANGE ITS MIND? YES, THE LEGISLATIVE POWER IS NOT EXHAUSTED BY EXERCISE, IT MAY CHANGE ITS PLANS AS OFTEN AS IT DEEMS NECESSARY AND EXPEDIENT. 3. HOW DOES THE COURT JUSTIFY THE LODGING OF THE CENTRALIZED POWER TO CONTROL SCHOOLS IN THE LEGISLATURE? THE STATE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IT, BUT BEYOND THIS, THE COURT REASONS THAT THERE CANNOT BE "A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF COMMON SCHOOLS WITHOUT POWER LODGED SOMEWHERE TO MAKE IT UNIFORM, AND EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, THAT POWER MUST NECESSARILY RESIDE IN THE LEGISLATURE.

State and Local Educational Agencies STATES HAVE CREATED NETWORKS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES TO IMPLEMENT AND ADMINISTER THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE. IN MOST STATES, THE LEGISLATURE HAS CREATED A STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, WHICH MAY BE ELECTED OR APPOINTED TO PERFORM THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS RELATING TO EDUCATION. LEGISLATURES THEN CREATED LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND GIVEN THEM SPECIFIC POWERS TO OPERATE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS ON THE LOCAL LEVEL. LOCAL BOARDS ARE VESTED WITH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE, SINCE EACH MEMBER IS A STATE OFFICIAL.

Mc. Gilvra v. Seattle School Dist. No. 11921 n School Districts can exercise only those powers fairly implied or expressly granted by statute. n School districts have no inherent local powers. n Clinic is different from playground or gym…. foreign to traditional powers.

Points to Raise: 1. EMPHASIZE THE PROPOSITION OF LAW THAT GIVES POWER TO SCHOOL (OR MUNICIPAL) OFFICIALS TO OPERATE BY IMPLICATION 2. WHAT DOES THIS COURT MEAN WHEN IT SAYS THAT SCHOOL DISTRICTS, BECAUSE THEY ARE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, HAVE MORE LIMITED POWERS THAN CITIES, TOWNS, OR COUNTIES? SCHOOL DISTRICTS HAVE NO INHERENT LOCAL POWERS. AS AGENCIES OF THE STATE, THEY HAVE ONLY THOSE POWERS GIVEN TO THEM BY THE LEGISLATURE 3. WHY IS A CLINIC DIFFERENT FROM A PLAYGROUND OR GYMNASIUM? RENDERING OF MEDICAL, SURGICAL, OR DENTAL SERVICES IS SO FOREIGN TO THE POWERS TRADITIONALLY EXERCISED BY SCHOOL DISTRICTS THAT IT CANNOT BE IMPLIED AND MUST BE GIVEN IN EXPRESS LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE

Mc. Gilvra continued… 4. WE ARE ALL AWARE OF SCHOOL DISTRICT PROGRAMS THAT PROVIDE “CLINICAL” SERVICES TO CULTURALLY DEPRIVED AND HANDICAPPED STUDENTS. WHY IS THIS NOT ILLEGAL IN VIEW OF MCGILVRA? THE ANSWER IS THAT SUCH PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY EITHER STATE OR FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS, WHICH ALLOCATE MONIES FOR THESE PURPOSES. 5. A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION MAY EXERCISE THE FOLLOWING POWER AND NO OTHERS: (1) THOSE GRANTED IN EXPRESSED WORDS; (2) THOSE NECESSARILY OR FAIRLY IMPLIED; AND (3) THOSE ESSENTIAL TO THE PURPOSES OF THE CORPORATION. THESE POWERS APPLY EVEN MORE STRICTLY TO SCHOOL BOARDS SINCE THE CHARACTER OF A SCHOOL BOARD IS LIMITED.

Educational Agency Functions: n Legislative n Executive n Judicial

School Officers n In most states a superintendent is considered an employee.

School Boards n School board members are state…. not local officials. n School board functions are: 1. Discretionary. 2. Ministerial.

Quasi-Judicial Functions A SCHOOL BOARD ACTS AS A QUASIJUDICIAL AUTHORITY PERFORMING MANY FUNCTIONS: - DUE PROCESS HEARING TO DISMISS A TENURED TEACHER - STUDENT EXPULSIONS A FUNDAMENTAL TENET OF THESE QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTIONS IS TO

Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association ISSUE: WHETHER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS THIS SCHOOL BOARD FROM MAKING THE DECISION TO DISMISS TEACHERS ADMITTEDLY ENGAGED IN A STRIKE AND PERSISTENTLY REFUSING TO RETURN TO THEIR DUTIES. THE TEACHERS AND SCHOOL BOARD HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN BITTER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE TEACHERS ILLEGALLY WENT OUT ON STRIKE.

Points to Raise: 1. SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS DID NOT HAVE THE KIND OF PERSONAL OR FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE DECISION TO TERMINATE THE EMPLOYMENT OF TEACHERS WHO WERE ADMITTEDLY ENGAGED IN A STRIKE PROHIBITED BY STATE LAW, WHICH MIGHT CREATE CONFLICT OF INTEREST SUCH AS MIGHT PRECLUDE THE SCHOOL BOARD, ON DUE PROCESS GROUNDS, FROM MAKING THAT DETERMINATION. 2. THE RECORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SUCH PERSONAL ANIMOSITY ON THE PART OF SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS TOWARD TEACHERS WHO WERE ADMITTEDLY ENGAGING IN A STRIKE PROHIBITED BY STATE LAW AS MIGHT PRECLUDE THE SCHOOL BOARD, ON DUE PROCESS

Points to Raise continued… 3. Given that state statutes permitted the school board to dismiss striking teachers, and assuming that the board's decision was, in other respects, proper under state law, federal due process did not prevent the board from pursuing a course of action which was within its explicit statutory authority and which, in its judgment, would serve the best interest of the school system. The fact that the result may also have been desirable for other reasons was irrelevant to the due process issue. 4. Mere familiarity with the facts of the case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not disqualify it as the decision maker with respect to actions that assertedly affect the liberty or property rights of other.

Points to Raise continued… 5. Decision makers are not disqualified on due process grounds simply because they have taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, if there is no showing that the decision makers are not capable of judging the particular controversy fairly on the basis of their own circumstances. 6. The school board's prior role as negotiator with its teachers did not disqualify it on due process grounds from deciding that public interest in maintaining uninterrupted classrooms required the teachers, who were admittedly striking in violation of state law, to be discharged.

Points to Raise continued… 7. Permitting the school board to make a policy decision on whether teachers who admittedly engaged in the strike, prohibited by state law, should be discharged preserves the board's control over school district’s affairs and leaves balance of power over that aspect of labor relations where the state legislature has placed it. 8. Evidence did not demonstrate that the school board's decision to terminate the employment of teachers who were admittedly striking, in violation of state law, was affected by the type of bias which would disqualify the school board from making the decision, as a matter of due process.

Sioux City Community School District v. Iowa Department of Education PARENTS APPEALED A SCHOOL DISTRICT’S DECISION NOT TO PROVIDE BUS TRANSPORTATION FOR STUDENTS WHO LIVED LESS THAN TWO MILES FROM THEIR SCHOOL. THE AREA EDUCATION AGENCY (AEA) REVERSED. THE SCHOOL DISTRICT APPEALED. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AFFIRMED THE AEA'S DECISION, AND APPEAL WAS TAKEN. THE DISTRICT COURT FOR WOODBURY COUNTY AFFIRMED, AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT APPEALED. THE SUPREME COURT

Points to Raise: 1. TO CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, THE AGENCY ACTION MUST BE UNREASONABLE OR LACK RATIONALITY UNDER THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES. 2. THE AGENCY'S DECISION IS UNREASONABLE WHERE IT IS NOT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OR IS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THE LAW. 3. THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S DECISION TO NOT PROVIDE BUS TRANSPORTATION FOR STUDENTS WHO LIVED LESS THAN TWO MILES FROM THEIR SCHOOL WAS DISCRETIONARY IN NATURE BECAUSE THE LAW STATED THAT THE PROVISION OF TRANSPORTATION WAS DISCRETIONARY FOR STUDENTS LIVING LESS THAN TWO MILES FROM SCHOOL, AND PARENTS PROPERLY CHALLENGED THIS DISCRETIONARY DECISION PURSUANT TO THE STATUTE WHICH DIRECTS

Points to Raise: 4. The powers and duties of public office are measured by the terms and necessary implication of the grant of constitutional or statutory authority. Administrative boards, commissions, and officers have no common-law powers. 5. Where a statute provides for a review of a school district's discretionary action, the review, by necessary implication, is limited to determining whether the school district abused its discretion. No law gives the Department of Education authority to override the school district's ultimate decision because it determines the decision was wrong. 6. Because the school district has discretion in the provision of transportation and the Department of Education has authority to review decisions made pursuant to such discretion, its review is necessarily limited to the abuse of discretion standard.

Points to Raise: 7. In applying the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court looks only to whether a reasonable person could have found sufficient evidence to come to the same conclusion as reached by the school district, and in so doing, the appellate court will find a decision was unreasonable if it was not based upon substantial evidence or was based upon an erroneous application of the law. I. C. A. § 17 A. 19, subd. 10, par. f(1). 8. Neither the Supreme Court of Iowa nor the Department of Education may substitute its judgment for that of the school district. 9. The Department of Education exceeded its authority when, instead of reviewing the school district's decision for an abuse of discretion, the Department considered the entire record and concluded that the school district's discretionary decision not to provide the bus transportation was wrong.

Points to Raise: 10. The school district did not abuse its discretion when it decided not to provide the bus transportation, given that a reasonable person could have found substantial evidence supporting the school district's decision; a sidewalk was constructed by the city in compliance with all of the applicable laws and ordinances, the safety committee determined the traffic flow along road was regular but not excessive, and the speed of the traffic was not extreme, and committee noted the presence of very little traffic during the morning and afternoon hours when children would be using the sidewalk along the road. 11. Parents challenging the school district's discretionary decision were required to show that the school district's decision not to provide the bus transportation was unreasonable and lacked rationality.

School Board Meetings …common law principles concerning the conduct of school board meetings include school board procedures, executive sessions, voting, minutes, records, quorum, notice of meetings, and bylaws. Each state varies according to specific state statutes.

School Board Meetings n Must be held within geographic boundaries of the school district. n Executive sessions may be used for discussion but NOT action…action must take place in public. n Quorum. n Can act ONLY through their minutes.

Chapter 5 school boards; selection, qualification and salaries of members (22. 1 -28 thru 22. 1 -57. 5) 22. 1 -28 22. 1 -29. 1 22. 1 -30 22. 1 -31 22. 1 -32 22. 1 -33 22. 1 -34 22. 1 -35 22. 1 -36. 1 22. 1 -37 22. 1 -38. 1 consolida. . . 22. 1 -39 22. 1 -40 22. 1 -41 22. 1 -42 22. 1 -43 22. 1 -44 vacancie. . . 22. 1 -45 22. 1 -46 22. 1 -47 supervision of schools in each division vested in school board qualifications of members public hearing before appointment of school board members certain officers may not act on school board or serve as tie breaker oath salary of members special districts continued application of article school board selection commission composition of school board; to be appointed by commission composition of school board in certain cases notice by commission of meeting for appointment terms of members of school board provisions for school board where division consolidated as result of certain governmental vacancies in school board appointment of tie breaker application of article referendum on changing method of selection of members of school board abolition of school board selection commission appointment of school board members and tie breaker by county governing body; terms; referendum to revert to appointment by school board selection commission limitation on time of holding subsequent referendum composition of boards; appointment and terms; tie breaker

Chapter 7 General Powers and Duties of School Boards (22. 1 -71 thru 22. 1 -87) 22. 1 -71 SCHOOL BOARD CONSTITUTES BODY CORPORATE; CORPORATE POWERS 22. 1 -72 ANNUAL ORGANIZATIONAL MEETINGS OF SCHOOL BOARDS 22. 1 -73 QUORUM 22. 1 -74 MINUTES OF MEETINGS 22. 1 -75 PROCEDURE IN CASE OF TIE VOTE 22. 1 -76 CHAIRMAN; CLERK; VICE-CHAIRMAN; DEPUTY CLERK; TERMS; COMPENSATION AND BONDS OF CLERK AND DEPUTY CLE. . . 22. 1 -77 DUTIES OF CLERK 22. 1 -78 BYLAWS AND REGULATIONS 22. 1 -79 POWERS AND DUTIES 22. 1 -79. 1 OPENING OF THE SCHOOL YEAR; APPROVALS FOR CERTAIN ALTERNATIVE SCHEDULES 22. 1 -79. 2 UNIFORMS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS; BOARD OF EDUCATION GUIDELINES 22. 1 -79. 3 POLICIES REGARDING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES 22. 1 -80 DEVELOPMENT OF PARK AREAS ADJACENT TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 22. 1 -81 ANNUAL REPORT 22. 1 -82 EMPLOYMENT OF COUNSEL TO ADVISE OR DEFEND SCHOOL BOARDS AND OFFICIALS; PAYMENT OF COSTS, EXPENSES A. . . 22. 1 -83 PAYMENT OF EMPLOYEE'S LEGAL FEES AND EXPENSES 22. 1 -84 INSURANCE 22. 1 -85 FUND FOR PAYMENT OF HOSPITAL, MEDICAL, ETC. , SERVICES PROVIDED OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENT. . . 22. 1 -86 MEETINGS OF PEOPLE OF SCHOOL DIVISION; LOCAL COMMITTEES 22. 1 -86. 1 APPOINTMENT OF STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES TO LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS 22. 1 -87 JUDICIAL REVIEW

§ 22. 1 -32. Salary of members. A. Any elected school board may pay each of its members an annual salary that is consistent with the salary procedures and no more than the salary limits provided for local governments in Article 1. 1 (§ 15. 2 -1414. 1 et seq. ) of Chapter 14 of Title 15. 2 or as provided by charter. However, any elected school board of a school division comprised of a county having the county manager plan of government, as provided in § 15. 2 -702. 1 may, after a public hearing pursuant to notice in the manner provided in subdivision 8 of § 22. 1 -79, set the annual salary of its members at no more than $25, 000, except that the annual salary of the chairman, vice-chairman, or both, may exceed $25, 000. B. The appointed school board of the following counties may pay each of its members an annual salary not to exceed the limits hereinafter set forth: Accomack - $3, 000. 00; Alleghany - $1, 500. 00; Amherst - $2, 200. 00; Brunswick - $1, 800. 00; Cumberland - $3, 600. 00; Essex - $1, 800. 00; Greensville - $1, 800. 00; Hanover - $8, 000. 00; Isle of Wight - $4, 000. 00; Northampton - $3, 000. 00; Prince Edward - $2, 400. 00; Richmond - $5, 000. 00; Southampton - $5, 300. C. The appointed school board of the following cities and towns may pay each of its members an annual salary not to exceed the limits hereinafter set forth: Charlottesville - $3, 000. 00; Covington - $1, 500. 00; Danville - $600. 00; Emporia - $240. 00; Fries - $240. 00; Hopewell - $3, 600. 00; Lexington - $600. 00; Lynchburg - $2, 400. 00; Manassas Park - $3, 000. 00; Martinsville - $2, 400. 00; Norfolk - $3, 000. 00; Poquoson - $3, 000. 00; Roanoke - $4, 200. 00; Salem - $4, 800. 00; South Boston - $600. D. Any school board may, in its discretion, pay the chairman of the school board an additional salary not exceeding $2, 000 per year upon passage of an appropriate resolution by (i) the school board whose membership is elected in whole or in part or (ii) the governing body of the appropriate county, city, or town whose school board is comprised solely of appointed members. E. Any school board may in its discretion pay each of its members mileage for use of a private vehicle in attending meetings of the school board and in conducting other official business of the school board. Its members may be reimbursed for private transportation at a rate not to exceed that which is authorized for persons traveling on state business in accordance with § 2. 2 -2825. Whatever rate is paid, however, shall be the same for school board members and employees of the board. F. No appointed school board shall request the General Assembly's consideration of an increase in its annual salary limit as established in subsections B and C of this section unless such school board has taken an affirmative vote on the requested increase. Further, no elected school board shall be awarded a salary increase, unless, upon an affirmative vote by such school board, a specific salary increase shall be approved. Local school boards shall adopt such increases according to the following procedures: